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Abstract: Managed care plan subscribers in need of emergency medical treatment often 
face unduly restrictive plan practices. These practices may result in life-threatening injury or 
significant financial obligations on the part of plan subscribers. They are the result of a 
managed health care system that is inadequately regulated and overly concerned with cost 
control. Economic incentives lead plans to deny approval for emergency medical treatment 
or to deny retroactively coverage for such treatment. Emergency medical providers also are 
harmed by these practices, often forced to treat patients under federal law but denied 
payment for their services. This Article describes this problem in more detail and argues that 
the existing legal framework for preventing and addressing harms to managed care 
subscribers due to denial of emergency medical care or coverage is wholly insufficient. 
Moreover, the author argues that current law leads to an unjust apportionment of the cost of 
emergency care among providers, subscribers, and plans and that federal legislation to 
address these injustices is necessary. The Article critically examines the ability of the 
proposed Federal Access to Emergency Medical Services Act to protect consumers from 
harms due to plan denial of approval for emergency medical treatment and fairly apportion 
the cost of emergency care among the relevant stakeholders without significantly increasing 
health care costs. It advocates the passage of the Act with minor revisions. 
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Dear Doctor: 
I'm writing to you because of my experience with my liMO. Let me 
start with a history of my situation .... I have a blood disorder 
called anticoagulant lupus. This causes my blood to clot easily. I 
have had about 6 clots in my legs. I am 24 and have been on 
coumadin since I was 18. One evening [two months ago] I was 
experiencing some numbness and loss of circulation in my wrist 
and hand. Considering my particular problems I was concerned 
and called my HMO. Because it was after hours I talked with the 
[physician] on call. I told him my history and explained the 
problem. He told me that it probably was not a blood clot and to 
follow-up with my regular doctor in the morning. After discussing 
it with my family, we decided not to risk it and went to the 
emergency room at [a nearby hospital]. When I got there, I filled 
out the usual paperwork. When the hospital called my HMO to get 
approval, the doctor on call asked to speak with me. He said he 
thought he had explained to me that he did not feel it was a clot. I 
asked him if he was positive it wasn't a clot. He said no he was not, 
but he really felt it probably wasn't. He also told me that the only 
way he would approve this emergency visit was if it turned out to 
be a clot. If not, it was up to me to pay the bill. Fortunately, it was 
not a clot, but now I have a medical bill which I feel my HMO 
should pay for. Why was that doctor willing to risk my health? 
Isn't it better to be safe than sorry? I am very disturbed by this 
practice. I work and pay for my insurance. I feel I am entitled to 
the best care that they can [provide]. 
A Dissatisfied HMO Member1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
In an effort to control costs, many managed health care plans require 
that their members obtain authorization before seeking care in a hospital 
emergency department (ED). Some members claim they have been 
unable to reach their plans during emergencies2 or have been denied 
1. Letter from HMO patient to David S. Davis, M.D., J.D., Chair, Public Policy Committee, 
Maryland Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians (Sept. 6, 1993) (punctuation 
altered) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
2 See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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prior authorization inappropriately.3 Others claim their plans have 
retroactively denied coverage for emergency care.4 These practices may 
be endangering the lives and health of managed care subscribers as well 
as inappropriately shifting costs of emergency care from plans to 
patients or, more often, to EDs. 
Administrators of managed care plans argue that the cost of 
emergency care is very high and that the services provided are often 
unnecessary.5 In many cases, they say, patients can wait to see a plan 
physician for treatment. 6 Emergency care providers and some consumer 
groups counter that managed care plans are taking advantage of hospital 
EDs.7 The plan managers know that, under the Federal Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA),8 all hospitals offering 
emergency services must screen all persons who come to the hospital to 
determine if an emergency exists and, if so, must provide them with 
treatment until they are stabilized, whether or not they can pay for the 
treatment.9 Therefore, a plan member who goes to a hospital offering 
emergency services must be screened and stabilized, even if the member 
could not obtain prior plan authorization for the emergency care. 10 
These practices create significant dilemmas for both patients and ED 
providers. For example, consider the patient who experiences chest pain 
in the middle of the night and cannot reach his or her managed care plan 
3. See, e.g., Loren A. Johnson & Robert W. Derlet, Conflicts Between Managed Care 
Organizations and Emergency Departments in California, 164 W. J. Med. 137, 139 (1996) ("Using 
the rationale that the claim can always be reviewed and paid later, if necessary, [managed care 
plans] have been known to publish policies advocating the routine denial of 'treatment 
authorization,' and, in some instances, patients with obvious life·threatening conditions have been 
denied authorization."). 
4. Id. 
5. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra note 76. 
7. See, e.g., Letter from David S. Davis, M.D., J.D., Chair, Public Policy Committee, Maryland 
Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians, to Governor Parris Glendening (May 9, 
1995) (regarding "HMOs-Reimbursement-Services in Hospital Emergency Facilities," H.B. 615, 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995)) (on file with Washington Law Review). Plans often send their members (or 
desire that their members go) to the ED even when their condition is not of an emergency nature. 
Reasons why this might be done are convenience to HMO providers who have abbreviated hours, 
financial incentives to physicians paid on a capitation basis, lack of specialists within the HMO 
network, fear of misdiagnosis of high risk cases, and cost shifting to patient and ED. I d. at 1-2. 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, dd (1994). 
9. § 1395dd(a), (b). 
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h); see also Helen Lippman, The Games Plans Play withER Bills, 
14 Bus. & Health 20,21 (June 1996) (quoting Lauren Dame, attorney and co·author of report on 
patient dumping for Public Citizen Health Research Group, as stating that federal mandate is "one 
of the reasons HMOs can get away with refusing to pay" for ED visits). 
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for "preapproval" for out-of-network care. The patient, ·mcertain as to 
whether the pain is indigestion or a heart attack, must choose between 
waiting perhaps an hour or more trying to contact the managed care 
plan, potentially risking health or life, or going imm(~diately to the 
closest emergency facility. At the ED, the physician may attempt to 
reach the patient's plan again and, if the plan does not respond, the 
patient may still be reluctant to be treated, concerned that the plan may 
not pay the bill if the condition is not determined to be an emergency.11 
Emergency physicians feel tom because, on the one hand, EMTALA and 
their own professional ethics require them to perform the diagnostic 
exam and tests needed to rule out heart trouble. 12 On the other hand, 
emergency physicians also are sensitive both to a patient's reluctance to 
be strapped with a large ED bill for tests that will not be covered by 
insurance, and to the possibility that if the patient cannot pay the bill, 
they and the hospital will incur the costs of the patient's care. 13 
At least twelve states recently have enacted legislation that attempts 
to remedy this situation by eliminating some of the obstacles managed 
care plans have placed in the way of members seeking emergency care, 
and/or by making it more likely that plans will reimburse patients or 
providers for ED treatment.14 Bills attempting to address this issue also 
have been introduced in Congress.15 
11. Other examples of conditions that may appear to a layperson to be an. emergency, but on 
retrospective review may not be, include: 
1. A young woman with pelvic pain, who fears she may have a miscarriage, bleeding ovarian 
cyst, tubal pregnancy or infection. 
2. A patient with an unusual and severe headache, with vomiting and arm numbness. 
3. A patient with 12 hours of vomiting, diarrhea and abdominal cramps, not better despite the 
phone advice of the HMO. 
4. A patient who fell and cannot use her arm. 
5. A middle-aged patient with chest pain and trouble breathing, whose father died of a heart 
attack. 
Maryland Chapter of the Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Fact Sheet on H.B. 1203 and S.B. 
701 (Aug. 23, 1993). If, on ultimate diagnosis, these conditions respectively tum out to be (1) a 
urinary tract infection; (2) a migraine headache; (3) viral gastroenteritis or food poisoning; (4) a 
wrist sprain; or (5) chest wall pain or esophageal reflux, they may not be covered by the HMO. /d. 
12. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, Emergency Doctors Faced with Catch-22 as 
HMOs Impede Access to Emergency Care, 11 Health Letter I (Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe ed., Feb. 1995) 
[hereinafter Health Letter]. 
13. /d. at 2. 
14. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 20-821,-923,-1068,-1137,-2801 to -2804 (West Supp. 1996); 
Ark. Code Arin. § 20-9-309 (Michie Supp. 1996); Cal. Health & Safety Cod~§ 1371.4 (Deering 
Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 641.513 (West Supp. 1997); Ga Code Ann. §§ 31-11-80 to -82 
(1996); Ga Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-1 to -10, 33-21-1, -13, -18 (Supp. 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 22:2018(DX1) (West 1995); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II §§ 19-705.1(b}, -712.5, -716 (Supp. 
1996); Va Code Ann.§ 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996); W. Va Code§ 33-25A-8d (Supp. 1996); 
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This Article explores the conflict between managed care and 
emergency care in detail, first analyzing it from the perspective of the 
various stakeholders-the managed care industry, the consumer, and the 
ED provider. In Part ill, the Article examines the root causes of the 
conflict, focusing on (1) the clash between managed care philosophy and 
the nature of emergency care and (2) the allegation of "inappropriate" 
ED use. Part IV describes and analyzes the limitations of proposed 
solutions to the problem, including the limitations of reliance on the 
market, the courts, and recent state statutes. The last section of the 
Article, Part V, argues for a federal solution to the conflict16 and 
critiques the ability of proposed federal legislation to address adequately 
the problem in a way that discourages unnecessary emergency care but 
does not significantly increase health care costs or penalize patients who 
are truly in need of emergency services. 
II. THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS 
A. The Managed Care Industry 
1. An Overview 
With an eye toward controlling the rising cost of health care, this 
country has boldly embraced the concept of managed care.17 Employers 
Act of Apr. 14, 1996, § 13, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 169; New York Regulation of the Delivery of 
Managed Care Act, S. 7553, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996); Pennsylvania Hospital 
Emergency Insurer Reimbursement Act, 1996 Pa. Legis. Serv. 112 (West). Some states, such as 
Minnesota and Texas, have attempted to address the issue through regulations. See Minn. R. 
4685.1010 (1996); 25 Tex. Admin. Code, tit. 28, §§ 119.51, 119.52, 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 
3.3704 (1996). Another half dozen states are considering legislation to address the problem. See 
Milt Freudenheim, HMO's Cope With a Backlash on Cost Cutting, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1996, at 
AI. 
15. Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, H.R. 815, 105th Cong. (1997); Access 
to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S. 356, 105th Cong. (1997); Access to Emergency 
Medical Services Act of 1995, H.R. 2011, 104th Cong. (1995); Access to Emergency Medical 
Services Act of 1995, S. 1233, 104th Cong. (1995); Graham Amendment No. 3014 to S. 1357, 
104th Cong., 141 Cong. Rec. S16,007, S16,130 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995); see infra note 249. 
16. The argument assumes that existing relevant federal statutes-EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1395cc, dd (1994}, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA}, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 
(1994)-will not be repealed or amended in the near future. 
17. Studies have shown that managed care has slowed the growth of health care costs in the 
private market. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems 
and Antitrust, 19 Cornell L. Rev. 1507, 1514 (1994) (''There is widely-accepted evidence that 
associates managed care with significant cost savings as compared to fee-for-service or traditional 
indemnity insurance."). Greaney cites numerous reports confirming this statement but also qualifies 
the statement by clarifying that different managed care organization forms "vary significantly in 
their capacity to control costs." /d. at 1514. For example, empirical studies reveal that HMOs and 
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and states (through their Medicaid programs)18 are rapidly moving 
individuals into managed care plans. In addition, over four million 
Medicare patients (twelve percent of the Medicare population) have 
joined managed care plans.19 
Although managed care has no precise definition, it refers to 
"programs that attempt to control the utilization as well as the pricing of 
health care services."20 In doing so, managed care plans often limit the 
independent practice associations (!PAs) achieve appreciably greater cost recuctions than preferred 
provider organizations (PPOs) and IPA point-of-service systems.Id.; see aL;o Editorial, Managed 
Care Beats Medicare Any Day, Bus. Wk., Feb. 27, 1995, at 136. 
IS. As of March 1996, 71% of the nation's employees in companies with 10 or more workers 
were enrolled in managed care plans. Steven Findlay & Wendy J. Meyeroff, Health Costs: Why 
Employers Won Another Round, Bus. & Health, Mar. I996, at 49, 49-50. As of mid-1995, 
approximately 28% of the Medicaid population nationwide was enrolled in managed care plans. 
Office of Managed Care, Health Care Fin. Admin., National Summary of MEdicaid Managed Care 
Programs and Enrollment, tbl. II (Sept. 20, I996) (listing percentage as of June 20, 1995) (on file 
with Washington Law Review). Most state efforts to move their Medicaid population into managed 
care plans have involved only a portion of the state's Medicaid population and are considered 
regional "demonstration projects." See The Nat'! lnst. of Health Care Management, States as 
Payors: Managed Care for Medicaid Populations, at ES-4 (Feb. 1995). However, at least 14 states 
have received approval from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for a state-wide 
demonstration project to move most of their Medicaid population (with the exception of the 
disabled and long-term care population) into managed care. See Peter Ma·~Pherson, Measure by 
measures: A Commercial Version of HEDIS Has Been Adapted for Use by Medicaid, but It's 
Weaknesses May Outweigh-And Outlast, Hosp. & Health Networks, Mar. 20, I996, at 53, 53. 
A recent study synthesizing over IOO reports, studies, and articles on Medicaid managed care 
found that Medicaid managed care plans can produce savings of between S% and 15% over fee-
for-service plans. The Kaiser Comm'n on the Future of Medicaid, News Release: Study Finds That 
Medicaid Managed Care Can Save Money and Improve Access but Big Cost Savings are Unlikely 
(May 3I, I995) (on file with Washington Law Review). However, the study also found that the 
overall savings potential from Medicaid managed care is limited because mznaged care enrollment 
in most states is restricted to the least costly of the Medicaid population gro·Jps-children and low 
income adults who account for only 23% of total Medicaid spending.Id.; see also Fred Schulte & 
Jenni Bergal, Doubts Raised About HMO Savings, Sun Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 26, 
I995, at 7A (casting doubt on state health officials' claim that Florida has saved as much as $50 
million per year in Medicaid costs by shifting beneficiaries to HMOs). 
19. Health Care Fin. Admin., Monthly Medicare Managed Care Contr.zct Report l (Sept. l, 
I996) (stating that actual number of enrollees as of Sept. I, 1996 was 4,:548,113) (on file with 
Washington Law Review). 
20. Michael G. MacDonald eta!., Health Care Law: A Practical Guide § 6.05[3][c][iii], at 6-36 
(I994); see also George W. Rimier & Richard D. Morrison, The Ethical Impacts of Managed Care, 
I2 J. Bus. Ethics 493, 493 (1993) ("Managed care is a term in common use-but often used 
without precision-to refer to forms of health benefits coverage and health s·~rvice delivery that are 
alternatives to traditional fee-for-service medicine."). Rimier and Morrison compiled other 
definitions of managed health care from several authoritative sources: 
Managed care is a comprehensive approach to health care delivery that en:ompasses planning, 
education, monitoring, coordinating, and controlling quality, access, and cost considering the 
interests of patients, providers, and payors. American Managed Care and Review Association. 
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number of providers who service beneficiaries, negotiate favorable 
prices from those providers for the right to participate in the managed 
care plan, and require each beneficiary to have his or her health care 
needs screened by a primary care physician (PCP), often called a 
gatekeeper.21 "Capitation" is often a primary feature of managed care 
plans. Under a capitation arrangement, a health care facility or physician 
agrees to provide all or nearly all of the health care needs of a defined 
patient population for a flat amount that is fixed in advance. By limiting 
or fixing total revenues in relation to the total health care needs of a 
specific group of beneficiaries, the facility has a great economic 
incentive to limit utilization and the content of the health care product.22 
Managed care plans vary greatly. A number 'of authors have described 
them as existing along a continuum from "least managed" to "most 
managed."23 On the "most managed" end are closed panel or staff model 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in which members must see 
plan physicians who typically are salaried and operate out of a central 
facility.24 On the "least managed" end are traditional indemnity plans 
with a few managed care features, as well· as preferred provider 
• . • A variety of interventions in health care delivery and financing intended to 
eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate care and to reduce cost, including: reviewing and 
intervening in decisions about health services to be provided, either prospectively or 
retrospectively; limiting or influencing patients' choice of providers; and negotiating different 
payment tenns or levels with providers. Congressional Budget Office. 
Managed care is a set of techniques used by or on behalf of purchasers of health 
benefits to manage health care costs by influencing patient care decision-making through case-
by~e assessment of the appropriateness of care prior to its provision. Institute of 
Medicine/National Academy of Sciences. 
!d. at 494 (footnotes omitted). 
21. MacDonald et al., supra note 20. 
22 !d. § 7.02(2Xf), at 7-15; see also David Segal, A Closer Look at Plan English, Fine Print in 
HMO Contracts Spurs Lawsuits, Legislation Requiring Clarity on What's Covered, Wash. Post, 
Mar. 27, 1996, at Fl. 
23. See, e.g., Peter R. Kongstvedt, Essentials of Managed Care 25 (1995); R. Danielle Federa & 
Tracey L. Camp, The Changing Managed Care Market, in Managed Care 3, 3 (Seth B. Goldsmith 
ed., 1995). 
24. See Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 25. According to Federa and Camp: 
[These more "managed" models are more likely to have] formalized utilization review 
monitoring procedures, provider utilization profiling, and peer review; more selective provider 
subpanels, frequently including a group setting of physicians or staff providers; less freedom 
or no freedom in consumer choice of providers .•• ; more comprehensive coverage, including 
preventive care with little consumer out-of-pocket expense; and more shifting of risk to the 
provider (e.g., capitation) or salaried arrangements rather than fee-for-service. 
Federa & Camp, supra note 23, at 3. 
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organizations (PPOs). In a PPO, the plan provides its members with 
incentives to use designated health care providers (prefe:rred providers). 
Members also may use non-preferred providers but typically must pay a 
higher cost for their services. 25 In general, all models share a number of 
common cost containment features including provider selection, 26 access 
procedures, physician financial incentives, and peer and utilization 
review.27 However, the specifics of each of these features differ from 
plan to plan. 
2. Competitive Pressures 
The competitive environment in which managed care plans operate 
has intensified dramatically in many regions of the cmmtry in the last 
few years.28 In the market for employer contracts, where the competition 
is most fierce, plans are competing primarily on the basis ofprice.29 This 
means that plans must cut premiums and, to remain profitable, must 
operate more efficiently, negotiate favorable contracts with providers, 
and cut unnecessary costs where possible. The most important factors 
cited by managed care administrators for turning a profit include low 
hospital utilization, favorable contracts with hospitals, control of 
administrative costs, and increased enrollment.3° For many plans, 
however, the intense nature of the competition has meant profit declines, 
and survival has required a store of capital, typically available only to 
the larger and for-profit plans.31 Thus, competitive pressures are forcing 
plans to become bigger and, if they have not done so aJieady, to switch 
to for-profit status.32 Incentives to cut costs created by the excessive 
competition within the industry also have created a backlash among 
25. See Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 25. 
26. Provider selection means that plans rather than members choose the physicians that members 
can see. These physicians are part of a ''provider panel" or "network" and a.--e selected, in part, for 
their ability to limit unnecessacy health care expenditures. See Linda J. Havlin & Larry J. Tucker, 
Managed Care Benefit Design, in Making Managed Health Care Work 265, 270 (Peter Boland ed., 
1993). 
27. See infra Part II.A.3.a. 
28. See John Lombardo, Fever Pitch Competition has Managed-Care Companies Fighting to 
Stay on Top, Wash. Bus. J., May 31, 1996, at 19. 
29. William H. Nelson, Customers Demand Managed Care, 49 Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 10, 10 
(1995). 
30. Michael Pretzer, The Managed-Care Juggernaut: Explosive Growth Nationwide, Med. 
Econ., Apr. 15, 1996, at 64, 69. 
31. Lombardo, supra note 28. 
32 Pretzer, supra note 30, at 74. A number of analysts predict that ultimately the market will 
consist of only a "handful oflarge regional managed-care players." Lombardo, supra note 28. 
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consumers and state legislators in favor of consumer protections from 
managed care plans.33 
3. Keeping the Lid on Expenditures 
Internally, plans attempt to control costs in large part by managing or 
controlling provider behavior so that providers will make cost-effective 
decisions in the care and treatment of the plan's members. Perhaps one 
of the most controversial aspects of some managed care models are 
financial incentives to member physicians to increase efficiency and 
productivity. These incentives take the form of bonuses or "salary 
withholds."34 For example, in some plans, physicians may receive 
bonuses for keeping patients out of the hospital, ordering fewer tests and 
procedures for their patients, and lowering the use of expensive 
specialists. 35 
a. Utilization Review 
Another mechanism common to managed care plans to ensure that 
care provided is cost-effective is utilization review (UR). UR consists of 
an evaluation of ''the necessity and appropriateness of medical care."36 It 
is based, in part, on the assumption that "careful review of medical care 
can eliminate wasteful, unnecessary ... or harmful care.'m Although UR 
has been used in traditional indemnity plans, its use in the managed care 
setting is distinctive: 
In contrast to traditional insurance plans and Medicare, which 
generally rely on retrospective review, [many managed care plans] 
decide whether to reimburse care prospectively and concurrently. 
The reviewer may be the [plan] itself or a third party contractor 
(commonly a for-profit company). First-level reviewers are usually 
33. See Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 New Eng. 
J. Med. 1601, 1601 (1996) ("In 1996 alone, 1000 pieces of legislation attempting to regulate or 
weaken HMOs were introduced in state legislatures, and 56 laws were passed in 35 states."). 
34. See Segal, supra note 22. 
35. See Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed Care 
Organizations, 23 J. L. Med. & Ethics 223, 224 (1995); see also Bodenheimer, supra note 33, at 
1602 (''The trend in managed care is toward the 'capitation-plus-bonus' method of paying 
physicians. High-profile managed-care consultants suggest that physicians, whose use of hospitals 
and expensive ambulatory care services is low receive 30 to 50 percent of their income in 
bonuses.'') (footnotes omitted). · 
36. Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law 322 (1995). 
37. Id. 
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non-physicians who apply plan-specific criteria for medical 
necessity and determine whether to authorize a particular 
procedure ordered by the treating physician.38 
If the first level reviewers are uncertain as to how to rule on a request for 
coverage, they "may refer a case to a physician advisor before denying 
authorization for treatment."39 
b. The Gatekeeper and Prior Approval 
In addition to the UR process, many plans also pro,::edurally limit 
access to care by requiring physician or plan preauthorization for certain 
kinds of care or treatment. Typically care or treatment subject to 
preauthorization includes hospitalization, specialty car.e, and use of 
ancillary services. Without preauthorization from a primary care 
physician (PCP) or other plan representative, the plan ¥.ill not pay for 
the services or will reimburse at a substantially reduced rate.40 A 
preauthorization system is considered key to managing costs in most 
managed care plans. Authorities on managed care assert that there are 
many reasons for an authorization requirement: 
One is to allow the medical management function of the plan to 
review a case for medical necessity. A second reason is to channel 
care to the most appropriate location (e.g., the outpath;:nt setting or 
to a participating specialist rather than a nonparticipating one). 
Third, the authorization system may be used to provide timely 
38. Susan J. Stayn, Comment, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations: 
Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1674, 1680-81 
(1994) (footnotes omitted). 
39. /d. at 1681. 
40. Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 184. In an HMO, payment can be completely denied for 
failure to obtain required preauthorization. In most PPOs, however, if a subscriber does not obtain 
required preauthorization of a covered benefit, payment may not be denied, only significantly 
reduced. For example: 
[A plan may pay] 90% of charges for authorized services but only 50% of charges for 
nonauthorized services or perhaps impose[ ] a flat dollar amount penalty for failure to obtain 
authorization .•.. In a PPO where a contractual relationship exists bet.veen the provider 
physician and the plan, the penalty may fall solely on the provider, who may not balance bill 
the member for the amount of the penalty. In the case of ..• a PPO in which the member 
received services from a nonparticipating provider[ ], the penalty falls on the member, who 
must then pay more out of pocket. 
/d. 
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information to the concurrent utilization review system and to 
large case management.41 
Plans differ in terms of exactly what services will require prior 
authorization. The more tightly controlled the system, the more services 
that require preauthorization and the greater the plan's ability to manage 
utilization. Plans also differ in terms of who may authorize use of 
services outside of the plan. In plans that are tightly controlled, the 
patient's PCP must authorize the service.42 In more loosely controlled 
plans, authorization may also come from plan personnel and not solely 
from the PCP or another physician.43 
For non-emergency care, the preauthorization role of the physician 
and that ofUR often overlap.44 In the context of emergency care, the two 
functions generally remain separate as there is often no time to consult 
UR for a decision before care is received. As a result, the plan or 
physician decision whether or not to preauthorize treatment precedes the 
UR determination. The UR determination typically is made 
retrospectively, and that determination is the basis for deciding whether 
the patient's care will be covered by the managed care plan. 
4. Emergency Care: Controlling Access and Denying Reimbursement 
As stated above, emergency care is one area that managed care plans 
often try to restrict. In part, this is because "ED visits generate higher 
charges [to plans] than comparable visits to physicians,'>4s and because, 
41. !d. at 182. 
42 However, authorization may be required from the plan's medical director for very 
"expensive procedures such as transplants and for controversial procedures that may be considered 
experimental or of limited value except in particular circumstances." /d. at 183. 
43. !d. A study offederally-qualified HMOs found that in 41% of the plans surveyed, approval 
for ED use had to be obtained from a physician. Hany Davidson, Access to Emergency 
Departments: A Survey of HMO Policies, 18 Annals Emergency Med. 274, 276 (1989). In the other 
plans (59%), approval could be obtained from other plan employees such as nurses, emergency 
medical technicians, or administrative personnel. /d. 
44. In fact, some see UR in that context as the usurpation of the medical judgment of the 
attending physician. See Helene L. Parise, Comment, The Proper Extension of Tort Liability 
Principles in the Managed Care Industry, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 977, 983-84 (1991) (noting that one 
view ofUR is that it acts "as the effective 'practice of medicine' under which the medical judgment 
of the attending health care professional is confirmed, modified or rejected by the persons 
implementing the [UR] plan") (quoting Gazy Scott Davis, Managed Health Care Primer, 
Introduction to National Health Lawyers Ass'n, The Insider's Guide to Managed Care: A Legal 
and Operational Framework 31 (1990)). 
45. Gazy P. Young et al., Ambulatory V"ISits to Hospital Emergency Departments: Patterns and 
Reasons for Use, 216 JAMA 460,460 (1996). High costs of care in an ED are attributed to: 
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in some cases, emergency care at a hospital is not necessary. Some 
patients, for example, inappropriately use EDs for thei:r primary care 
needs. Plan administrators also are concerned about the "hidden costs" 
associated with ED use. In the ED, care is typically provided by the ED 
medical staff, and if the patient needs to be admitted he or she may be 
assigned to a physician who is not participating in the managed care 
plan. When that happens, the plan loses control of the care of the patient 
and the cost associated with that care.46 Some managed care advocates 
argue further that "[p]atients admitted to the ED are a 'caJ?tive audience' 
subject to any costly diagnostic test or treatment that the emergency 
physician chooses to order. The emergency physician has no incentive to 
control costs and will in fact make more money if excessive testing is 
done.'>47 
Plan managers say ''their costs could run out of control if they 
allowed patients unlimited access to hospital emergency rooms.'>48 The 
mechanisms used by managed care plans to control ED utilization vary 
[A]cquiring and maintaining (1) expensive specialized equipment used in the ED and (2) 
highly trained ED staff for 24 hours a day. A 1992 report on nine states ..• found that the 
average charges for treatment of a nonurgent condition in an ED were from one to five times 
the average charge for a Medicaid visit to a clinic or physician's office in the- community. 
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/HRD-93-4, Emergency Departments: Unevenly 
Affected by Growth and Change in Patient Use 21 (1993) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter GAO 
Report]. A similar report by the Office of the Inspector General found that emergency room visits 
normally cost at least three times the charge for a community-based physicim for the same care. 
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Pub. No. OEI 06-90-00180, Use of 
Emergency Rooms by Medicaid Recipients app. B, at 1 (1992) [hereinafter OIG, Recipients]. But 
see Robert M. Williams, The Costs of V"ISits to Emergency Departments, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 
642,642 (1996) (finding in study of monthly data on costs of hospital and physician services from 
1991 to 1993 in six Michigan hospitals that "[t]he true costs ofnonurgent care in the emergency 
department are relatively low ..• [and that] [t]he potential savings from a diversion of non urgent 
visits to private physicians' offices may therefore be much less than is widely believed''). In large 
part, the discrepancy may be explained by the difference between costs and charges for emergency 
care. Though costs may be low, charges to private third-party payors may be high as they are often 
cross-subsidizing costs of care to the uninsured and Medicaid population. /d. at 643-44. 
46. See Kongstvedt, supra note 23, at 147. 
47. Maryland Chapter of the Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Physicians' Guide to State 
Legislation: Case Study-Definition of Emergency Services 3 (1994) (describing managed care 
objections to legislation regulating plan coverage of emergency services); see also Johnson & 
Derlet, supra note 3, at 140 ("At present, most emergency departments treat evetyone no matter 
how trivial the problem. This has resulted in strained relations between [managed care plans] ... 
and emergency departments."); MartinS. Karpiel, Capitated Contracting for Emergency Services, 
SO Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 33, 33 (1996) ("[Managed care organization( believe emergency 
services are overutilized and too expensive, and that emergency department physicians are risk 
averse, order too many ancillary services, and over-admit."). 
48. Robert Pear, HMO's RefUsing Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert, N.Y. Times, July 7, 
1995, atAl. 
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from plan to plan. Many plans require preapproval for emergency care.49 
In cases where preauthorization is not possible, plans typically require 
notification within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of receipt of 
emergency services. 50 If preapproval is not received or notification is not 
given, coverage may be denied automatically.51 Some discourage use of 
911 telephone calls to summon an ambulance and paramedics.52 Often 
plans retrospectively scrutinize claims for emergency care to determine 
if the patient's condition was truly an emergency. If the condition was 
not an emergency, claim reimbursement may be denied. · 
B. The Consumer 
1. The Choice of Managed Care 
Consumer enrollment in managed care plans in many cases has been a 
result of voluntary choice. But in others, consumers have had no 
\ 
alternative. The latter happens when employers offer only one health 
insurance option53 or only managed care options, and when states 
mandate that Medicaid beneficiaries enroll in managed care plans. 54 
49. Prior approval is most often required for "out of network" care, that is, care at a facility with 
which a managed care plan does not have a contractual relationship to provide services to the 
plan's members. However, it may also be required for facilities with which the plan has a 
contractual relationship. The prior approval requirement and the degree to which prior approval is 
granted may depend on the contractually-agreed-upon rate of payment for services rendered. See 
Kongsvedt, supra note 23, at 147 (stating that many plans contract for special discounted rates with 
both free-standing urgent care centers and hospital EDs and that if "discount is deep enough, the 
plan may be more willing to allow urgent care visits than if it is paying full charges at an ED"). 
50. Some plans recognize that in a true emergency, it may not be possible to obtain 
preauthorization. !d. at 183. In those circumstances, the plan may require notification within 24 to 
48 hours of the emergency. Even in those cases, however, payment for the services may not be 
automatic. Notification simply may trigger review of the case to determine medical necessity. !d. 
51. See Gregory Henry, Emergency Care Under Managed Care: A Fatal Distraction, Health 
Sys. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 55, 55 (relating story of 46-year-old woman rushed by ambulance to 
Detroit ED in full cardiac arrest). 
Her husband had called 911 after she collapsed while getting out of the car. Despite heroic 
attempts to revive her over a 30-minute period, the woman died. ... Some months later, [the 
woman's husband] received a notice from the patient's HMO denying the claim because the 
patient hadn't called for authorization prior to going to the [ED]. 
!d. 
52 According to the American College of Emergency Physicians, "[P]lans do not inform 
patients about the availability of the 9-1-1 emergency system and sometimes discourage or even 
prohibit patients from calling 9-1-1." American College of Emergency Physicians, Talking Points: 
Managed Care 3 (1995) [hereinafter ACEP, Talking Points]. 
53. See Julie Kosterlitz, Unmanaged Care?, 26 Nat'l J. 2903, 2905 (1994) ("[M]any people 
don't have a choice of health plans. According to a survey by the accounting and employee 
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Consumers who have a choice often opt for a managed care plan 
because of the cost.55 Managed care plans have considerably lower 
premiums than fee-for-service plans. What influences consumer choice 
among these different plans is not well documented but mlevant factors 
are likely to include cost, location and convenience, whether their 
physician or a physician they know is affiliated with the plan, and 
reports from friends, relatives, and neighbors. 56 
2. The Uncertain Nature of the Benefit 
Although many consumers report satisfaction with their managed 
care plans,57 others describe significant problems. These problems 
highlight what some call the "dark side" of managed care. 58 In signing 
up for a managed care plan, employees do not know what is in the fine 
benefits consulting finn of KPMG Peat Marwick, 45 percent of Americans who get their health 
insurance through their employers are offered only one plan."); see also Robin Toner, Harry and 
Louise Were Right, Sort Of, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1996, at 4:1 ("[A]mong mid-size employers, 52 
percent now offer their workers only one plan."). 
54. States may obtain what are referred to as Section 1915 ''program" waivers to exempt them 
from certain statutory requirements set forth in the Social Security Act of 1935, § 1915, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396n (1994). Section 1915(b) waivers "enable states to mandate participation [of Medicaid 
beneficiaries] in a managed care program and restrict the providers from whom recipients receive 
Medicaid-covered services ...• Section 1915(b) waivers [have been] used extensively by the 
states." Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform: Process, Programs, and 
Policy Options, 16 Health Care Fin. Rev. 105, 106 (1995). 
55. See How Good is Your Health Plan?, Consumer Rep., Aug. 1996, at 28, 30. 
56. See Martin Gottlieb, Picking a Health Plan: A Shot in the Dark, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1996, 
at 3:1. 
57. See Member Satisfaction Exceeds 90 Percent for Blues-Related H!ofOs: Survey, Nat'! 
Underwriter, June 8, 1992, at 14, 14 ("[S]tudy conducted by the Gallup Organh:ation, which polled 
11,179 members of 47 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plan-related HMOs ... found that HMO 
members are as satisfied with their health care coverages as those who have traditional 
insurance."). Ninety-three percent of consumers surveyed were satisfied with the overall quality of 
their HMO. Id.; see also Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance 
Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994). But see Charles S. Clark, 
Emergency Medicine, CQ Researcher, Jan. 5, 1996, at 3, 7, 9 (noting 1994 Harris poll of 3348 
adults in three cities commissioned by Commonwealth Fund "found greater dissatisfaction levels 
among managed-care enrollees than those still in fee-for-service health plans"); see also Consumer 
Rep., supra note 55, at 29 (stating 10% of their readers said they did not get medical care they felt 
they needed because their HMO discouraged it, while only 2% of readers who had traditional 
indemnity insurance felt they did not get necessary care). 
58. See, e.g., Health Letter, supra note 12, at 3; see also Carolyn M. Clanc!' & Howard Brody, 
Editorial, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 JAMA 338 (1995); Suzann·~ Gordon & Judith 
Shindul-Rothschild, The Managed Care Scam: Playing the Denial Game, 258 Nation 657 (1994); 
Freudenheim, supra note 14, at AI; Fred Schulte & Jenni Bergal, Profits from Pain, Sun Sentinel 
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 11, 1994, at 1A. 
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print of their contract with the plan.59 Typically, subscribers are given a 
certificate that provides a brief description of the policy, or they may be 
given a "Summary Plan Description.'.oo They do not receive a copy of 
the "Group Contract" between their employer and the plan. This contract 
provides the details of plan coverage. 
3. Obstacles to Care 
A primary complaint of managed care consumers is the incentives 
within the system for undertreatment and subsequent treatment denial or 
delay. Horror stories from patients harmed by delays in receiving 
appointments with PCPs or specialists make consumers particularly 
suspicious of the motives of managed care plans. 61 
Receipt of emergency care has proved especially problematic for 
some consumers.62 Plan members have complained that they have not 
been able to reach their plan for several hours when attempting to obtain 
preapproval for ED treatment. 63 In some cases, a secretary or bookkeeper 
59. See Segal, supra note 22, at Fl ("Lured by low co-payments associated with HMOs, many 
consumers sign on the dotted line without understanding the limits of their coverage, and critics 
say the policies often disguise such limits in a morass of fine print."). 
60. The Federal Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) imposes a requirement 
that beneficiaries of employee group benefit plans be issued a "Silll1lllli1Y Plan Description." 
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act§ 102,29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994). 
61. See, e.g., Edward Dolnick, Death by HMO-One Woman's Horror Story, Glamour, Feb. 
1996, at 158; Spencer Rich, Managed Care, Once an Elixir, Goes Under Legislative Knift: Cost-
Cutting Focus Feared Harmfol to Patients, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1996, at AI; Elizabeth Rosenthal, 
Patients With Difficult Illnesses Fight New H.M.O. 's [sic] to Get Help, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1996, 
at AI; Fred Schulte et al., Audit Calls for Crackdown on Medicare HMOs, Sun Sentinel (Fort 
Lauderdale, Fla), Aug. 4, 1995, at IA. 
62 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 57, at 7, 9 (citing Harris poll finding that access to emergency 
care was rated as fair or poor by 12% of managed care patients compared with 5% in fee-for-
service plans); see also Henry, supra note 5 I. 
63. The American College of Emergency Physicians alleges that patients in some plans "must 
follow a very cumbersome preauthorization process. This means a patient who is suffering from 
very alarming and possibly painful symptoms must make several phone calls and experience 
prolonged waits before getting permission from their insurer to go to the emergency department." 
ACEP, Talking Points, supra note 52, at 3; see also Lippman, supra note 10, at 23 (quoting Leslie 
Zun, Chairman of Emergency Medicine at Milwaukee's Mount Sinai Hospital, as saying, "You call 
the HMO and you get an answering machine" and that hours can go by without return call). 
Although some plans are not available when called, other plans offer 24-hour urgent care. This type 
of arrangement usually obviates the need for patients to travel to an ED unless they happen to live 
considerably closer to the ED than to the urgent c.are center. Some plans also provide 24-hour on-
call response to phone calls from patients or EDs requesting authorization for emergency care. This 
feature also reduces the difficulties for some patients in reaching their managed care provider. 
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rather than a trained health care provider denies preapproval. 64 
According to one source, "[g]atekeeping responsibilities have been 
relegated to nonmedical personnel answering remote 800 telephone 
numbers during partial hours of service. Lacking a detailed knowledge 
of patients' signs and symptoms and of local medical resources, these 
gatekeepers are nonetheless empowered to make critical authorization 
and referral decisions, further imperiling patients and providers. •>6s 
4. Retroactive Denial of Coverage 
Consumers also have complained of plans that deny coverage 
retroactively even when plan approval was granted. In th1ese cases, plans 
have determined that the treatment received was not for an emergency 
condition although it initially appeared to be an emergency to the 
consumer.66 Although there is little empirical evidence o:fthe number of 
patients who are experiencing denials of claims for emergency care, 
there is much anecdotal evidence and a few "small scale" studies 
suggesting that the practice is widespread. For example, a study of 
"emergency claims at Connecticut hospitals found that one out of every 
three was denied," although half of those were reversed on appeal.67 A 
recent study by the Pennsylvania Department of Health found that one 
managed care plan rejected forty-three percent of emergency claims.68 
Furthermore, in Oregon, a plan was fined for denying ED claims without 
a reasonable investigation. The state's Department of Consumer and 
Business Services found that the plan had denied fiv•e thousand ED 
claims over a two-year period.69 
64. The American College of Emergency Physicians contends that the decision for 
preauthorization is typically "made over the phone, not based on an examination, and often by a 
clerk using some predetermined criteria." ACEP, Talking Points, supra note 52, at 3. 
65. Johnson & Derlet, supra note 3, at 139 (footnote omitted). 
66. The study by Davidson found that 96% of federally-qualified HMOs reviewed ED visits 
retrospectively prior to payment. Davidson, supra note 43, at 274. 
67. Lippman, supra note 10, at 23. 
68. /d.; see also Lori Sham, Cost-Control Efforts Lead to Claim Disputes, USA Today, Apr. 22, 
1995, at IA. According to Sham, based on an analysis of claims handled by Emergency Physicians 
Billing Service in Oklahoma City, "[s]ome plans deny less than 1% of emergency room claims as 
non-authorized or norr-urgent, while other plans deny 15% or more .•.. Some plans are denying 
two to three times as many claims as other plans at the same hospital." /d. The article also reported 
that some plans deny payment even after they authorize the ED visit: The reporter found that one 
independent physicians' association in California had been "retroactively denying 20%-25% of 
claims as non-urgent, even when the visits were authorized beforehand." /d. 
69. Lippman, supra note 10, at 23; see also Heruy, supra note 51, at 53 (reporting that one 
hospital in South Bronx found that "in one month alone, July 1995, more truill 48 percent of their 
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The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) also has 
collected examples from its members of cases where patients have been 
denied coverage. Table 1 sets out some of the types of claims that have 
been denied and the reasons for denial. 
Table 1: Examples of Cases in Which Managed Care Patients Were 
Denied Coverage for Emergency Room Care10 
Chief Complaint Patient Outcome Status of insurance Review 
17-month-old male Patient could not sleep since PCP approval was obtained 
with earache and 11:00 p.m. Saturday and had prior to the visit. However, 
vomiting presented at vomited up his medication HMO subsequently denied the 
ED at 1:11 a.m. (I'ylenol). Child required an visit [stating that] 'Emergency 
Sunday. evaluation to assure no Services are covered under this 
dehydration and no evidence member's contract only when 
of toxicity. He was diagnosed the condition requires 
with acute bilateral otitis immediate medical attention.' 
media. 
8-year-old male with Parents had tried soaking Claim was denied because 
infection in his fingers fingers at home, but there was there was no written referral 
presented at ED at 7:24 no improvement after one from the PCP, even though 
p.m. Sunday. day. They came to the [ED]. there was an approval obtained 
The infection required from the PCP at the time of the 
incision and drainage in the ED visit. 
ED setting. 
31-year-old male with Patient had history of asthma Visit was approved by the PCP 
complaint of shortness that required nebulization and subsequently denied by the 
of breath presented at treatment. HMO for lack of a referral. 
ED at 8:52p.m. Friday. 
patients in managed care plans were denied emergency care by their HMOs, or authorization for 
treatment was denied pending review''). Moreover, "[m]any of the HMOs involved gave nc 
telephone number to request permission, or callers simply got answering machines. Yet very few 
agreed to cover urgent treatment for their patients." Id.. 
70. Examples of retroactive denial of coverage for ED care. American College of Emergency 
Physicians, Hospital "A" Examples/Hospital "B" Examples (1994-1995) (on file with Washington 
Law Review). 
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17-year-old female Patient's mother stated that No gatekeeper was called since 
presented at ED at patient had shaking spells this patient's insurance did not 
11:20 p.m. Tuesday with her eyes rolling back. require pre-approval. The plan 
with increasing The patient was evaluated by retroactively denied 
headache, shaking the ED physician who ordered authorization and stated this 
spells, tonic-clonic extensive blood work, a blood was not considered to be an 
activity. culture and a cat scan of the emergency. 
head. A lumbar puncture was 
attempted but not successful. 
The patient was given a large 
N dose of rocephin and was 
admitted to the hospital. The 
ED physician ruled out 
meningitis and seizure 
disorder. 
64-year-old male Patient was admitted to the Claim was denied because of 
presented at ED at 7:10 intensive care unit and died no referral from the PCP. ED 
a.m. with abdominal less than 24 hours after attending physician recalls 
pain. admission. patient referred to the ED by 
patient's physician. 
7-month-old male with Patient had fever of I 06 with Claim was denied because 
fever presented at ED at histozy of fevers and increased condition "did not require 
9:00a.m. Friday. crankiness. Child was immediate medical attention." 
diagnosed as having a urinazy 
tract infection. Patient had 
fever for two days and had 
seen PCP one day prior to ED 
visit where they were told to 
wait and see. The night before 
coming to the ED, patient had 
vomiting and diarrhea. 
50-year-old male with Patient had a 2 centimeter Claim denied because no 
chin laceration chin laceration requiring physician referral. PCP was 
presented at ED at 1:35 suturing. called in the ED but never 
p.m. Sunday. returned call. 
5. Definitions of Emergency Services 
In general, managed care plans provide that emergency services are 
covered only when they are for an emergency medical condition and are 
medically necessary.71 For example, a typical plan policy defines 
"Emergency Services" as: 
71. Federally-qualified HMOs must provide basic and supplemental health services to their 
members. Section 1302 of the Public Health Service Act defines basic health services as including 
"medically necessazy emergency health services." Public Health Services Act of 1986, § 1302,42 
U.S.C. § 300e-l (1994). Federally-qualified HMOs were established in 1973 when Congress 
enacted legislation to promote HMOs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 280c, 300c (1994). IDIIOs that met certain 
requirements including the provision of a "prescribed range of basic health se-_'Vices" and consumer 
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Medically [n]ecessary [h]ospital or medical services for a 
[m]edical [e]mergency or accidental injury requiring immediate 
[m]edical [c]are. Immediate [m]edical [c]are is required if the lack 
of it would permanently endanger your health, cause other serious 
conditions, damage your bodily functions, or cause serious and 
permanent damage to any of your bodily organs or parts. 72 
The policy further defines "Medical Emergency'': 
[T]he sudden and unexpected onset of an acute medical condition 
requiring immediate [m]edical [c]are. Medical [e]mergencies 
include heart attacks, strokes, loss of consciousness or respiration, 
convulsions, and other acute conditions which we determine to be 
[m]edical [e]mergencies.73 
The plan often reserves the right to determine whether, in its 
judgment, a service is medically necessary and appropriate. 74 
Furthermore, "[t]he fact that a physician has prescribed, performed, 
ordered, recommended or approved a service [may] not in itself make it 
medically necessary [or] appropriate."75 
6. Risks to Health and Pocketbook 
In large part, rules established by managed care plans regarding 
receipt of emergency care are problematic because emergencies are an 
indeterminate class and plans can define them overly narrowly. For 
example, many plans use the term "life-threatening" to define an 
choice to purchase optional health seiVices were deemed "federally qualified." Health Ins. Ass'n of 
Am., Source Book of Health Insurance Data 25-26 (1994). In order to encourage the establishment 
of federally-qualified HMOs, the law initially "gave federally qualified HMOs substantial 
advantages over non-qualified HMOs." Bany R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials, and 
Problems 716 (2d ed. 1991). 
72 Kelley v. HMO Health Ohio, No. 68812, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200, at *11 (Nov. 22, 
1995) (unpublished opinion) (describing HMO policy offered by Terms of Health Ohio). 
73. /d. at *11-*12 (emphasis added). 
74. Medically-necessacy care is defined by one typical plan as care: 
[C]onsistent with the symptoms or diagnosis of the [m]ember's condition, disease, ailment or 
injwy; appropriate with regard to standards of good medical practice; [sic] not primarily for 
the convenience of a member, physician, hospital, or other provider; and the most appropriate 
supply or level ofseiVices which can safely be provided to the [m]ember. 
Fort Sanders Loudon Med. Ctr. v. Bump, No. 03A01-9207-CV-00262, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86, 
at *5-*6 (Jan. 28, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (describing policy offered by Tennessee Health 
Care Network). 
75. /d. at *6. 
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emergency medical condition. 76 Without medical expertise, consumers 
are at the mercy of managed care plans that decide over the phone 
whether they or their children 77 appear to need emergency care, 78 or that 
retrospectively decide whether the patient's condition was an 
emergency.79 The potential effect on consumers of "guessing" wrong 
may be devastating: "If they go to an [ED] without tht~ permission of 
their managed care plan, they go at their fmancial peril. If they ignore 
their symptoms, they may be risking their lives .... "80 In fact, plans that 
require preapproval or define emergency very narrowly "may deter 
requests for necessary care with potentially fatal results.":ll 
Plan screening by telephone can also be problematic for patients: 
Because of time constraints and absence of physical interaction, 
telephone medical conversations are necessarily less revealing than 
the usual physician-patient encounter. During a personal visit, 
76. In a study of federally-qualified health plans, researchers found that: 
[T]he vast majority (92%) [of plans] stated that their policy was to distinguish between life-
threatening and non-life-threatening situations. Members could proceed by any means to EDs 
without obtaining permission if the problem was life threatening .... In non life-threatening 
situations ... (80%) [of plans] required members to obtain permission from their physician, or 
from the HMO triage officer, prior to visiting an ED. [A] member's ability to define "life 
threatening'' and "non life-threatening'' determined whether he called 911 or the [plan's] triage 
number first. Understandably, these terms have not been easy to define, except in 
retrospect . . . . Much may depend on the ability to define "life threat1:ning," and HMO 
members [are] expected to use their brochures or common sense for guidance. 
Davidson, supra note 43, at 275-76. If a condition is not life-threatening, pati,nts may have to wait 
several days to see a plan physician. For example, one article described a case in which the parents 
of a three-year-old child who had gotten a ''pea-sized" pebble stuck in her nose on a Saturday 
morning were told by their managed care plan that the child could wait until Monday to see a plan 
physician. See Debra Lumpe, Lifo Under Managed Care, 15 Emergency Med. News 14, 14 (1993). 
77. It is especially "difficult for parents to know when their child is suffering from a 'potentially 
life-threatening emergency."' Kathy N. Shaw et al., Indigent Children Who Are Denied Care in the 
Emergency Department, 19 Annals Emergency Med. 59, 62 (1990); see also Young et al., supra 
note 45, at 464 ("Telephone triage may be particularly risky for pediatric patients.''). 
78. Although many plans use a telephone screening system to assess a patient's need for ED 
services, others do not believe such screening is appropriate. See Davidson, supra note 43, at 276 
(citing study that found that medical directors of 10 plans "believed that telephone triage systems 
introduce undue delay in ED access and for that reason were not used by their HMOs"). 
79. In many cases, it is not possible to determine prior to a medical exant whether a patient's 
condition is an emergency. See Young et al., supra note 45, at 463 ("There is no consensus about 
what constitutes a non urgent ED visit, and it is difficult to classify patients accurately [even for 
health professionals] without a complete examination or access to diagnostic t<:sts.''). 
80. Henry, supra note 51, at 56. 
81. According to the Maryland Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians, 
''patients are scared of coverage denial to the point of harm, including a death in Baltimore City in 
February [1995].'' Letter from DavidS. Davis to Governor Parris Glendening, supra note 7, at 3. 
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much of the meaning behind what a patient says derives directly 
from the sound, pitch, and resonance of the voice and from 
physical posture, eye direction, and facial expression. Much of this 
is absent or distorted in telephone conversation. 82 
Plans that require patients to justify their need for emergency services 
over the phone present unique difficulties for individuals whose 
"primary language is not English, who are illiterate or intoxicated, 
elderly, or who are frightened."83 Some individuals, Medicaid 
beneficiaries in particular, may not even have a phone.84 
C. The Provider 
1. Squeezed on Both Sides-The Dilemma ofEMTALA 
Emergency providers also face dilemmas in treating managed care 
patients who appear at the ED because the providers must comply with 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).85 
EMTALA was enacted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985.86 The law and subsequent amendments were 
aimed at addressing concerns that "because of increasing financial 
pressures, hospitals were denying emergency medical care to financially 
undesirable patients-a practice often referred to as 'patient 
dumping. "'87 Both patient health and the viability of public hospitals 
were being threatened by the private hospital practice of transferring 
uninsured emergency patients to public hospitals. 
Under EMTALA, if a hospital provides emergency services, 
screening must be provided to any individual who comes to the hospital 
82. Davidson, supra note 43, at 276. 
83. ld.; see also Clark, supra note 57, at 3 (''The effectiveness of telephone triage 'depends on 
the patient, their ability to respond, their education level and whether or not they are language 
impaired."') (quoting Diane Rowland, Executive Director, Kaiser Commission on Future of 
Medicaid). 
84. One study-of indigent children denied approval by their managed care plan for emergency 
~attempted to contact families for follow up after plan denial. The study concluded that 
"managed health care systems for indigent patients that rely on ... good telephone communication 
with [primacy care physicians may have a problem.]" Shaw et al., supra note 77, at 61. Many of the 
families the study attempted to contact "either had disconnected or no telephones." /d. 
85. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 § 9121, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 
Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. titles). Certain provisions of the Act 
.were expanded in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 §§ 6018, 6211, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 
103 Stat. 2106,2165, 2245 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. titles). 
86. § 9121, 100 Stat. at 164. 
87. MacDonald et al., supra note 20, § 20.01[2][b], at 20-8. 
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and requests examination or treatment for a medical condition. 88 
Screening has become a significant dilemma for a number of emergency 
care providers who have questioned whether they must screen a patient 
when the managed care plan has denied approval or preauthorization for 
the ED treatment. Hospitals in a number of states have violated 
EMTALA regulations by failing to adequately screen patients upon 
admission to the ED when emergency treatment was not authorized by 
the patient's primary care physician.89 EMTALA gives clear guidance as 
to the responsibility of a provider in these circumstances: "[A] hospital 
that has a hospital emergency department . . . must provide for an 
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of [its] 
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available . 
. . to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . 
exists."90 The only statutory reference to insurance states that "[a] 
participating hospital may not delay [providing] an appropriate medical 
screening examination . . . in order to inquire about the individual's 
method of payment or insurance status."91 Thus, a hospital that "triages a 
patient, then calls the patient's managed care plan for approval to further 
screen/treat, followed by discharge and referral to the managed care 
plan, risks a violation of the [EMTALA] regulation for f:nlure to provide 
an appropriate medical screening examination and/or a delay in 
treatment. "92 
If, upon screening, medical personnel determine that the individual 
has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must either treat and 
stabilize the individual or, in certain narrowly-defmed situations, 
transfer the individual to another facility.93 EMTALA defines the term 
"emergency medical condition" as: 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994). 
89. Health Care Fin. Admin., Department of Health & Human Servs., Statements of Deficiencies 
and Plans of Correction, Form HCFA 2567 (Sept. 1992) (sample statements on file with 
Washington Law Review). 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
91. 42 u.s.c. § 1395dd(h) (1994). 
92 Letter from Rosell1lii)' Feild, Health Insurance Specialist, Health Care Financing 
Administration, to Linda DeFeo, M.D., J.D., Mruyland Chapter of the American College of 
Emergency Physicians (Oct. 16, 1995) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(cX3) (1994)) (on file with 
Washington Law Review). This puts some hospitals in a legal bind as many have contracts with 
managed care plans that require that emergency physicians call the plan before screening patients. 
Henry, supra note 51. 
93. The law provides that a patient may be transferred prior to stabilization only if (I) the patient 
has requested the transfer in writing, after having been informed of (a) the hospital's obligation 
under EMTALA and (b) the risks of the transfer to the patient; or (2) the physician has certified in 
writing that, based upon the information available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits 
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(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of 
sufficient severity ... such that the absence of immediate medical 
attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(i) placing the 
health of the individual ... in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious 
impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any 
bodily organ or part; or (B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] 
who is having contractions-(i) that there is inadequate time to 
effect a safe transfer ... or (ii) that transfer may pose a threat to 
the health or safety of the woman or the unborn child.94 
There are significant penalties for failure to comply with EMTALA. 
Health care facilities or physicians ''that negligently violateD a 
requirement [are] subject to a civil money penalty of [up to] $50,000" 
per violation.95 In addition, any individual who is personally injured as a 
result of a hospital's failure to comply with the statute, or any medical 
facility that suffers a financial loss as a result of a hospital's violation, 
may bring a civil suit against the hospital and obtain civil damages to the 
extent such remedies are available under the law of the state where the 
hospital is located. 96 
2. Left Holding the Bag-A Fair Placement of Burden? 
Hospitals and physicians have taken EMTALA very seriously and 
thus are reluctant not to treat patients even if they do not receive 
preapproval from managed care plans for treatment. As a result, 
hospitals and physicians may be left with the fmancial burden of caring 
for those patients. This is often the case either because a patient's 
managed care plan prohibits "balance billing"97 or because a patient is 
judgment-proof and cannot pay the bill. Hospitals feel this burden 
acutely as they must absorb these costs on top of costs they already incur 
for care they provide to individuals who lack any health insurance. 
ED doctors also claim that they are burdened inappropriately by the 
task of obtaining prior approval. They allege they are required to spend 
inordinate time on the phone ''wrangling for approvals with insurers or 
expected from the provision of treatment at the other facility outweigh the increased risk the 
transfer presents to the patient. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sdd(cX1) (1994). 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sdd(eX1) (1994) (footnote omitted). 
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(dX1) (1994). 
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 139Sdd(dX2) (1994). 
97. Physicians or hospitals "balance bill" when they charge the patient over and above what the 
patient's managed care plan or other insurer pays for the visit or treatment. See Kongstvedt, supra 
note 23, at 184. 
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trying to find specialists 'in-network' for further treatment."98 Some 
claim they spend hours doing the work of the plan to keep plan members 
in network. The placement of this type of burden on ED physicians 
raises questions of fairness and responsibility for the "managed care" 
function. 
III. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 
A. A Clash ofCultures 
1. The Philosophies of Managed Care and Emergency Care 
Some have argued that the philosophy of managed care is at odds 
with the nature of emergency care. They have, in fact, referred to it as a 
"clash of missions and cultures."99 Managed care traditionally has 
emphasized regular preventive care and continuity of care wherein a 
physician coordinates all the medical services that a patient might need. 
In every sense of the word, the care is managed. In conm.st, emergencies 
by their very nature are difficult if not impossible to m<mage. They are 
unexpected and episodic. Emergency physicians provide intermittent 
care to patients they have never seen before. The two modes of practice 
have different histories and different purposes. 
Emergency medicine did not become a specialty until the late 1970s. 
Prior to that time, most hospital emergency facilities Wt::re staffed on a 
short-term basis by physicians with other specialties and other practice 
commitments. 100 Emergency rooms were considered a weak link in 
98. Sham, supra note 68, at lA; see also Deborah Glotzer et al., Prior Approval in the Pediatric 
Emergency Room, 88 Pediatrics 674, 678 (1991). In a study of HMO prior approval in a pediatric 
ED, Glotzer found that when ED staff were asked to name one major advantage of prior-approval 
policy, staff most commonly (33%) said: 
[I]ncreased continuity of care ... [and many (27%) said] reduced inappropriate [ED] use. 
[Others (20%)] saw no apparent advantage. The disadvantage[s] most frequently mentioned 
[were] the burden of telephone calls and paperwork involved in implementing the system 
(42%) ... [and] decreased access to care and frequent failure to educate or inform patients 
about the system before reaching the emergency room .... [A large majority (70%)] did not 
think that the prior-approval system was worth the trouble. 
Glotzer, supra, at 678. 
99. Pear, supra note 48, at A22. 
100. Jack Landry, Federal Legislative Impact on Emergency Medicine Practice, 5 Prac. Mgmt. 
& Admin. 31 (Emergency Clinics ofN. Am. ed., Feb. 1987); see also Birth of a Specialty, CQ 
Researcher, Jan. 5, 1996, at 10, 10 (noting that during late 1950s and 1960s emergency room care 
was "often provided by nurses or moonlighting physicians from a hodgeptldge of specialties in 
poorly equipped rooms"). 
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hospital care. 101 Emergency care was "low-tech" and messy. Emergency 
rooms were actually called "pits": 
They were named after the gory arenas in which bulldogs ravaged 
other dogs or mangled rats, or where gamecocks fought to the 
death on blood and offal-splattered floors. Even though hospitals 
euphematized them "accident rooms," they were "pits." In them, 
frightened interns waited while low, sleek, shiny red or jet black 
vehicles hauled in their cargoes of human misery.102 
There were a number of reasons for this ad hoc approach to 
emergency medical care. Most notably, there was not a widespread 
recognition of the need for specialization in this area. The variety of 
conditions seen and the range of care given in emergency rooms 
"obscured the complex and intensive nature inherent in emergency 
medical practice."103 Second, physicians did not believe that there was 
any money in caring for emergency patients. Most were uninsured and 
seeking charity care. 104 
Emergency medicine began to change significantly during the 1960s. 
More people began to use the emergency rooms for sudden and episodic 
health care needs. According to one article describing this time, 
"[p ]atients in large numbers turned to hospitals and their ERs as full 
service health care providers."105 American Hospital Association 
statistics showed that, in 1960, forty-two million patients received 
emergency medical treatment.106 By 1970, that number had increased to 
nearly sixty million, and by 1984 it had grown to seventy-eight 
million. 107 
It was also during this time that medicine in general was becoming 
more specialized. Emergency medicine was officially recognized as a 
101. Landry, supra note 100, at 31; see also Paul Glastris, Lift and Death in the Emergency 
Room-Part 2, Wash. Monthly, Feb. 1986, at 19, 21 (reporting that at time, "[f]ew [emergency 
rooms] had physicians staffing them around the clock, and many doctors who worked the ER beat 
had reputations, even among their peers, for incompetence"). 
102 Landry,supra note 100, at 31 (citingJ. Am. College Emergency Physicians, Dec. 1979). 
103. /d. 
104. /d. 
I 05. /d. at 32. 
106. !d. 
I 07. /d. More recent statistics indicate that in 1993, there were 97.4 million visits to EDs. See 
Clark, supra note 57, at 3. Also fueling the growth in emergency care was the health care payment 
system. In 1965, the federal government passed legislation establishing the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs. These programs made it possible for many who had previously been unable to receive or 
pay for medical care to do so. See Landry, supra note I 00, at 32-34. 
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specialty by the American Medical Association in 1979108 and became 
one of the fastest growing specialties in the 1980s. During that decade 
''what were formerly called emergency rooms (ERs) were upgraded to 
emergency departments (EDs)."109 
2. Different Approaches to Medical Practice 
The focus of the specialty of emergency medicine i:3 ''to evaluate, 
stabilize, and treat illnesses and injuries that require immediate care."110 
As a result, most EDs are set up to see patients with a wide spectrum of 
illnesses and injuries twenty-four hours a day. Individuals may present 
with life-threatening emergencies or with conditions :requiring little 
treatment. Patients do not require an appointment and often are treated 
on an outpatient basis. 
Once at the ED, patients are seen initially by a trained provider for the 
purpose of ''triaging'' them. This involves determining the severity of 
their illness or injury relative to that of other patients who are waiting 
for care. Typically, patients are designated as having a condition that is 
either emergent, urgent, or nonurgent: 
Emergent conditions are illnesses or injuries that could be life- or 
limb-threatening and require immediate attention. Urgent 
conditions are not life- or limb-threatening, but are time-sensitive 
and need prompt medical attention, for example, a broken bone or 
injury that requires sutures. Nonurgent conditions are neither life-
or limb-threatening nor time-sensitive. 111 
The specialty of emergency medicine differs significa:ntly from other 
specialties such as family medicine and internal medicine that 
predominate in the managed care setting. In emergency medicine, 
[skill] involves not only the differentiation of patients who are sick 
from those who are worried but well, but also the recognition of 
patients who appear well but are candidates for sudden 
deterioration, as well as those who have a significant underlying 
illness that is not readily apparent. The initial assessment must be 
based on rapid evaluation of the patient's appearance, chief 
complaint, and vital signs. This must lead to a rapid decision 
108. Clark, supra note 57, at 5. 
109. /d. at 5. 
110. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 12. 
111. /d. at 12-13. 
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concerning the stability of the patient and the necessity for early 
therapeutic intervention.112 
In contrast to internal medicine, in emergency medicine, "diagnosis 
and assessment of problems are not in order of probability, with the 
most likely diagnosis listed first, but are rather in order of the 'worst 
possible diagnosis. "'113 By its very nature then, emergency medicine 
may require ''unnecessary'' diagnostic tests in order to rule out life-
threatening possibilities. 
The "practice" of managed care, in contrast to that of emergency care, 
grew out of an effort to control our nation's increasing health care costs. 
While many plans tout a focus on preventive care and health 
maintenance, the motivation for this emphasis has been the cost saving 
potential of identifying a condition or potential for illness before it 
becomes symptomatic and costly to treat. 114 As data have emerged 
indicating that preventive efforts do not necessarily reduce costs, 115 
many plans are focusing less on preventive care and more on other ways 
to keep costs down. 116 Thus, managed care plans, as discussed above, 
attempt to keep patients out of hospitals and away from specialists and 
direct them to less expensive sources of care such as outpatient primary 
care physicians. 
3. Duty Versus Economics 
Clearly, the practice philosophy of managed care is heavily 
influenced by economics. This economic "mindset" is further 
exacerbated by plans that pay physicians on a per capita basis. Although 
most managed care plans traditionally paid their physicians for each 
service provided (much like a fee-for-service system but at a 
significantly discounted rate), more and more plans are attempting to 
negotiate per-person (per capita) rates with physicians (whether they see 
112. Barry E. Brenner & Robert R. Simon, The Specialty of Emergency Medicine, I J. 
Emergency Med. 349, 350 (1984). 
113. Id. 
114. See Mark Merlis, Congressional Research Serv., CRS Report: Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO) and Employer Group Health Plans l (Mar. 19, 1991 ). 
115. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, The H.M.O. Catch: When Healthier Isn't Cheaper, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 16, 1997, at 4:1 (While studies have shown that preventive care is generally good for your 
health, they have also shown that it often does not save money."). 
116. Consumer Rep., supra note 55, at 29 (citing survey finding that for some preventive 
measures, HMOs were no better than traditional health insurance arrangements, "which supposedly 
give short shrift to preventive care"). 
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the patients they are responsible for or not).m Physicians who accept per 
capita payments take on the same sort of risks that insurance companies 
assume. Their hope is that the payments they receive from the managed 
care plan will be greater than the costs associated with caring for the 
plan's patients. If it costs physicians more to care for the patients than 
their per capita fees, the physicians will lose money. This can happen if 
their patients are sicker than they anticipated or use unnecessary 
services.118 Critics of per-person payment agreements argue that the 
arrangements may provide incentives for physicians to "pay attention to 
things other than the best medical treatment" for the patient. 119 
The era of managed care is not the first encounter emergency 
physicians have had with concerns about payment for care. EDs have 
had a long history of providing charity care and treating Medicaid 
patients.120 This history, and the fact that under EMTAJ ... A, EDs have a 
duty to screen all who come to their doors, has made EDs sources of 
"bad debt" within hospitals. 121 Hospitals in some parts of the country 
have closed their EDs because of their drain on institutional resources.122 
The EDs that remain open are required to take all "comers" and, as a 
result, continue to incur bad debt. In some cases, this has put the 
financial viability of the hospital in jeopardy.123 Prior to the growth of 
managed care, hospitals were able to shift much of the cost of treating 
117. See Michael Quint, Health Plans Are Forcing Change in the Method for Paying Doctors, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1995, at AI; see also Segal, supra note 22, at F3 ("About 60 percent of 
managed-care plans limit the number of referrals to specialists by paying physicians a 'capitated 
fee' .... In effect, the fewer referrals to specialists that such doctors make, the more money they 
earn."). 
118. Quint, supra note 117, at AI. 
119. /d. at D5 (quoting Sidney Wolfe, Public Citizen Health Research Group in Washington). As 
a result of such incentives, in 1996 voters in at least one state (Oregon) considered an initiative that 
would have outlawed capitation altogether. See Bodenheimer, supra note 33. at 1602. The Oregon 
ballot measure-Measure 35-failed, with 35% of voters in favor, but 65% opposed. See Oregon 
Ballot Measures, Oregonian (Portland), Nov. 6, 1996, at C5. 
120. However, prior to EMTALA, there were many reports that EDs denied care to many who 
lacked insurance or could not pay for their care. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The 
Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 21,60 n.292 (1989). 
121. Frank Welsh, Cost Containment in Emergency Departments, 49 Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 42, 
42 (1995) ("Unlike most hospital departments, which are expected to break even or tum a profit, 
[EDs] traditionally have been run as a service to the community without much concern for the 
bottom line."). 
122 See, e.g., Robert E. Tranquada, Emergency Medical Care and the Public Purse, 276 JAMA 
945, 946 (1996) (stating that financial pressures have resulted in decrease in number of hospital-
based EDs in Los Angeles County "from 103 in 1982 to 85 today"). 
123. See Jennifer Preston, As Reserves Drop, Hospitals Talk of Forsaking Charity Care, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 14, 1996, at AI. 
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the uninsured in their EDs to paying patients. With managed care 
forcing hospitals to cut rates and reduce hospitalization, hospitals' 
ability to cover the costs of caring for the uninsured and underinsured 
has reached its limits.124 
B. Inappropriate Use of Emergency Departments 
1. Empirical Evidence 
Advocates for managed care plans argue that, without stringent 
controls on ED use, some plan members will inappropriately use EDs 
when other, less expensive care options are available. Historically, some 
groups have relied on hospital emergency facilities as a source of 
medical care even for non-emergent problems because they have lacked 
alternative sources of medical care and have known they cannot be 
turned away by EDs. But studies of the percentage of inappropriate 
visits to EDs have varied significantly in their findings, from as low as 
eleven percent125 to as high as ninety-three percent, with most 
somewhere between thirty-eight and sixty-seven percent.126 
Rates of ED misuse also have been shown to vary considerably 
among different groups of patients. For example, there is little, if any, 
evidence that the privately-insured population inappropriately uses the 
124. ld. In addition, the shift of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care may be creating greater 
strains on hospital EDs. For those beneficiaries who continue to use the ED for nonurgent care, 
rather than receive some payment for these services through Medicaid, EDs may be denied any 
payment at all if the ED use was unauthorized or retrospectively deemed ''unnecessary by a 
managed care plan." ld.; see also Tranquada, supra note 122, at 945. 
125. Don P. Buesching et al., Inappropriate Emergency Department Visits, 14 Annals 
Emergency Med. 672, 673 (1985) (using guidelines established by American College of 
Emergency Physicians, authors found overall inappropriate visit rate to ED at three community 
hospitals to be 10.8%). 
126. See GAO Report, supra note 45, at 20 (finding that, in 1990, approximately 43% of care 
provided at EDs was not for emergency or urgent condition, and that, in some rural areas, visits for 
nonurgent care were as high as 93%); Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. Pub. No. OEI 06-90-00181, Controlling Emergency Room Use: State Medicaid Reports 1 
(1992) ("[R]ecent studies show non-emergency visits for the general public range from 11 percent 
to 38 percent of all emergency room visits.'') (footnotes omitted); J. Thomas Badgett, Can 
Medicaid Format Alter Emergency Department Utilization Patterns? 2 Pediatric Emergency Care 
67, 67 (1986) ("Greater than two thirds of those receiving care in emergency departments do not 
qualify as clinical emergencies.''); Robert Steinbrook, The Role of the Emergency Department, 334 
New Eng. J. Med. 657, 657 (1996) ("The majority (55.4 percent) [of visits to emergency 
departments in this countly in 1992] were classified as nonurgent.''); William C. Stratmann & 
Ralph Ullman, A Study of Consumer Attitudes About Health Care: The Role of the Emergency 
Room, 13 Med. Care 1033, 1033 (1975) ("Estimates ofnonurgent visits as a proportion of total ER 
visits range from one to two-thirds.''). 
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ED.127 In addition, "[t]he elderly have been shown to have low rates of 
inappropriate use in several studies, while high rates of inappropriate use 
have been noted in the pediatric age group, in patients who did not have 
private physicians, and in patients with lower socioeconomic status."128 
More recent studies attribute the use of EDs for nonurgent care to 
whether the patient has a primary care physician. A recent General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report found, in 1990: 
Of the 38 million nonurgent ED patient visits, about 42 percent (15 
million) did not have a primary health care provider. About 6 
million of these patients were unable to find primary care providers 
willing to treat them because the patients were either uninsured or 
their medical care costs were covered under a government-assisted 
program, such as Medicaid.129 
Much attention has been given to the Medicaid population and their 
"overuse" of the ED.130 Several reports by the Office of the Inspector 
General have focused on the problem. The most recent report found that 
Medicaid recipients "consistently make a significantly hi,gher proportion 
of non-emergency and marginally appropriate emergency room visits"131 
than that among the general population. While non-emergency visits 
127. In fact, a recent study found that, although the difference was not statistically significant, 
members of managed care plans were more likely than others to use the ED for emergent or urgent 
problems. See Young et al., supra note 45, at 462-63. 
128. Marc Afilalo et al., Emergency Department Use and M'ISUSe, 13 J. Emergency Med. 259, 
262 (1995) (parenthetical information in quotation omitted). Afilalo relies on the following studies 
in drawing these conclusions: Buesching, supra note 125; A.G. Davison et al., Use and Misuse of 
an Accident and Emergency Department in the East End of London, 76 J. Royal Soc'y Med. 37 
(1983); D.J.E. Eagle eta!., Misuse of the Emergency Department by the Elde•ly Population: Myth 
or Reality? 19 J. EmergencyNursing212 (1993); S.R. Lowenstein et al., Care of the Elderly in the 
ED, 15 Annals Emergency Med. 528 (1986); T.F. Oberlander et a!., Advice Seeking and 
Appropriate Use of a Pediatric Emergency Department, 147 Am. J. Disabled Children 863 (1993); 
M. Prince et al., A Study of "Inappropriate" Attendances to a Pediatric Accident and Emergency 
Department, 14 J. Pub. Health Med. 177 (1992); E. Vayda et al.;Emergenc<v Department Use at 
Two Hamilton Hospitals, 112 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 961 (1975); M. Walsh, Patient's Choice: GP or 
A&E Department? 5 Nursing Standard 28 (1990); B.W. Wolcot, What is an Emergency? Depends 
on Whom You Ask, 8 J. Am. C. Emergency Physicians 241 (1979). 
129. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 21. Medicaid patients often lack primaty care physicians 
because such physicians choose not to participate actively in the Medicaid program due to its low 
level of reimbursement. Furrow et al., supra note 71, at 745. 
130. See, e.g., Richard I. Haddy et al., Nonemergency Emergency Room Use in Patients With 
and Without Primary Care Physicians, 24 J. Fam. Prac. 389 (1987); Robert E. Hurley et al., 
Emergency Room Use and Primary Care Case Management: Evidence /rom Four Medicaid 
Demonstration Programs, 79 Am. J. Pub. Health 843 (1989); The Medicaid Access Study Group, 
Access of Medicaid Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 New Eng. J. Med. 1426 (1994). 
131. OIG, Recipients, supra note 45, at 1. 
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among the general public, including Medicaid recipients, ranged 
between eleven percent and thirty-eight percent, those for Medicaid 
recipients alone were estimated from seventeen to sixty-one percent.132 
In an effort to control costs while insuring quality and access, many 
states have turned to managed care approaches for their Medicaid 
population.133 Although there is some evidence that managed care is 
reducing ED visits by Medicaid beneficiaries134 not all plans have been 
successful at steering patients from the ED, 135 finding that it is difficult 
to break old habits.136 Some plans have also found it difficult to change 
physician practices regarding approval for emergency care. One study 
found that even an elaborate gatekeeping system was largely ineffective 
at preventing ED visits by pediatric Medicaid beneficiaries in managed 
care plans.137 In addition, the majority of primary care physicians and 
ED staff surveyed found the gatekeeping policies, at least for after-hours 
visits, "burdensome and inappropriate."138 
132 /d. 
133. In 1994, "all states except Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont and 
Wyoming reported having at least one Medicaid managed care program." The Kaiser Comm'n on 
the Future of Medicaid, Medicaid and Managed Care: Discussion Brief2 (Feb. 1995). In 1995, 
over a quarter of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in some type of managed care program. See 
Office of Managed Care, supra note 18. 
134. See, e.g., David Brown, Deluged by Medicaid, States Open Wider Umbrellas, Wash. Post, 
June 9, 1996, at A1 (reporting shift of Medicaid population in Tennessee to managed care). 
In one year, the rate at which Medicaid patients under age 21 visited hospital emergency 
rooms was cut nearly in half. (It dropped from 900 visits per 1,000 Medicaid patients in 1993 
to about 500 visits per 1,000 TennCare patients in 1994.) For people between age 21 and 64, 
ER visits dropped more than one-third. 
!d.; see also Bettina French, The Urgent Care Crunch: Medicaid Managed Care Tackles 
Emergency Use-With Mixed Results, 69 Hosp. & Health Networks 34 (1995) (noting that in 
Arizona, first state to move all Medicaid patients into managed care, "ED use and the growth in per 
capita costs for care for the indigent are significantly lower than in states with traditional Medicaid 
programs''). 
135. See Robert E. Hurley et al., Gatekeeping the Emergency Department: Impact of a Medical 
Primary Care Case Management Program, 14 Health Care Mgmt. Rev. 63, 70 (1989). 
136. See French, supra note 134, at 38; see also Shaw et al., supra note 77, at 61 (finding, in 
their follow up study of indigent children in managed care plans who were denied authorization for 
ED care, that 58% of those contacted said they did not plan to change their use of ED, and only 
one-third said they would call their prinuuy care physician before coming to ED in future). 
137. Glotzer, supra note 98, at 674. 
138. /d. Physicians surveyed indicated a reluctance to deny care to a child who had already been 
brought to the ED because of"clinical, ethical, and legal concerns." /d. 
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2. But Just How Big Is the Problem? 
Despite strong evidence that there is inappropriate use of EDs, the 
extent of that misuse is questionable. Some attribute the differences in 
study results to inconsistent methodologies. One study attributed its low 
findings of an eleven percent inappropriate-use rate to its definition of 
"appropriate."139 The study was based on guidelines developed by the 
ACEP. These guidelines included thirteen clinical circum:;tances as well 
as the following introductory statement: 
We feel that a patient has made an appropriate visit to an 
emergency department when: An unforeseen condition of 
pathophysiological or psychological nature develops which a 
prudent lay person, possessing an average knowledge of health and 
medicine, would judge to require urgent and unscheduled medical 
attention most likely available, after consideration of possible 
alternatives, in a hospital emergency department.140 
The authors point out that previous studies of ED utilization h1d 
relied on ''urgency ratings based on physicians' retrospective assessment 
of disease process or 'threat to life and limb' criteria."141 Other studies 
have found that physician and patient perceptions of what constitutes an 
emergency differ dramatically.142 
139. Buesching, supra note 125, at 675-76; see also Afilalo et al., supra note 128. Afilalo and 
his co-authors similarly concluded that the variability in the rates of nonurgent ED use-which 
they found to be between 7% and 94% worldwide-was largely attributable to the differences in 
the operational defmitions of appropriate ED users. ld. at 262. According to the authors, "[s]tudies 
that use only the physician's perception will generate data suggesting high levels of misuse (25-
94%)." ld. (footnotes omitted). They cite a study by Hansagi and colleagues as an illustration of 
how perceptions of what is an emergency can vary.ld. (citing H. Hansagi et al., Trial of a Method 
of Reducing Inappropriate Demands on a Hospital Emergency Department, 101 Pub. Health 99 
(1987)). Hansagi and colleagues "found that 45% of patients originally assip1ed to a nonurgent 
group by ED assistant nurses were later reclassified as emergency cases upon reassessment by a 
senior nurse advisor." ld. Also, "Davison and colleagues reported a 39% rate of inappropriate use 
based on a retrospective review of the medical records by a physician." ld. (citing Davison et al., 
supra note 128). However, "12% of the cases considered inappropriate were patients referred to the 
ED by a family physician." ld. 
140. Buesching, supra note 125, at 672 (footnotes omitted). 
141. ld. 
142 See David W. Baker et al., Determinants of Emergency Department Use by Ambulatory 
Patients at an Urban Public Hospital, 25 Annals Emergency Med. 311, 313 (1995) (finding 89% 
ofER patients thought they needed to be seen immediately, but only 43% req(lired care within 24 
hours according to physician reviewers); see also Marilyn J. Gifford et al., Emergency Physicians' 
and Patients' Assessments: Urgency of Need for Medical Care, 9 Annals Emergency Med. 502 
(1980); Wolcot, supra note 128. 
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
A number of potential solutions have been implemented or suggested 
to mitigate the harms to consumers and the economic burden to EDs 
imposed by current managed care practices. These include relying on the 
market, suing plans for inappropriate denial of preapproval or coverage, 
and a variety of regulatory approaches, some taken by Medicare and 
others enacted as part of recent state statutes. This section summarizes 
each of these approaches and argues that all are significantly limited in 
their effectiveness. 
A. Relying on the Market 
Those who believe that government regulation should be kept to a 
minimum might argue that the best method to address this problem is 
through the market-competition among managed care plans for 
enrollees will lead to practices that take into account consumer concerns. 
Unfortunately, that is not likely to happen in the context of managed 
care. In large part, this is because consumers often do not have much 
choice when it comes to selecting a health insurance plan; it is their 
employers who make most of the choices. Additionally, there is little 
evidence that employers take into consideration consumer concerns 
when selecting health coverage and some evidence that they, in fact, 
ignore such concerns. 
1. Limitations on Consumer Choice 
An essential feature of a market-driven system is consumer choice. 
But consumers in our current health system often do not have any option 
but a managed care plan. Nor do they have the option to ''take their 
business elsewhere" if they do not like a certain feature of their plan. 
According to recent studies, forty-five percent of individuals who get 
their health insurance through their employers are offered only one 
plan, 143 and fifty-two percent of midsize employers "now offer their 
workers only one plan."144 In other cases, where employees can choose 
among a number of plans, there is a dearth of good information about 
plan quality. 
143. See Kosterlitz, supra note 53, at 2905. 
144. See Toner, supra note 53, at 4:1. 
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Typically, employee information about the quality of various plans is 
by word of mouth. Consumers do not have access to comprehensive 
"report cards" about specific areas of plan services. Althcugh there have 
been efforts to develop such consumer information, the quality of the 
information is not generally good or detailed enough to be of much 
assistance to most consumers.145 For example, such information does not 
describe plan decisions regarding emergency care. Also, because 
emergencies are relatively "rare" events, consumers may not know of 
others who have experienced problems with emergency care; they may 
assume that how plans deal with emergencies is not of primary 
importance to them because they are unlikely to need emergency care. 
Such thinking, however, ignores the possible catastrophic harm that can 
occur in an emergency situation and is evidence that most individuals 
have difficulty accurately weighing the importance of rare events with 
potentially devastating outcomes.146 
Finally, even if there was good information about plans and an 
employee wanted to switch to another plan, employees are limited in 
their ability to shift from one plan to another. Typically, employers 
provide an open enrollment period during which employ•ees can make a 
change among plans, but only at twelve-month intervals. Thus, 
consumer influence on plan behavior is likely to be negligible. 
2. Employers Show Little Interest in Quality 
Alternatively, the market might work to improve the behavior of 
managed care plans in a way that was more responsive to consumer 
concerns if employers, who do most of the selecting of plans, took into 
account the concerns of their employees. Unfortunately, the limited 
studies available indicate that that is not how employen; make choices 
among plans. For most employers, it is a question of cost, not quality, of 
care that is important. For example, in selecting managed care plans, 
employers have been shown to give relatively little weight to a plan's 
accreditation for achieving certain quality standards by the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance, a private accreditation association for 
145. See Consumer Rep., supra note 55, at 30 (stating that despite emergence of industry to give 
consumers relevant information about quality of plan services, "the tools for measurement are 
primitive at best, and the 'report card' movement is promising more than it can deliver"). 
146. Statisticians have pointed out that many individuals have difficulty evuluating probabilistic 
events. See, e.g., Richard Zeckhauser, Procedures/or Valuing Lives, 23 Pub. Pol'y 419, 441 (1975) 
(arguing that we have great deal of difficulty thinking about very small probability levels); see also 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics .md Biases 3 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
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HM:Os.147 One study found that such certification was not one of the 
factors employers of large- and medium-sized companies considered 
most important when shopping for an HMO. 148 
In addition to placing a premium on the cost of health insurance, there 
are other reasons why employers generally do not consider quality in 
selecting health insurance plans. Many employers, especially small- to 
medium-sized businesses, do not have the expertise or resources to 
evaluate the quality of managed care plans. 149 Moreover, quality is 
difficult to measure: data collection on quality of care indices is still in 
its infancy.150 The larger employers that do have the resources and 
expertise, in many cases, are still reluctant to make decisions based on 
quality because they believe they are '•crossing over the line" into 
making medical judgments and questioning the practice patterns of local 
physicians and hospitals.151 
B. Taking Plans to Court 
1. Recovery for Physical Harm 
One potential or partial solution to the problems created by conflicts 
over emergency care between managed care plans and their members is 
for members who have been adversely affected by plan decisions to sue 
their plans for redress. Such actions could provide subscribers with some 
compensation for their harms and, ideally, would deter plans from 
147. See David Segal, HMOs: How Much, Not How Well: When Companies Go Shopping For 
Plans, Quality Ratings Are Given Short Shrift, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1996, at F3. 
148. /d. (reporting that study found 'just 20 percent [of 197 midsize to large companies 
surveyed] consider the industty's most respected seal of approval 'extremely important' when 
shopping for health care coverage''); see also John K. Iglehart, The National Committee for Quality 
Assurance, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 995, 997 (1996) (noting that according to Prudential Health Care 
System's chief medical officer, company's gain in business as result of gaining NCQA 
accreditation probably has not offset millions of dollars company spent obtaining accreditation). 
149. See Peter Boland, Market Overview and Delivery System Dynamics, in Making Managed 
Healthcare Work: A Practical Guide to Strategies and Solutions 3, 9 (Peter Boland ed., 1993); 
Laird Miller & Joanne Miller, Why Employers Are Not Using Quality to Select Providers and Plan, 
in Making Managed Health Care Work: A Practical Guide to Strategies and Solutions, supra, at 
116-17; see also Iglehart, supra note 148, at 996 (explaining that NCQA estimates that although 
more than half of all large employers, that is, those with more than 5000 employees, ''use data from 
accreditation surveys .•. in deciding which health insurance products to purchase," small 
employers use accreditation surveys only 17% of time to purchase health insurance plans). 
ISO. See, e.g., Iglehart, supra note 148, at 998; Consumer Rep., supra note 55, at 34-35; see 
also Boland, supra note 149, at 10 (noting that even if employers agree on quality of care indices, 
many employers are not willing to pay added cost of documenting quality care). 
151. See Boland, supra note 149, at 8. 
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making future inappropriate decisions to deny coverage. Yet several 
obstacles to this traditional common law approach limit its effectiveness. 
In some cases, HMOs require that disputes over treatment are subject to 
binding arbitration, thus keeping such disputes out of court.152 Also, such 
suits may be preempted under the Federal Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA).153 
a. The Roadblock Called ERISA 
Under current law, many patients who are harmed. because their 
managed care plan denies them preauthorization or access to benefits 
have little recourse against their plan. If an individual receives health 
insurance through an "employee benefit plan," a suit against the plan 
may be preempted under ERISA.154 Most individuals in the United 
States receive their health insurance through such employee benefit 
planS. ISS 
152 See Richard C. Reuben, In Pursuit of Health, A.B.A. J., Oct 1996, at 54, 56. 
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). ERISA "was adopted to provide for national unifonn 
administration of employee pension and health plans through federal legislation and to promote the 
growth of these private plans by freeing them from the scramble of state laws that unnecessarily 
complicated employee benefit administration." Robert L. Roth, Recent Developments Concerning 
the Effect of ERISA Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan 
Administrators, Managed Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, Health Law., Early Spring 
1996, at 3, 7. 
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Employees are part of an employee benefit plan if their employer 
provides medical benefits to its employees "through an insured plan, an uninsured plan, an HMO 
or PPO, and memorializes [its] decision to do so through a memorandum distributed to employees, 
and provides copies of benefit booklets or outlines of available benefits." W. Eugene Basanta et al., 
Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 31 Tort & Ins. LJ. 357, 362 (1996). 
155. As of 1994, 60.5% of the U.S. population received their insurance through an employee 
benefit plan. Employee Benefit Research Inst, Issue Brief 5 (Feb. 1996). A larger group may 
receive their health insurance through their employer, but not every purchase of group health 
insurance by an employer constitutes an "employee benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA. 
See, e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. Weiner, 543 So. 2d 794 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that 
ERISA plan did not exist where group health insurance policy was sold to individual through 
independent marketing company and plaintiff was merely sole proprietor who bought group policy 
for his family). According to one author: 
Weiner underscores the proposition that an ERISA plan is not created by the mere marketing 
of group health-insurance policies by insurance brokers or other such entrepreneurs who often 
try to capture the market of small businesses with too few employees to enjoy favorable group 
rates on the open insurance market. 
Theresa A. DiPaola, WrongfUl Denial of Health Insurance Benefits, Trial, Mar. 1990, at 74, 75; see 
also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-l(j) (1995). These regulations, promulgated by the Department of Labor 
under ERISA, exclude from ERISA group insurance programs offered to employees 
under which (1) [n]o contributions are made by an employer or employee organization; (2) 
[p ]articipation •.• is completely voluntary for employees or members; (3) the sole functions of 
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Although ERISA does provide some remedies for wrongs committed 
by ERISA plans,156 awards of damages "for bodily injury, emotional 
distress, property damage, lost wages, or punitive damages" by a plan 
member who claims to have been harmed by improper denial of benefits 
are not authorized under ERISA.157 
Numerous federal courts have considered whether patients who are 
enrolled in ERISA plans may bring state common law claims against the 
plan or whether such claims are preempted.158 Most have held that where 
a plan member is injured because a managed care organization denied a 
necessary benefit or was negligent in administering benefits-for 
example, by negligently delaying a patient's access to necessary 
treatment-the claim is preempted.159 Four federal courts of appeals 
the employer or employee organization with respect to the program are, without endorsing the 
program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect 
premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and 
(4) [t]he employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form of cash or 
otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any 
profit, for administrative services ... [for] payroll deductions or dues checkoffs. 
§ 2510.3-l(j). 
156. The Act provides a "detailed system of filing suit, the grounds for such suits, and the relief 
to which the litigant is entitled." Basanta, supra note 154, at 362. 
157. !d. at 362-63 (''Nor can a plan participant who alleges that he has suffered physical injury 
because his medical condition deteriorated as a result of a denial of benefits recover compensatory 
damages. Recovery is limited to the value of the benefits that should have been provided."). 
158. See, e.g., Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1994) (preempting employee's 
claim under state law that HMO fraudulently induced participants to choose plan); Visconti v. U.S. 
Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that vicarious liability claim preempted 
by ERISA), rev'd sub nom. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 564 (1995); Rollo v. Maxicare, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988) (preempting claims 
for breach of contract, tortious interference with physician-patient relationship, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and consumer fraud because claims related to employee benefit 
plan). However, there are also cases in which managed care entities have been found liable for state 
law actions under either a theory of vicarious liability or corporate negligence. See Independence 
HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that state law malpractice claim for 
negligent treatment by ostensible agent not preempted). Under the theory of corporate negligence, 
at least one court found that the claim that an HMO was negligent in selecting and retaining 
physician was not preempted. See Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 
Parkview Div., 795 F. Supp. 142, modified, 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992). A second court 
held that the issue of preemption was one that could not be resolved by the court (but could be 
raised again on remand). McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Super. 
1992), aff'd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996). Fora more detailed discussion of this issue see Robert Roth, 
The Effect of ERISA Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan 
Administrators, Managed~ Care Entities, And Utilization Review Agents, Health Law., Winter 
1994-1995, at 7; and Roth, supra note 153. 
159. See Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86 Am. J. Pub. Health 863, 864 
(1996); see also Roth, supra note 153, at 4 ("In general, state law claims against managed care 
entities arising out of their non provider roles are preempted by ERISA."). These claims are brought 
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have agreed with this interpretation of the federal law. 160 In Corcoran v. 
United HealthCare, Inc., 161 the Fifth Circuit held that a "malpractice" 
claim against an HMO for denial of benefits was preempted by 
ERISA.162 The plaintiff had a high-risk pregnancy and her obstetrician 
had ordered her hospitalized shortly before her delivery date so that he 
could monitor her condition. Her health plan required preapproval for all 
hospitalizations. The plan denied the request for hospitalization on the 
ground that it was not medically necessary. Instead, it authorized ten 
hours per day of home nursing care. During a time when there was not a 
nurse on duty, the fetus went into distress and died. 163 The Sixth, Eighth, 
and Ninth circuits have all followed the approach taken in Corcoran. 164 
b. One "Success" Story 
In the context of emergency care, there are few reported cases where 
a plan member, injured as a result of a plan decision not to give 
preapproval or to delay receipt of care, has sued the plan. This may be 
due in large part to ERISA preemption of such suits. One of the only 
reported cases of this type where a plaintiff has been successful involved 
James Adams, a six-month-old boy from Fairburn County, Georgia. 
James and his family received their health care through the Kaiser 
under a number of theories including bad faith, coverage denial, breach of contract, 
misrepresentation of available benefits, and many of the corporate issues involved in the provision 
of care by managed care plans. Basanta, supra note 154, at 363. A number of district courts have 
distinguished between these types of "malpractice" cases and those based on the quality of care 
provided in delivering a covered benefit, and have found that the latter are not preempted under 
ERISA. See Mariner, supra (discussing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare., Inc., 57 F.~·d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla., 
Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (lOth Cir. 1995)); see also Roth, supra note 153, at 4 (concluding that 
recent trend "appears to be for courts to find that state law tort claims against ERISA managed care 
entities in their capacity as arrangers for the provision of care and providers are not preempted by 
ERISA''). 
160. See Mariner, supra note 159, at 865. 
161. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). 
162 Id. at 1331. 
163. Id. at 1322-24. 
164. See Mariner, supra note 159, at 865; see Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding that family's claims of malpractice arising from Biodyne's refusal to 
authorize psychiatric benefits pursuant to utilization review related to employee benefit plan and 
were preempted by ERISA); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
family's state law claim for wrongful death based on plan's delay in approving autologous bone 
marrow transplant was preempted by ERISA because it was based on negligence in administering 
benefits); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that health 
plan's refusal to preapprove heart surgery was denial of benefits so that ERISA preempted 
malpractice claim). 
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Foundation Health Plan of Georgia. James's mother called Kaiser's 
emergency line one morning at "3:50 and reported that James was 
"moaning, panting, limp and running a 104-degree temperature."165 The 
emergency line nurse told Mrs. Adams to place James in a tepid bath 
and then, after checking with a doctor, directed that the child be taken to 
a hospital forty-two miles from his home. The plan received a fifteen 
percent discount for patients treated at this hospital. On the way to the 
hospital, James' heart stopped beating. He was revived at another 
hospital with CPR "but circulation ceased to his extremities and he 
developed gangrene."166 His physicians subsequently diagnosed a blood 
infection, and both his hands and legs had to be amputated as a result of 
the gangrene.167 
In a malpractice suit against the health plan, the plaintiffs' attorney 
argued that the child would not have been harmed if the plan had 
directed his parents to take him to the closest ED. A jury awarded the 
child forty-five million dollars-the largest verdict in a Georgia 
malpractice case.168 The award was appealed by the health plan, which 
claimed that it would have made no difference if James had been sent to 
the nearest ED, but the parties settled prior to an appellate decision. 169 
The claim was permitted to proceed because James's family did not 
receive their health insurance through an ERISA employee benefit plan 
and thus their claim was not preempted by the federal law. 
2. Recovery for Economic Losses 
Plan members who are not physically harmed as a result of plan 
denial of preapproval for ED care, because they sought the care in any 
case, may be left with significant medical bills. In these situations, plan 
members also may seek redress in court. Unlike cases involving claims 
for personal injury, however, ERISA does not bar claims for economic 
loss based on coverage denial. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary 
may bring a civil action under ERISA ''to recover benefits due to him 
165. See Mark Silk, $45 Million Malpractice Verdict Fulton County Jury Award Against HMO 
Largest Ever in State, Atlanta J. & Const., Feb. 4, 1995, at C10; see also Plaintiffs' Complaint for 
Damages at 3, Adams v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan (Ga. Ct. Fulton County 1995) (No. 93-VS-
7985E) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
166. See Silk, supra note 165, at CIO. 
167. /d. 
168. /d. 
169. Telephone conversation with Deborah Haas Thaler, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas William 
Malone, attorney for plaintiffs in Adams v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (July 10, 1996). 
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under the terms of his plan."170 Benefit claims litigation under ERISA is 
in the nature of an action to enforce beneficial rights under a trust.171 
Damages are typically limited to the amount of the services in dispute 
(that is, contractual damages).172 
In cases brought under either ERISA or state common law, the court 
looks to the language in the health care agreement and "as with general 
contract terms [attempts] to ascertain and carry out the true intention of 
the parties."173 The intent of the parties is presumed to reside in the 
language they chose to employ in the agreement and common words 
appearing in the contract are "given their plain and ordinary meaning."174 
There are relatively few court opinions involving disputes over 
managed care plan coverage for ED care. In three of the half-dozen 
cases reported, the plaintiffs lost because of clear noncompliance with 
the contract language-they failed to comply with the contract 
provisions requiring notification of the plan within a certain number of 
hours after receipt of the emergency services.175 In cases where terms 
required judicial interpretation, however, plan members were more 
likely to win. 
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aXlXB) (1994). 
171. See Therese M. Connerton, Suits by Beneficiaries Against Plans or Employers to Recover 
Benefits, CA23 ALI-ABA 207,213 (Feb. 1, 1996), available in WESTLAW, A.L.l.-A.B.A. CLE 
Materials File (explaining that principles of common law of trusts are incorporated into federal 
common law of employee benefits to guide courts in absence of express ERISA rules). The 
standard of review in cases involving benefits is a de novo standard unless the plan's governing 
documents vest the plan fiduciary with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits 
or to construe the tenns of the plan documents, in which case the court applies an abuse of 
discretion standard. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 
172 See Basanta, supra note 154, at 362-63. 
173. See White v. Keychoice Welfare Benefit Plan, 827 F. Supp. 690, 696 (D. Wyo. 1993) 
(applying ERISA); see also Kelley v. HMO Health Ohio, No. 259003, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5200, at *7 (Nov. 22, I 995) (unpublished opinion) (applying state common law). 
174. See Kelley, !995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200, at *7. 
175. See Glass v. Complete Health Inc., No. 93-0938-RV-C, 1994 U.S. Dirt. LEXIS 14510 (S.D. 
Ala Oct. 12, 1994) (unreported opinion) (dismissing plaintiff's claim, among other reasons, for 
failure to notifY plan within 24 hours after receipt of emergency services as required by Group 
Master Contract), affd, 74 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1996); Humana Hospital-B.1yside v. Lightle, 407 
S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1991) (denying coverage for emergency services to HMO subscriber for failure to 
notifY HMO within 48 hours of any hospitalization for emergency services in out of area hospital 
as required by plan); see also Kelley, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200, at *14 (affirming trial court's 
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff was seeking coverage for emergency treatment for 
head injuries on grounds that plaintiff's extended inpatient stay for alcohol 
detoxification/rehabilitation did not constitute emergency services within terms of health plan and 
even if it did, coverage was not warranted because plaintiff failed to give ?ian required 24-hour 
notification). 
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a. Judicial Interpretation of Contract Terms-Favorable to the 
Insured 
In cases involving interpretation of contract terms, courts have 
appeared to construe the language "as a reasonable person in the position 
of the HMO participant, not the actual participant, would have 
understood the words to mean."176 In White v. Keychoice Welfare Benefit 
Plan,171 the case to articulate most clearly this standard of review in a 
dispute over emergency care, the plaintiff, Jerry Lee White, became 
seriously ill and was taken to the ED at Wyoming Medical Center. He 
was diagnosed as having a pelvic diverticular abscess that had 
penetrated into the supradural region of his spinal cord. His physician 
believed this was a severe, life-threatening infection and directed that 
White be airlifted to Denver to expedite therapy for a life-threatening 
problem and to minimize any neurological damage that might occur as a 
result of prolonged ground transport to Denver.178 
White's HMO denied coverage for the cost of the air ambulance-
$4185.15.179 The denial was based on the language in the plan's Group 
Contract, which only covered ambulance services for surface 
transportation. The court noted that the Group Contract was not provided 
to employees. Instead, they received a Summary Plan Description 
(SPD), which did not indicate that air ambulance services were not 
covered. The SPD also stated that, "If any conflicts arise between the 
[SPD] and the plan documents (contracts), the plan documents will 
govem."180 
Because the plan in question was an ERISA plan, the court looked to 
the provisions of ERISA requiring that an SPD must "be written in a 
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and 
be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such 
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the 
plan."181 The court cited prior case law interpreting ERISA to hold that 
in reviewing the SPD and Group Contract, ''the standard to be applied 
will be that of a reasonable person in the position of an employee 
welfare benefit plan participant."182 Based on this standard, the court 
176. See White, 827 F. Supp. at 696. 
177. /d. 
178. /d. at 692. 
179. /d. 
180. /d. at 693. 
181. !d. at694(citing29U.S.C. § 1022(aX1)(1994)). 
182. /d. at 696. 
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found that the air ambulance cost was covered under the plan. The court 
quoted from precedent in explaining its decision: 
The ambiguity in the summary plan description must be resolved 
in favor of the employee and made binding against the drafter. Any 
burden of uncertainty created by careless or inaccurate drafting of 
the summary must be placed on those who do the drafting, and 
who are most able to bear that burden, and not the individual 
employee, who is powerless to affect the drafting of 1he summary 
of the policy and ill equipped to bear the financial hardship that 
might result from a misleading or confusing document. Accuracy 
is not a lot to ask. And it is especially not a lot to ask in return for 
the protection afforded by ERISA's preemption of state law causes 
of action-causes of action which threaten considerably greater 
liability than that allowed by ERISA.183 
Although White was based on ERISA, the few non-ERISA cases 
apply similar long-standing common law rules of contract and insurance 
policy interpretation.184 Where policy language is clear., it is generally 
enforced as written, even where enforcement disadvantages the insured. 
Where there are questions of interpretation the terms are generally 
construed to protect the reasonable expectations of the insured.185 
However, such a standard is not always expressly articulated.186 Nor 
does its application mean that the plan member will always succeed in 
his claim. 
b. A Decision for the Plan 
In Fort Sanders Loudon Medical Center v. Bump, 187 plan subscriber 
Richard Bump was denied coverage for several ED visits because the 
183. /d. at 697-98 (quoting Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
184. See Kelley v. HMO Health Ohio, No. 259003, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5200 (Nov. 22, 
1995); Fort Sanders Loudon Med. Ctr. v. Bump, No. 03A01-9207-CV-00262, 1993 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 86 (Jan. 28, 1993). 
185. Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 6.3(aX3), at 633 (1988). But see 
Robert H. Jeny, II, Understanding Insurance Law 143 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that ''the existence of 
an ambiguity in the policy is not a predicate for the .•• application [of the doctrine of the 
reasonable expectations of the insured]" and that at least 16 states have applied doctrine in absence 
of ambiguous policy terms). 
186. See, e.g., Medical Ctr. Health Plan v. Brick, 572 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that plan arguably covered two out of three of plaintiff's ED visits, presumably because 
plan agreement was somewhat ambiguous regarding circumstances that would support emergency). 
187. No. 03A01-9207-CV-00262, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Jan. 28, 1993) (unpublished 
decision). 
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court found that the treatment afforded Bump did not "qualify under the 
policy as emergency services which may be rendered without 
authorization of the primary care physician."188 Bump had been 
experiencing migraine headaches and had been assigned by the plan to a 
primary care physician.189 When Bump sustained headaches after his 
primary care physician's normal office hours, he would go to the ED for 
treatment.190 The medical charges in question were for fifteen ED visits 
from January 22, 1989 through November 20, 1989.191 The visits were 
not preauthorized.192 The plan stated that emergency services rendered 
under circumstances for treatment of an accidental injury or a medical 
emergency would be covered if not authorized.193 Medical emergency 
was defined as "a serious health-threatening or disabling condition 
manifested by severe symptoms occurring suddenly and unexpectedly 
which could reasonably be expected to result in serious physical 
impairment or loss of life if not treated immediately."194 Although not 
express in its reasoning, the court apparently felt that Bump's 
expectations that the visits were covered were not reasonable given the 
terms of the policy. 
Thus, if the terms of an individual's coverage regarding emergency 
services are unclear, he may recover in court for the cost of such services 
if his use of the services was "reasonable" in light of the language in the 
insurance policy. This, however, assumes individuals have the resources 
necessary to bring a legal action in the first place to prove their 
reasonableness-an obstacle that many individuals will not be able to 
overcome. Moreover, if the case involves an ERISA plan, individuals 
may have a difficult time securing a lawyer to represent them, due to 
"ERISA's limited damage and attorneys' fees."195 
3. Suing the Plan (Gatekeeper) Physician 
Although ERISA preempts most suits against managed care plans, it 
does not preempt suits against managed care physicians. Yet, 
188. /d. at •8. 
189. /d. at •6. 
190. /d. 
191. /d. 
192 Id. at •8. 
193. /d. 
194. /d. at •4. 
195. Patricia Butler & Karl Polzer, Private-Sector Health Coverage: Variation in Consumer 
Protections Under ERISA and State Law 26 (1996). 
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remarkably, few such suits have been brought or, perhaps more 
accurately, have resulted in published opinions. 196 One stumbling block 
to such suits has been an argument that physician gatekeepers have not 
established a physician-patient relationship with the managed care 
member.197 Often, such physicians never meet the plan member and may 
never have spoken to them on the phone. Typically, the gatekeeper 
speaks directly to ED personnel. 
This argument, however, was discredited in Hand v. Tavera. 198 In 
Hand, Lewis Hand, an enrollee in an HMO in San Antonio, Texas, and 
his wife, sued his primary care physician for failure to approve his 
treatment by an ED.199 Hand, forty-nine years old with a history of high 
blood pressure, came to the ED of Humana Hospital complaining of a 
three-day headache.200 The ED physician, Dr. Daniel Boyle, was told 
that Hand's father had died of an aneurysm.2°1 Boyle also observed that 
Hand's symptoms rose and fell with his blood pressure and that his 
blood pressure dropped periodically in response to medication.202 Boyle, 
after observing Hand for a few hours, determined that Hand could be 
"on the brink of a stroke and should be admitted to the hospital."203 Dr. 
Boyle called Dr. Robert Tavera, who was Hand's primary care physician 
and who was responsible that evening for authorizing admissions for his 
practice's HMO patients.204 Boyle briefed Tavera by telephone and 
recommended hospitalization.205 Tavera, however, disagreed with 
Boyle's assessment and "concluded that Hand could be treated as an 
outpatient" with medication and follow-up.206 Hand "was sent home, 
196. Id. at 50 ("One ERISA expert noted that, due to lack of potential remuneration, few lawyers 
have developed expertise representing employees in ERISA health plan litigation."). 
197. Another explanation for the small number of suits of this type is that plaintiffs' attorneys 
perceive managed care plans rather than the plan physicians as ultimately responsible for decisions 
to deny care. Id. 
198. 864 S.W.2d 678 (fex. Ct. App. 1993). 
199. ld. at 679. 
200. Id. at 678-79. 
201. Id. at 679. 
202. Id. 
203. Texas Malpractice Case Clarifies Liability of Gatekeeper Physicians, Med. & Health, May 
I, 1995, at 3, 3. 
204. Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 679. 
205. ld. 
206. Id. 
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where he suffered a stroke a few hours later."207 He remains disabled 
from the stroke.208 
Hand subsequently sued Tavera, Boyle, the health plan, and the 
hospital. He ultimately settled with the health plan209 and the hospital 
and dropped the case against Boyle after finding no negligence on his 
part.210 At a hearing on the suit against Tavera before the District Court 
of Bexar County, Texas, Tavera moved for summary judgment "on the 
sole ground that he and Hand never established a physician-patient 
relationship and therefore he owed Hand no duty" of care.211 The lower 
court granted the summary judgment.212 
On appeal, the decision was reversed.213 The court of appeals found 
that ''when the health-care plan's insured shows up at a participating 
hospital emergency room, and the plan's doctor on call is consulted 
about treatment or admission, there is a physician-patient relationship 
between the doctor and the insured."214 The contract between the 
Humana plan and Tavera was determined to be the basis for the 
physician-patient relationship.215 The court found that: 
[T]he contracts ... show[ ed] that the Humana plan brought Hand 
and Tavera together just as surely as though they had met directly 
and entered the physician-patient relationship .... In effect, Hand 
had paid in advance for the services of the Humana plan doctor on 
207. /d. 
208. Texas Malpractice Case Clarifies Liability of Gatekeeper Physicians, supra note 203. 
209. Humana Health Care Plans successfully argued "that as agents for Hand's employer-who 
was self-insured-they were shielded under ... ERISA." Don Finley, Malpractice Suit to Have 
Impact-Ruling in Case Having Ripple Effect in Medical, Legal Community, San Antonio Express-
News, May 14, 1995, available in 1995 \VL 5561172. 
210. Telephone conversation with Randall Jackson, Esq., Attorney for Lewis Hand (July 13, 
1995). In addition, Hand could not have sued Boyle for a violation of EMTALA because the Act 
does not provide a private civil action for damages against individual doctors who violate the 
federal statute. It provides only a civil fme against offending physicians. In contrast, the Act 
provides for civil damage suits against offending hospitals. See Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 680 (referring 
to Hand's additional claim against Tavera); infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
211. Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 679. 
212 /d. at 678. 
213. Id. at 678, 681. 
214. /d. at 679. 
215. The contract provided that "PHYSICIAN agrees to provide or arrange for covered health 
care services for ENROLLEES in accordance with ATTACHMENT B [Attachment B specifies 
various physician responsibilities, including 'emergency care of a covered ENROLLEE who has 
been assigned to PHYSICIAN']." /d. 
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duty that night, who happened to be Tavera, and the physician-
patient relationship existed.216 
The court also found that, under the contract between the HMO and the 
medical group that employed Tavera, the physicians in the group were 
"obligated ... to treat Humana [plan] enrollees as they would treat their 
other patients. "217 
4. The Limited Reach ofEMTALA 
Although ED physicians and hospitals that provide emergency 
services may be penalized under EMfALA for failur,;: to screen and 
stabilize managed care patients who appear at the hospital seeking 
emergency care, and hospitals may be sued for harms suffered by 
patients for refusal of care, EMfALA does not allow for administrative 
or private actions against managed care plans.218 Thus, patients have not 
been able to use EMTALA against managed care plans that deny 
authorization for ED services. 
C. The Medicare Approach: A Possible Model? 
Although private managed care plan members have few protections or 
remedies regarding receipt of emergency care, those in public insurance 
programs do enjoy some protections. Those safeguards have been 
developed most extensively for Medicare beneficiaries. 219 These 
216. !d. 
217. !d. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine negligence on the part of Tavera 
but the case was settled prior to trial. 
218. See Deannas v. Av-Med, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that 
EMTALA does not apply to HMOs or similar health plan providers). However, in limited 
circumstances, administrative actions might be brought against managed care physicians. See 
Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 680. In Hand, the plaintiff's brief also argued that Tavera, as an "on-call" 
physician, violated EMTALA. Plaintiff's Brief at 16, Hand (No. 04-92-00618-CV). EMTALA 
requires hospitals to maintain a list of on-call doctors to treat emergency patients. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395cc(aXl)(I)(iii) (1994). Furthermore, "doctors accepting 'on-call' co•rerage are required to 
provide timely treatment in accordance with anti-dumping requirements." Plaintiff's Brief at 16, 
Hand (No. 04-92-00618-CV) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l) (1994)). Although the court rejected 
this claim because the statute does not include a private right of actior for damages against 
physicians who violate it, an administrative enforcement action, arguably, could be brought against 
physicians in these limited circumstances (that is, where the gatekeeper is also the "on-call" 
physician). See Hand, 864 S.W.2d at 680. 
219. There ar.: several arrangements that allow Medicare beneficiaries to ~~nroll in managed care 
plans. HMOs offer coverage through two types of Medicare contracting options. The first are "risk-
based contracts" under which an HMO accepts a per capita payment for each Medicare beneficiary 
who chooses to enroll. The second type of HMO option is a cost-based contJact. Under this option, 
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protections include regulations stating that plans cannot require prior 
authorization for emergency services220 and an interpretation of coverage 
for emergency services that is favorable to the enrollee.221 
Medicare law provides that disputes between beneficiaries and 
managed care plans over emergency care or other benefits are subject to 
an appeal process.222 An initial appeal is provided by the plan itself. But 
if this appeal is not totally favorable to the enrollee, the case is 
automatically referred to the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA).223 In 1989, HCFA hired a contractor, Network Design Group, 
Inc. (NDG),224 to conduct a prospective review of requests by Medicare 
beneficiaries for reconsideration after disputes with their managed care 
an HMO is paid a predetennined monthly amount based on an estimate of the total cost of 
Medicare covered services for enrolled beneficiaries. At the end of the year, adjustments are made, 
based on the amount of services actually provided. Medicare beneficiaries may also join a third 
type of managed care organization called a competitive medical plan (CMP). A CMP is a 
prepayment organization that does not meet the strict requirements of the HMO provisions of the 
Public Health Service Act for federally certified HMOs but that still is capable of providing 
services to Medicare beneficiaries on a prepaid basis. 42 C.F.R. § 417 .407( c) (1996). 
220. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.414(cXl) (1996) ("An HMO or CMP must assume financial 
responsibility and provide reasonable reimbursement for emergency services and urgently needed 
services .•• that are obtained by its Medicare enrollees from providers and suppliers outside the 
HMO or CMP even in the absence of the HMO's or CMP's prior approval."). 
221. See discussion infra notes 269-271 and accompanying text. 
222 The Medicare managed care appeals process was modeled after, "and is comparable to, the 
multi-level due process procedures in the Medicare [fee-for-service] program. These appeal 
SYStems derived from a long histozy of Congressional efforts to protect Social Security Act 
beneficiaries from inappropriate adverse benefit decisions." David A. Richardson et al., Network 
Design Group, Inc., HCFA Cooperative Agreement No. 17-C-9007012-01, A Study of Coverage 
Denial Disputes Between Medicare Beneficiaries and HMOs 9 (Sept. 1993) (on file with 
Washington Law Review). 
223. In this respect, the appeal process under Medicare for managed care enrollees is unique. 
"By comparison, employer group HMO programs rely almost exclusively on the HMO's internal 
grievance SYStem to address disputes." ld. at 11. There are at least two significant implications of 
this type of independent third-party review. First, "[p]lans are aware that evezy (appealed) benefit 
denial will come under the direct scrutiny of its payor (HCFA). Consequently, the Medicare appeal 
program may act to deter inappropriate or marginal claim denials. Secondly, the system generates a 
census of benefit denials contested by enrollees." ld. These data are not readily available in 
employer group programs.ld. Once HCFA has made its determination, the beneficiazy may appeal 
the decision to a Social Security Administration administrative law judge (AU) if the amount in 
controversy is more than $100.ld. at 10, fig. 2.1. The beneficiazy may request subsequent Appeals 
Council review of the AU's decision as well as judicial review if the amount in dispute exceeds 
$1000.ld. 
224. In August 1996, NDG changed its name to the Center for Health Dispute Resolution, but it 
will be referred to as NDG in this Article. 
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plan.225 From 1989 to 1992, the contrac~or processed more than ten 
thousand reconsideration cases to determine if the plan had "correctly'' 
or "incorrectly'' denied the initial request for payment.226 In 
approximately sixty percent of the cases, the contractor determined that 
the plans correctly denied benefits, but in forty perce:tJ.t of the cases 
benefits were incorrectly withheld.227 Disputes over emergency care 
were a significant number of the reconsideration cases.228 
The contractor also completed a more detailed analysis of a sample of 
over seven hundred reconsideration cases.229 Approximately sixty 
percent of the sample cases involved disputes over either in-area 
emergency services or "urgent" out-of-area services.230 In these cases, 
plan denials were upheld seventy-five and sixty percent of the time, 
respectively. 231 
The authors of the study concluded that these case types were 
"dispute prone" and most often decided against the beneficiary in part 
because of HCFA's regulatory definitions of "emergency" and 
''urgent."232 The regulations define "emergency services" as: 
[C]overed inpatient or outpatient services that are furnished by an 
appropriate source other than the HMO or CMP and 1hat meet the 
following conditions: 
(1) Are needed immediately because of an injury or su.dden illness. 
(2) Are such that the time required to reach the HMO's or CMP's 
providers or suppliers (or alternatives authorized by the HMO 
or CMP) would mean risk of permanent damage to the 
enrollee's health.233 
According to the authors of the study: 
These definitions place [enrollees] in the unreasonable position of 
making quasi-clinical evaluations of their symptoms and 
conditions and do not, expressly, make allowance for subjective 
experience (e.g., pain or suffering). As a consequence, enrollees 
225. Subsequently, HCFA contracted with NDG to serve as the outside reviewer for all 
Medicare HMO requests for reconsideration. Telephone conversation with David Richardson, 
President, Network Design Group (Apr. 1996). 
226. See Richardson, supra note 222, at 53. 
227. ld. 
228. !d. at 51. 
229. ld. at 65-66. 
230. ld. at 3. 
231. ld. 
232 ld. 
233. 42 C.F.R. § 417.401 (1996). 
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who appear to act prudently from a lay perspective may face 
substantial or even catastrophic out-of-pocket liabilities.234 
They further determined that "some denials place enrollees who make 
'honest and reasonable' mistakes" at great financial risk, which may 
ultimately benefit providers.235 These penalties, they concluded, 
"seem ... out of proportion to the offense while creating perverse 
provider incentives."236 
In January 1992, HCFA revised its manual regarding emergency care 
for Medicare managed care beneficiaries. 237 Although the definition of 
"emergency services" was not changed, the new guidelines provide that: 
An emergency is determined at the time a service is 
delivered. ... If it is clearly a case of routine illness where the 
patient's medical condition never was, or never appeared to be, an 
emergency as defined above, then [the plan is] not responsible for 
payment of claims for the services. [Plans may] not retroactively 
deny a claim because a condition, which appeared to be an 
emergency, turns out to be non-emergency in nature.238 
Moreover, the guidelines provide that "[a]ll procedures performed 
during evaluation and treatment of an emergency condition related to the 
care of that condition must be covered."239 In the period between January 
1992 and June 1994, HCFA also began to rethink its definition of 
emergency services and make some refinements to the definition in 
terms of guidelines for their contractor, NDG, in reviewing claims. 
These guidelines provided that an emergency should be determined from 
the perspective of the beneficiary.240 
Based on these refinements, in June 1994, NDG distributed a 
newsletter, Reconsideration Notes, to Medicare managed care providers, 
describing how they would be reviewing disputes regarding emergency 
care services and hoping to educate plans as to how to assess these cases 
234. Richardson, supra note 222, at 3. 
235. /d. at 4. 
236. /d. 
237. HMO!CMP Manual§ 2104 (9th rev. eel. Jan. 1992). 
238. CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide~ 13,960.22, at 5842 (1996). 
239. /d. For example, the guidelines state that where a member who is treated in an ED for chest 
pain and the attending physician orders diagnostic pulmonruy angiography as part of the 
evaluation, the plan may not decide, upon retrospective review, that the angiography was 
unnecessruy and refuse to cover this service. /d. 
240. See infra notes 241-244 and accompanying text. 
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on their initial review.241 The Notes state that, when applying the 
definition of emergency care, a key issue is the risk to th.e health of the 
enrollee that would result if access to medical treatment was 
significantly delayed.242 In determining that risk, NDG stated that it 
recognizes that plans will likely apply "expert medical judgment" but it 
warned plans that they cannot expect enrollees to have clinical expertise; 
rather enrollees ''will generally make the assessment of risk as lay 
patients."243 Specifically, the Notes explain that: 
[T]he HCFA HM:O/CMP Manual § 2104.1 makes c:lear that [a 
managed care plan] must base its determination on th.e member's 
presenting symptoms and conditions, not the diagnosis established 
after medical evaluation .... 
Accordingly, NDG will begin its evaluation of emergency/urgent 
cases by giving consideration to the expert medical assessment of 
the Plan. However, NDG will not ignore credible member 
testimony-particularly contemporaneous to the emergency/urgent 
care seeking-in judging whether "risk'' exists. 
"Contemporaneous" testimony includes, for example: member 
statements recorded in ambulance vendor notes; statements made 
to family or friends; and ER Department notes. Testimony NDG 
would weigh strongly includes statements like: "I thought I was 
having a heart attack"; "it felt like a stroke"; ''there was so much 
blood, I didn't think I should wait." In each of these statements, the 
member has stated or clearly implied their lay assessment that risk 
of permanent damage existed.244 
On March 27, 1995, HCFA sent out a letter to all current Medicare-
Contracting HMOs reminding them of policies relating to the provision 
of emergency services for Medicare beneficiaries.245 
241. Reconsideration Notes (Network Design Group, Inc., Health Care Fin. Admin., Pittsford, 
N.Y.}, June 1994, at 2. 
242 /d. 
243. /d. 
244. /d. 
245. See Letter from Rodney C. Armstead, M.D., Director, Office of Manag:d Care, Health Care 
Financing Administration, to current Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and 
Competitive Medical Plans (Mar. 27, 1995) (on file with Washington Law Review). On October 13, 
1995, HCFA sent a similar letter to state Medicaid directors regarding Medicaid Managed Care 
Plans and Emergency Services. See Letter from Gale A. Drapala, Deputy Director, Office of 
Managed Care, HCFA, to Managed Care Plans and Emergency Services (Oct. 13, 1995) (on file 
with Washington Law Review). Although the Medicaid state and federal regulations do not address 
this issue directly, HCFA has interpreted the requirement for Medicaid coverage of emergency 
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During the period January 1992 to December 1995, the number of 
reconsideration requests regarding Medicare managed care and 
emergency care declined significantly from approximately one in two 
thousand enrollees in 1992, to one in five thousand enrollees in 1995.246 
During the same time frame there was also a decrease in the percent of 
plan decisions upheld from seventy~eight percent in 1992 to seventy~two 
percent in 1995 and a corresponding increase in percent of plan 
decisions overturned-from nineteen to twenty~ five percent.247 
The downward trend in the number of plan decisions upheld may be 
attributable to the more recent application of the "patient~centered" 
definition of emergency services applied by NDG. However, there has 
been no systematic effort to study this question, and it is difficult to 
interpret the data in light of the decline in total number of requests for 
reconsideration of plan decisions to deny coverage of emergency care. 
The latter decline may mean that plans are doing a better job at the 
initial plan level of appeal in interpreting the definition of emergency 
condition and/or of educating enrollees about the appropriate use of 
emergency services. This would mean that the bulk of cases being 
submitted for reconsideration are those where plans believe the use of 
EDs is unreasonable from the perspective of the plan member. Thus, 
these cases would be more difficult to decide at the reconsideration level 
and one might expect a fairly even number of cases overturned and 
upheld. On the other hand, the reduction in number of requests for 
setvices to parallel the Medicare requirements, that is, that a Medicaid HMO must "assume 
financial responsibility and provide reasonable reimbursement for emergency setvices and urgently 
needed setvices ••• that are obtained by its Medica[id] enrollees from providers and suppliers 
outside the HMO ..• even in the absence of the HMO's ... prior approval." 42 C.F.R. § 
417.414(cXl) (1996). The letter from Drapala, however, did not inform Medicaid Directors of how 
HCFA interprets emergency setvices for Medicaid beneficiaries based on the reasonable perception 
of the beneficiacy. Letter from Gale A. Drapala, supra. More recently, HFCA has drafted another 
letter on this issue to All Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and 
Competitive Medical Plans. The letter clarifies the definition of Emergency Setvices, by stating 
that the "determination of whether an emergency exists should be made from the perspective of the 
patient and within the context of the circumstances existing at the time the patient sought 
emergency care. Beneficiaries, therefore, have a right to emergency setvice if they have symptoms 
of sufficient severity and sudden onset and they are acting reasonably given their knowledge, 
experience and state of mind." Memorandum from Bruce M. Fried, Director, HCFA Office of 
Managed Care, to All Medicare-Contracting Health Maintenance Organizations and Competitive 
Medical Plans, Draft (Apr. 3, 1997) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
246. Network Design Group, Inc., Medicare HMO/CMP Reconsideration Project, Computer 
Printouts of Reconsideration Statistics (Sept. 23, 1996) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
247. /d. According to statistics provided by the Reconsideration Project on September 23, 1996, 
the percentages of ED cases upheld and overturned in 1996 were approximately two-thirds and 
one-third, respectively, indicating a continuing trend. /d. 
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reconsideration could mean that plans are not making enrollees aware of 
the appeals process. 248 
·Although there is some evidence that the Medicare approach has been 
responsible for helping to reduce the number of beneficiaries who are 
retroactively denied coverage for emergency care, the ~:uidelines for a 
patient-centered standard for review are limited to Medicare enrollees, 
and they are simply guidelines-they have not been included in the 
Medicare statute or adopted as formal regulations.249 
D. Recent State Legislation 
1. Limited and Comprehensive Approaches 
During the last three to four years, a number of states also have 
recognized the problem of emergency care for managed c~are subscribers 
and have passed legislation to deal with it. Much of the earliest 
legislation focused narrowly on the problem, simply changing the 
definition of emergency condition in the state's HMO Act or health 
insurance laws. Many of the more recent state statutes, however, have 
taken a more comprehensive approach, attempting to address various 
248. Medicare law requires that Medicare HMOs have a comprehensible and publicized 
grievance and appeals process. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Managed Care from the 
Beneficiary's Perspective, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1163, 1178 (1996). Their internal grievance 
procedures must be clearly described in written membership rules. !d. at 1179. Despite these 
requirements, some Medicare beneficiaries do not know about the appeals process. One study 
found that 25% of beneficiaries who were plan members did not know that they had the right to 
appeal their HMO's refusal to provide or pay for seJVices. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't 
of Health & Human SeJVs., Pub. No. OEI-06-91-00730, Beneficiary Perspectives of Medicare Risk 
HMOs 8 (Mar. 1995). 
Even if members know about the appeal process, however, they may be stymied by its slowness 
and defeated by its "arbitrariness." In some cases, enrollees may not be able to get past the plan for 
a third-party review of their claim. According to the opinion in a recent class a:tion suit brought by 
Medicare beneficiaries denied medically-necessary services, in many cases "the HMOs hide the 
ball [and fail to inform Medicare patients that they have] a right to present additional evidence to 
the HMO for reconsideration. This omission violates [federal regulations]." Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 
F. Supp. 747, 758 (D. Ariz. 1996); see also Robert Pear, Medicare Patients in H.M.O. 's [sic] Win a 
Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1996, at B15. 
249. In the 104th Congress, Sen. Bob Graham (Democrat representing Florida) offered an 
amendment to the Medicare budget appropriation that would have required plan coverage for ED 
visits if a "prudent layperson" would have thought he or she was experiencing an emergency 
medical condition. Although the amendment passed on the Senate floor, negotiations on the budget 
appropriation package collapsed and the bill was vetoed by President Clinton. See 141 Cong. Rec. 
H14136-H14137 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (veto message of President Clinton). In his most recent 
Medicare budget proposal, however, President Clinton has incorporated the "prudent layperson" 
standard. President's Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Proposal (last modified Apr. 7, 1997) 
<http://www.hcfagov/~gs/fy98.html> (on file with Washington Law Review). 
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aspects of the problem, from preauthorization requirements to who 
should be required to pay for services received. 
a. The First Round 
Maryland was the first state to pass legislation addressing this 
problem. In 1991 and 1992, emergency care physicians in the state 
began to notice what they considered to be a pattern of abuse on the part 
of HMOs in the use of EDs. They felt that HMOs and other managed 
care plans were sending their patients to out-of-network EDs in order to 
satisfy their legal mandate to provide emergency services to their 
subscribers.250 They also believed that liMOs had an incentive to do this 
under the payment provisions of the state's HMO Act.2Sl Under the Act, 
non-HMO providers in emergency facilities who treated HMO patients 
were required to accept a fee for their services that was determined by 
the HMO and state insurance commission, without input from or review 
by non-HMO providers.252 These rates were significantly below the 
customary fee charged by EDs for their services. In some cases, 
emergency physicians also observed that plans would retroactively deny 
coverage for the services provided by the ED. 
In response to these practices, emergency physicians in the state 
proposed legislation that would: (1) require that HMO emergency rates 
be established in an open process-subject to public review and 
comment, and not based on Medicare and Medicaid rates;253 and (2) 
change the definition of emergency services in the HMO Act so that it 
would be more beneficial to patients. They proposed that "emergency 
services" be defined as: 
[1]hose health care services that are provided in a hospital 
emergency facility after the sudden onset of a medical condition 
that manifests itself by symptoms of sufficient severity, including 
severe pain, that the absence of immediate medical attention could 
reasonably be expected by a prudent lay person, who possesses an 
average knowledge of health and medicine, to result in: 
Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy; 
Serious impairment to bodily functions; or 
250. See Intetview with DavidS. Davis, M.D., J.D., Chair, Public Policy Committee, Maryland 
Chapter of ACEP, in Baltimore, Md. (July 14, 1995). 
251. See Maryland Health Maintenance Organization Act, Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II §§ 
19-701 to -735 (Supp. 1996). 
252 See Intetview with David S. Davis, supra note 250. 
253. S. 701, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1993) (codified at Md. Code. Ann., Health Gen. II§ 19-716). 
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Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.254 
The definition was taken, in part, from HCFA's revised interpretation 
of emergency services.255 Maryland's HMO Act provides that HMOs 
practicing in the state must provide emergency services.256 Thus, the 
change in definition would require HMOs to cover emergency services 
as defined in the statute. They would no longer be able to decide 
unilaterally how emergency would be defined. The state emergency 
physicians, with the help of the state hospital association, were 
successful in getting both bills passed. The changes became effective on 
October 1, 1993. Within the first eighteen months after the law took 
effect, a representative from the State Insurance Commission stated at a 
hearing at the State Legislature that the Commission had seen a 
significant decline in the number of complaints against HMOs involving 
emergency care.257 
In 1995, two additional states-Virginia and Arkansas-passed 
legislation in this area. Both followed the Maryland model of including a 
statutory definition of emergency services that would apply to HMO 
services and of basing that definition on a "prudent layperson" standard. 
The Arkansas Legislature passed a free-standing bill entitled "Definition 
of Emergency Medical Care Act."258 The Virginia Legislature, like the 
254. S. 701 (codified at Md. Code. Ann., Health Gen. II§ 19-701(d) (emph-asis added)). 
255. See Interview with David S. Davis, supra note 250. 
256. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II§ 19-701(f)(2)(1996). 
257. See telephone interview with Randy Reichel, Associate Commissioner, Maryland Insurance 
Administration (July 18, 1995). The statement was made on February 16, 1994 in Ms. Reichel's 
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on S. 450, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1994). Although Ms. 
Reichel made this statement, the Insurance Commission has no empirical evidence to confirm her 
impressions. 
258. The law defines "emergency medical care" as: 
[H]ealth care services provided in a hospital emergency facility to evaluate and treat medical 
conditions of a recent onset and severity, including, but not limited to, severe pain that would 
lead a prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledge of medicine and health, to believe 
that his or her condition, sickness, or injury is of such a nature that failure to get immediate 
medical care could result in: (A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy; (B) serious 
impairment to bodily functions; (C) or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 
Ark. Code Ann.§ 20-9-309(cX1) (Michie Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). The Legislature stated in 
the policy and purpose section of the new law, 
Because of the need for rapid assessment and care, in order to protect the lite and health of the 
people of Arkansas, during a medical emergency, it is hereby found and declared necessary: 
370 
1) To establish a definition for emergency medical care 
2) To ensure that emergency medical care is provided in a timely manner by 
licensed and qualified personnel at a hospital's emergency department; and 
3) To ensure that emergency medical care is not delayed or denied based on: 
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Maryland Legislature, dealt with this issue through an amendment to its 
existing HMO law.259 
b. The Second Round 
California, the "birthplace of HMOs," and the state with one of the 
highest HMO enrollments,260 was one of the first to take a more 
comprehensive legislative approach to the problem of managed care and 
emergency care. The California Medical Association sponsored a bill, 
which passed and then took effect on January 1, 1995.261 Since 
California passed its broad law, a handful of other states also have 
adopted more comprehensive legislation to address this problem?62 
Common features of these statutes include (1) a new definition of 
emergency services; (2) restrictions on the use of prior authorization; (3) 
twenty-four hour telephone access for authorization for treatment of 
non-emergency conditions by an out-of-network provider; and (4) 
required coverage for federally mandated ED screening and treatment. 
a) A person's ability to pay for expenses incurred during a medical emergency; 
or 
b) Prospective authorization of treatment by an insurance company, health 
maintenance organization, hospital medical service corporation, health 
benefit plan, or any other insurer. 
Ark. Code Ann.§ 20-9-309(b) (Michie Supp. 1995). 
259. Va. Code Ann.§ 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996). 
260. See Western Market Characterized by Extremes, but Choice Seen as Common Thread, 
Managed Care Outlook, Nov. 29, 1996, at 1, 5. 
261. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1371.4 (Deering Supp. 1996). Although comprehensive in 
nature, the legislation includes an exemption. The law provides that most of the requirements do 
not apply 
with respect to either a provider with which the health care service plan has a contract that 
includes the provision of emergency services and care and necessacy medical care or a health 
care service plan that has 3,500,000 enrollees and maintains a prior authorization system that 
includes telephone availability (within 30 minutes) of an emergency physician who is on duty 
at an emergency department of a general acute care hospital. 
!d. Based on this provision, California's largest HMO, Kaiser Permanente, as well as hospitals 
contracted by HMOs to provide emergency care for their members are exempt from the law's 
emergency requirements. See Health Letter, supra note 12, at 3. 
262 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 20-821,-923,-1068, -1137, -2801 to -2804 (West Supp. 
1996); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 641.513 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-11-80 to -82, (1996); 
Ga. Code Ann.§§ 33-20A-l to -10,33-21-1,-13,-18.1 (Supp. 1996); New York Regulation of the 
Delivelj' of Managed Care Act, S. 7553, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996). Macyland also 
passed a second statute making its coverage of the issue more comprehensive. Md. Code Ann., 
Health-Gen. II§§ 19-705.l(b), -712.5,-716 (Supp. 1996). 
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While some statutes include more unique features, 263 these four are the 
predominant elements of most legislation and are discussed in more 
detail below. 
1) Definition of Emergency Services 
Some states taking a more comprehensive approach have adopted the 
prudent layperson standard originally passed in Marylan.d.264 However, 
other states have not modified their definition of emergency services or 
have adopted a slightly different formulation of the prudent layperson 
standard. The California statute, for example, requires that plans pay for 
emergency services provided by a non-participating hospital without 
prior authorization unless the patient did not need emergency care and 
reasonably should have known that an emergency did not exist.265 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania also take a slightly different approach to 
determining what constitutes emergency for the purposes of plan 
coverage. Pennsylvania law provides that in making a de-cision whether 
263. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803 (requiring health plans. to have physician 
specialists available 24 hours per day to provide emergency specialty care and if plan fails to 
provide appropriate specialist within reasonable time of request for specialty consultation, 
provision of necessary medical care by any available provider is deemed authorized by plan, and 
payment for such care may not be denied). Specialty consultation for treatm~nt of an immediate 
life-threatening medical condition is deemed authorized by plan and payment filr such care may not 
be denied. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803. Florida requires: 
[In] providing for emergency services and care as a covered service, a hr~lth maintenance 
organization may not ... (b) Indicate that emergencies are covered only if care is secured 
within a certain period of time; (c) Use terms such as "life threatening" or "bona fide" to 
qualify the kind of emergency that is covered; (d) Deny payment based on the subscriber's 
failure to notify the health maintenance organization in advance of seeking treatment or within 
a certain period of time after the care is given. 
Fla Stat. Ann.§ 641.513 (West 1996); see Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4(d) (providing for 
dispute resolution mechanisms between plans and providers). California Jaw provides that in 
disputes between plans and examining physician over need for further care aiter patient has been 
stabilized, plan must have its own medical staff take over case or transfer patit:nt to hospital under 
contract with plan. § 1371.4(d). If the plan fails to do so, further treatment at first hospital will be 
deemed authorized and payment for it shall not be denied. § 1371.4(d). Arizona Jaw provides that 
in any disputes between plans and emergency department providers over medical necessity of 
specific emergency services, plan must assume care of enrollee within reasonable period of time 
after disagreement and if it does not, plan may not deny coverage for medically-necessary 
emergency services provided due to lack of prior authorization. See Ariz. Rt:v. Stat. Ann. § 20-
2803(0); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2804 (including provisions regaroing patient payment 
for care; generally, providing that if it is determined that care was not emergency, patient may be 
responsible for payment to hospital and provider); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 614.51J(3Xa) (same); H.R. 
859, 1996 Md. Laws ch. 503 (same). 
264. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann.§ 33-20A-3(2); S. 7553 (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996). 
265. Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4(c). 
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to reimburse a member of a managed care plan for emergency services, 
a plan must consider the patient's presenting symptoms and the services 
provided.266 Also, in Minnesota, instead of adopting the "prudent 
layperson" terminology, regulations provide that emergency services are 
those that "a reasonable person" would have believed could not wait 
until the next work day or until an appointment could be made.267 
2) Restrictions on Plans' Ability To Require Preauthorization for 
Emergency Services 
Most of the states that have passed legislation in this area have 
provisions in their laws addressing prior authorization for emergency 
care.268 Most prohibit any preauthorization requirement as a condition 
for reimbursement of any services necessary to comply with federal law. 
For example, the California law states that as long as federal or state law 
requires that emergency services and care be provided without first 
questioning the patient's ability to pay, a health care services plan shall 
not require a provider to obtain authorization prior to the provision of 
emergency services and care.269 A few states limit the prohibition on 
prior authorization to services that a reasonable person or prudent 
layperson would think are necessary to treat an emergency condition.270 
Finally, a few state statutes set limits on plan requirements for prior 
authorization for post-stabilization treatment or nonemergency treatment 
for someone who seeks care at the ED. For example, the Arizona law 
provides: 
A health care services plan may require as a condition of coverage 
prior authorization for health care services arising after the initial 
medical screening examination and immediately necessary 
stabilizing treatment. Prior authorization is granted unless denied 
or direction of the enrollee's care is initiated by the plan within a 
266. Pennsylvania Hospital Emergency Insurer Reimbursement Act, No. 112, 1996 Pa Legis. 
Serv. 464 (West). 
267. Minn. R. 4685.1010 (7XE) (1996). 
268. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 20-2803; Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4; Fla. Stat. 
Ann.§ 614.513(1Xa) (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann.§§ 33-20A-5, -20A-9 (Supp. 1996); Md. 
Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-712.S(d) (Supp. 1996); W.Va Code§ 33-25A-8d (Supp. 1996); 
S. 7553 (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996). 
269. Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4(c); see also Fla Stat. Ann. § 641.513(1Xa); Md. Code 
Ann., Health-Gen. II§ 19-712.S(c) (Supp. 1996). 
270. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1371.4(c); Ga Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-3, -20A-9 
(Supp. 1996). 
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reasonable period of time after the plan receives the prior 
authorization request. 271 
3) Twenty-Four Hour Access Requirements to Emergem:y Care 
and/or Telephone Access to Plan for Prior Authorization 
A few statutes state explicitly that a plan must provide twenty-four 
hour access to emergency care. Legislation in Maryland, for example, 
provides that an HMO must have a system "for provid'ing a member 
with 24-hour access to a physician in cases where there is an immediate 
need for medical services, including providing 24-hour access by 
telephone to a person who is able to appropriately respond to calls from 
members and providers concerning after-hours care."272 To meet this 
requirement, Maryland law states that the plan may "prmide for access 
to a physician who does not have a contract with the HMO or a facility, 
such as a hospital emergency room."273 
A few states have required that plans have in place a tw1enty-four hour 
telephone access number if any type of preauthorization for ED use is 
required.274 Because most of the legislation prohibits preauthorization 
for initial screening and stabilization, the twenty-four hour access is 
required for authorization for post stabilization treatment. For example, 
Arizona law states that a plan that requires prior authorization after 
screening and stabilization must provide twenty-four hour access by 
phone or fax to respond to requests, and plan personnel must have access 
to a physician if necessary to assist in making the determination. 275 
4) Requiring Plans To Reimburse Emergency Care Providers for 
Services That Are Required Under Federal Law 
Many of the new laws not only prohibit a pr.eauthorization 
requirement for emergency services mandated by EMfALA,276 but also 
require that plans cover these screening and stabilization services. The 
271. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803(C). The statute also states that a provider must attempt to 
comply with instructions received after a reasonable period of time, but the plan must cover all 
costs incurred up until that time. § 20-2803(C). 
272. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-705.1 (b X2) (Supp. 1996). 
273. § 19-705.1(bX2). 
274. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803(0) (West Supp. 1996); Cal. Health & Safety 
Code § 1371.4(a) {Deering Supp. 1996); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-705.l(bX2) 
(requiring 24-hour telephone access whether or not preauthorization is required). 
275. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2803(0). 
276. See supra Part II.C.l. 
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Arizona law, for example, provides that "[a] health care services plan 
shall provide coverage for an initial medical screening examination and 
any immediately necessary stabilizing treatment required by the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act."277 In some cases, 
coverage is limited to situations where the care is determined to be an 
emergency under a prudent layperson standard278 or a reasonable person 
standard. 279 
2. Unsuccessfol Efforts 
In states where this type of legislation has been proposed, it has 
generally been supported by emergency care providers and opposed by 
managed care plans. In two states, bills that passed the legislature were 
subsequently vetoed by the govemor.28° For example, in 1995, the 
Maryland Legislature passed and the Governor vetoed House Bill615.281 
The bill would have required all managed care plans to pay for any 
services provided to its enrollees in a hospital emergency facility 
whether or not a reasonable person would have believed they required 
emergency services.282 In 1995, proposed legislation on this issue also 
277. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 20-2803(A) (West Supp. 1996); see also Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§ 371.4(b) (Deering Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 641.513 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann.§ 
33-20A-9 (Supp. 1996); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II § 19-712.5(c) (Supp. 1996); Va. Code 
Ann. § 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996); Minn. R. 4685.1010 (1996); 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 
119.52 (1996). 
278. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann.§ 33-20A-3, -20A-9 (Supp. 1996); Va. Code Ann.§ 38.2-4300. 
279. See Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 1371.4; Minn. R. 4685.1010. 
280. See infra notes 281-284 and accompanying text. 
281. H.R. 615, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995). 
282 In his Jetter to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the Governor explained his position 
on the bill: 
The decision to veto this bill was a most difficult one because the bill is an attempt to balance 
the interests, sometimes competing, of the major elements in our health care delivezy system-
hospitals, emergency room health care providers, health maintenance organizations, and most 
importantly, patients. However, the bill is sufficiently burdened with legal and substantive 
flaws that fairness requires that it be vetoed. 
Letter from Governor Parris N. Glendening to The Honorable Casper R. Taylor, Jr., Speaker of the 
House of Delegates, Mazyland General Assembly (May 24, 1995) (on file with Washington Law 
Review). The Governor was particularly concerned about changes made by members of the 
Conference Committee after the bill had passed both houses. As introduced and passed by the 
House, the bill compelled HMOs to reimburse health care providers for "emergency" services 
provided in a hospital emergency room. Id. However, the Conference Committee of the House and 
Senate significantly expanded the scope of the bill to cover any service rendered in an emergency 
room setting. !d. This change and others, the Governor wrote, 
have the potential for a significant, unanticipated financial impact not only on the HMO 
industzy, and ultimately their subscribers, but on the State as well. Care provided in an 
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passed the Texas legislature, but it ultimately was vetoed by Governor 
Bush.283 The bill was strongly opposed by the state's managed care 
industry. 284 
3. Limitations on Effictiveness of State Statutes-Foiled by ERISA 
Again 
Although many of these reforms conceptually have merit, the enacted 
state laws-even the most comprehensive ones-will be greatly limited 
in their effectiveness. A significant obstacle to implementation of state 
legislative reforms to address this problem is ERISA. In addition to 
preempting state common law claims for malpractice and denial of 
benefits, the law also may preempt state statutes attempting to regulate 
employee benefit plans. 
emergency room is the most expensive way to deliver health care. The bill removes any 
financial disincentive for subscribers to seek care in costly settings such as emergency rooms. 
For example, under the bill as finally passed, an HMO subscriber including a State employee 
in a managed care plan, or a client of the State Medicaid program, could seek treatment at a 
hospital emergency room in contravention of the rules of the HMO, ... and yet the HMO or 
the State would be liable for payment to the provider .•.. Given that Maryland is currently 
shifting toward having a greater percentage of Medicaid patients in manago:d care plans, the 
ultimate fiscal impact on the State could be substantial ..•. 
/d. 
283. On June 16, 1995, Governor Bush vetoed The Patient Protection Act, H.B. 2766, 74th Leg., 
Regular Sess. (Tex. 1995), which, among other significant regulations of managed care plans, 
would have set standards for emergency care coverage. In vetoing the bill, the Governor stated: 
This Bill attempted the difficult task of balancing the often conflicting interests of the parties 
in the health care delivery system while attempting to preserve consumer affordability. Had 
that focus remained sharp, good law would have resulted. Unfortunately, the final Bill imposes 
numerous new regulations on managed care organizations, adds potentially significant costs to 
state and local governments and private employers, and contains exemptions which may give a 
competitive advantage to some managed care organizations. The result was tc•o little protection 
for patients and much too much protection for special interests. 
George W. Bush, Governor of Texas, Proclamation by the Governor of the Stat•! of Texas (June 16, 
1995) (transcript on file with Washington Law Review). 
284. According to the President of the Texas Medical Association, 
No piece of legislation in recent session [of the legislature] was lobbied a> intensely as the 
Patient Protection Act. The opponents to this legislation-principally the managed care 
industry, the Texas Business Group on Health, and the Texas Association of Business and 
Chambers of Commerce-conducted a high-profile advertising campaign that relentlessly 
propagandized the legislation ..•. These tactics were disingenuous at best. Some local mayors, 
chambers of commerce, and even some physicians, panicked by this calculated technique, took 
those alerts at face value and appealed to the governor to veto the bill. 
Governor Bush Vetoes Patient Protection Act: Message from TMA President Mark J. Kubala, MD, 
Action (Texas Med. Ass'n), July 5, 1995, at 2. 
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Whether a state law would be preempted requires an analysis of the 
state law under ERISA's several preemption provisions. These include 
''the 'preemption' clause, the 'savings' clause, and the 'deemer' 
clause."285 Under the preemption clause, ERISA preempts state laws 
insofar as they "relate to any employee benefit plan."286 The savings 
clause creates an exception to this preemption provision for state laws 
that regulate insurance "out of deference to the traditional state 
regulatory roles in these areas."287 The deemer clause, however, 
prohibits states from enlarging the scope of their accepted regulatory 
authority in the area of insurance by "providing that states may not treat 
self-insured ERISA plans as insurers in order to subject them to state 
insurance regulation. "288 
Thus, the first step in detennining whether state laws regulating 
managed care provision and coverage of emergency care would be 
preempted by ERISA is to determine whether they "relate to" an 
employee benefit plan. This preemption provision289 historically has 
been interpreted expansively by federal courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court.290 However, a more recent decision by the U.S. Supreme 
Court suggests that the Court may be contracting its interpretation of the 
preemptive reach of the provision. In New York State Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,291 several 
commercial insurers, managed care plans, and their trade organizations 
challenged New York's rate setting system for payment of hospital bills 
by third party payors on the ground that they were preempted by 
ERISA. 292 Both the district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
285. Roth, supra note 153, at 3 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)). 
286. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
287. Roth, supra note 153, at 3 (commenting on rationale behind 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) 
(1994), which states that "[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B) [(the deemer clause)], nothing 
in [ERISA] shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities"). 
288. Christine C. Rinn, ERISA and Managed Care: The Impact of Travelers, Health Law., Early 
Spring 1996, at 19, 19 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XB) (1994), which states that certain 
employee benefit plans and trusts shall not be "deemed to be an insurance company [or similar] for 
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regular insurance companies, insurance contracts, 
banks, trust companies, or investment companies"); see infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text. 
289. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
290. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (i987). 
291. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995). 
292 /d. at 1675. Under the New York law, ''patients with Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage, 
Medicaid patients, and HMO participants are billed at a hospital's DRG rate. Patients covered by 
commercial insurers and self-insured plans are billed at the DRG plus a 13% surcharge, which is 
retained by the hospital, and an additional 11% surcharge, which is given to the state. HMOs are 
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found that the rate setting system "related to ERISA plans because they 
could indirectly increase plan costs and influence an ERISA plan's 
choice for obtaining medical insurance."293 The U.S. 8upreme Court 
reversed. The Court stated that "such state laws [which have only an 
indirect economic impact on ERISA plans] do not bear the requisite 
'connection with' ERISA plans to trigger pre-emption."294 Thus, 
Travelers somewhat narrowed the scope of ERISA preemption and 
paved the way for some adjustments to previous broad interpretations of 
the "relates to" language. 
In CIGNA Healthplan v. Louisiana,295 decided by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals after Travelers, the court found that a state's "any 
willing provider'' law-which requires that all licensed health providers 
who agree to terms of a preferred provider contract must be accepted as 
providers in a preferred provider organization (PPO}-was preempted 
by ERISA.296 This decision was based, in part, on an initial 
determination that the state law "relates to" employee: benefit plans 
within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause.297 In making its 
decision, the court in CIGNA cited the consistent position of the U.S. 
Supreme Court that ERISA preempts "state laws that mandat[e] 
employee benefit structures or their administration."298 
Based on this criterion alone, it would appear that state laws 
regulating emergency care for purposes of managed care coverage 
would "relate to" ERISA benefit plans. Such statutes arguably mandate 
broader coverage than plans might otherwise provide for emergency 
care. This appears to be the case even after Travelers' narrowing of 
ERISA's preemptive scope. 
subject to surcharges as high as 9"/o depending on the number of Medir.aid recipients they 
enrolled." Id. at 1674; Rinn, supra note 288, at 19. 
293. Travelers, 115 S. Ct at 1675-76; Rinn, supra note 288, at 19. 
294. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680. In part, the Court explained its detennination by concluding 
that ERISA preemption was not designed to assure cost uniformity and as long as the law did not 
"bind plan administrators to any particular choice [for medical insurance or] ••. preclude uniform 
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package," it would not be 
preempted. Id. at 1679-80. 
295. 82 F.3d 642 (5thCir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 387 (1996). 
296. Id. at 650. 
297. Id. at 648. 
298. Id. at 647 (quoting Travelers, 115 S. Ct. 1678 (1995)). But see Napoletano v. CIGNA 
Healthcare, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996) (holding that "Connecticut's somewhat different version of 
an 'any willing provider' law did not relate to employee benefit plans and so was not pre-empted"), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1106 (1997); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Refuse Case on Whether 
Health Care Networks Must Be Open to All Doctors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1996, at Al6. 
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The second step in the ERISA preemption analysis is whether the 
state law is ''saved" because it regulates insurance.299 In Metropolitan 
Lifo Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,300 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth 
the requirements that a statute must meet to come within the savings 
clause. First, the statute must fit the "common sense" definition of 
insurance regulation.301 Second, the statute must satisfy each of the 
following tests: (1) it must have the effect of spreading the 
policyholders' risk; (2) the practice that it attempts to regulate must be 
an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the 
insured; and (3) the statute must be limited to entities within the 
insurance industry.302 In CIGNA, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana's 
"any willing provider'' statute did not fit within the savings clause 
because it did not satisfy the third element of the second prong of the 
test-the statute was not limited to "entities within the insurance 
industry."303 The statute stated specifically that it also applied to "'self-
funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts, or employers who establish or 
participate in self-funded trusts or programs,' [as well as] 'health care 
financiers, third party administrators, providers, or other 
intermediaries. "'304 Thus, under the rationale applied in CIGNA, whether 
a state statute regulating emergency care is preempted under ERISA for 
all ERISA plans will depend on the types of entities to which the statute 
applies. Existing state statutes regulating emergency care typically apply 
to health insurance carriers through amendments to the state insurance 
laws and to HMOs through the state's HMO Act. Most states now have 
such statutes regulating HMOs.305 Although these statutes would appear 
to be safe from ERISA attack,306 that conclusion is not certain.307 
299. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) (1994). 
300. 471 u.s. 724 (1985). 
301. /d. at 740. 
302 /d. at 743. 
303. CIGNA, 82 F.3d at 650. But see Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 
995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Virginia statute that prohibits insurance companies from 
unreasonably discriminating in establishing preferred provider organizations was not preempted by 
ERISA because it fell within ERISA's savings clause). 
304. CIGNA, 82 F.3d at 650 (footnote omitted). 
305. See Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 56. 
306. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 1986, 1987 (1996). 
Because ERISA contains an exception allowing states to regulate insurance, state laws can 
force insurance companies and managed -care organizations to include specific 'mandated' 
benefits and certain other provisions in the insurance contracts they sell .... The effect of [this] 
exceptionO, according to a 1985 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, is to permit states to 
regulate the benefits covered by policies sold by insurance companies ...• 
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If the state statute was determined to come under the savings clause, 
however, the "deemer'' clause would still apply.308 The "deemer clause," 
as mentioned above, limits the reach of the savings clause: by prohibiting 
states from including self-insured plans309 as insurance 1:ompanies. For 
this reason, if the state statute meets the "relates to" criteria and if the 
plan in question is a self-insured plan, the plan is not su~ject to the state 
law. This provision greatly limits the effectiveness of many state laws 
regulating health insurance plans.310 As of 1990, more than half of all 
U.S. workers were covered by self-insured plans.311 
As a result, state laws attempting to regulate managed care plan 
coverage of emergency care are likely to have little impa.ct on managed 
care plans. Clearly, all self-insured plans will not be required to comply 
with them. Also, depending on how such statutes are written and how 
the savings clause is interpreted, it is possible that all ERISA plans may 
be exempt from such state laws. The ambiguity of the law, moreover, 
and the uncertainty of most employees regarding whether they are part 
of an ERISA plan, make many state statutes practically ineffective. 312 
/d. (citations omitted). 
307. Federal courts have held that HMOs are not insurers as a matter oflaw. See Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 14 F.3cl 708 (2d Cir. 1993), 
rev'd, 514 U.S. 645 (1995); O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1990); Deannas v. Av-
Med, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1993). However, one author points out that these decisions 
"do not appear to apply the Supreme Court's test for what is the business of insurance." Butler & 
Polzer, supra note 195, at 56. In addition, at least one district court has held that HMOs are in the 
business of insurance. See Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 673 F. Supp. 
903 (W.O. Mich. 1987). 
308. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XB) (1994); see supra notes 285-287 and accompanying text. 
309. Self-insured plans are those where the employer assumes the risk of me:lical claims. 
310. However, some types of managed care plans, such as HMOs, may not be considered self-
insured if an employer pays the HMO on a capitation basis and shifts all the insurance risk to the 
plan. 
311. Sharon Silow-Carroll et al., Economic & Social Research Inst., Wash., D.C., In Sickness 
and in Health? The Marriage Between Employees and Health Care IS (1995). But see Gregozy 
Acs et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profit, Provisiom,, and Premiums, IS 
Health Aff. 267 (1996) (estimating that about 40% of employees with health coverage are in self-
insured plans, defined as plans not buying coverage from health insurers or HMOs). 
312 For example, in states that prohibit prior authorization for emergency services, if the patient 
does not know whether or not he or she is in an ERISA plan the state's protective statute will not 
be of any assistance to the patient, and hospital ED personnel, also unsure of whether the state 
statute applies, will likely believe they need to obtain the plan's prior authcorization in order to 
ensure coverage of the patients' services. 
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V. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION 
A. The Goals of Federal Legislation 
Given the significant limitations of the market and existing law to 
deal with the problems created by the conflicts between managed care 
and emergency care, a federal legislative solution is needed. This 
solution must recognize the health and safety needs of plan members 
and the validity of reasonable efforts by managed care plans to contain 
health care costs. Moreover, the solution must include a fair mechanism 
to apportion burdens among the various stakeholders. 
1. Protecting the Consumer 
When individuals must wait for hours for plan approval before 
receiving emergency care, or are denied preapproval by health care plan 
personnel who have not examined them, they may face significant risks 
to their life and health. This is truly the case for those experiencing 
"real" emergencies. In order to prevent death, disability, or other serious 
harms to the consumer, federal legislation that will protect consumers 
from such risks is warranted. Congress, through its enactment of 
EMfALA, already has recognized a role for the federal government in 
ensuring that individuals who need emergency care receive it and are not 
thwarted by inability to pay or other obstacles.313 Efforts by managed 
care plans to discourage plan members from seeking emergency care 
may not technically violate the terms of EMfALA, but arguably they 
violate the spirit of that legislation. The irony of the current state of 
affairs is that due to EMfALA and managed care policy, individuals 
without health insurance may have more access to emergency care than 
those with health insurance-a result that undermines the broad goals of 
EMf~.314 
313. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). 
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a); see also Alicia K. Dowdy et al., The Anatomy of EMTALA: A 
Litigator's Guide, 27 St. Mary's L.J. 463, 465 (1996) ("Although concerns regarding the 
availability of emergency medical care for the poor or uninsured prompted the drafting of 
EMTALA, the statute applies to the treatment of all patients, regardless of a patient's ability to pay 
or insurance coverage.") (citing Correa v. Hospital of S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1193 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(noting that presence of insurance coverage is irrelevant for purposes of EMTALA because 
hospital's motive is not necessary element for establishing liability under statute), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 1423 (1996); Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., 996 F.2d 708, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that EMT ALA applies to all patients with emergency medical conditions, regardless of 
whether they have insurance to pay for treatment)). 
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Government also has historically played a role in the r:egulation of the 
insurance industry, protecting consumers from ''unscrupulous" insurers 
and insurance practices. While most of this regulation has taken place at 
the state level (pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Acf15), Congress has 
also recognized the need, in certain situations, to protect individuals 
from abuses of the insurance industry. For example, in 1982, Congress 
passed amendments to the Medicare law aimed at protecting the elderly 
from unfair practices in the sale and administration of Medigap 
insurance policies.316 More recently, Congress pass,ed the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (IllPAA),317 which 
prevents insurers from denying coverage to individuals based on pre-
existing medical conditions or limiting periods of ineligibility for 
coverage due to a pre-existing condition and requires employers to make 
insurance coverage available to certain individuals who have previously 
lost other coverage.318 Finally, and most recently, Congress passed the 
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996319 and the 
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996.320 The former amends ERISA.to 
prohibit a health plan or insurer from restricting "benefits for any 
hospital length of stay in connection with child birth fo::- the mother or 
newborn child, following a normal vaginal delivery, to less than 48 
hours, or for women giving birth by Cesarean section, to less than 96 
hours."321 The latter requires that plans provide some types of parity in 
coverage between medical and surgical benefits and mental health 
315. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994) ("Congress declares that the continued regulation and 
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest."). 
316. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 507(b), 94 Stat. 441 
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (1994 & Supp. I 1995)). Medigap policies "are 
designed to cover the gaps in Medicare coverage-primarily by paying the required hospital and 
physician bill deductibles •.. and required coinsurance." Julie Rovner, Climbing Medigap 
Premiums Draw Attention on Hill, Cong. Q., Feb. 17, 1990, at 527. Further amendments regulating 
Medigap insurance were passed by Congress in 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4352, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-129 (1990) (codifi•!d as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395ss). 
317. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
318. 110 Stat. 1936. 
319. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2934-44, tit. VI (1996) (codified in scattered sections 
of29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
320. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944-50, tit. VII (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
321. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996 § 711,29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1996). 
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benefits.322 Thus, congressional action in this area is not without 
precedent.323 
2. Controlling Health Care Costs 
Managed care has been encouraged by federal policy as a mechanism 
to control our seemingly uncontrollable health care costs. This policy 
goal is still important as health care costs continue to climb324 and take 
up a significant proportion of our gross domestic product. 325 Therefore, 
federal legislation aimed at curbing managed care denials of ED care 
and coverage must not overreach in a way that excessively limits or 
stifles the ability of plans to exercise control over utilization of 
expensive sources of medical care. 
3. Fair Apportionment ofBurdenAmong the Stakeholders 
Apart from the health risks to consumers posed by plan policies that 
excessively discourage ED use, the 'conflict between managed care plans 
and EDs is essentially one of who should bear the cost of emergency 
care for plan members. Managed care plan administrators want to 
control unnecessary health care costs and presumably believe that it is 
fair to make providers or patients responsible for payment of these 
services in situations that are not truly emergencies. Patients do not want 
to be responsible for paying for these services when they sincerely 
believed they were experiencing emergencies because of extreme pain, 
shortness of breath, loss of blood, or other symptoms that would prompt 
most people to conclude that they need to seek medical care 
immediately. Finally, hospitals and emergency physicians argue that it is 
not patients who actually get saddled with payment for the unreimbursed 
322 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 §§ 712, 2705, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 
(1996). 
323. Moreover, there is now developing a broad consensus of the need for consumer protections 
against managed care plans. See Toner, supra note 53, § 4 ("President Clinton ... has announced 
that he will appoint a panel of experts to recommend ways of protecting consumers in this fierce 
new health care marketplace .... [B]ipartisan consensus [on this issue] reflects the broad popularity 
of these regulatory moves.''). 
324. Note that although growth of health care costs have slowed for some large employers, 
overall growth in health care costs continues to climb. See Milt Freudenheim, Survey Finds Health 
Costs Rose in '95, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1996, at Dl. 
325. In 1991, the United States spent 13.2% of its gross domestic product for health care while 
Gennany spent 8.5%, Japan spent 6.8%, and the United Kingdom spent only 6.6%. See Furrow et 
al., supra note 36, at 853. 
383 
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 384 1997
Washington Law Review Vol. 72:315, 1997 
care; it is typically the health care providers who must seek payment 
from patients or absorb the costs of their care. 326 
What is fair in this context requires consideration of ( 1) the 
provisions of the insurance policy, which in virtually all cases will cover 
emergency care and (2) determination of what constitutes an emergency 
and who makes that determination. A fair solution in general terms 
would appear to be one that made the insurer/plan responsible for 
coverage of services necessary to treat potential emergencies;327 
providers responsible for costs above and beyond what is necessary to 
treat such emergencies; and patients responsible for the costs associated 
with ED visits that are obvious non-emergencies. The challenge for 
legislators will be to create a process that fairly distinguishes potential or 
highly probable emergencies from the rest. 
B. Proposed Federal Legislation 
Significant headway has already been made toward a federal solution 
to this problem. On February 25, 1997, U.S. Representative Benjamin 
Cardin (Democrat, Maryland), introduced House Bi11815,328 and Senator 
Bob Graham (Democrat, Florida) introduced Senate Bill 356.329 The 
identical bills, both titled "Access to Emergency Medical Services Act," 
adopt features of many of the existing state statutes. For example, they 
prohibit managed care plans from requiring prior authorization for 
emergency medical care330 and establish a uniform definition of 
emergency medical condition that protects patients through the adoption 
of a prudent layperson standard.331 Plans that cover emergency services 
326. See Clark, supra note 57, at 7 (reporting physicians' argument that, "for HMOs to take the 
final diagnosis and then say they won't pay is immoral"). "We're made to look like bad guys 
because we must then send a bill back to the patient. Payment should be decided not on the final 
diagnosis but on the presenting complaint." Id. 
327. Potential emergencies would be those that appear to be emergencies based on presenting 
systems prior to treatment and ultimate diagnosis by a medical professional. 
328. Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, H.R. 815, IOSth Cong. (1997). 
329. Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S. 356, IOSth Cong. (1997). Cardin 
previously had introduced a similar bill, H.R. 2011, 1 04th Con g. (1995), on July 11, 1995 and a 
parallel bill had been introduced in the Senate by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski. SeeS. 1233, 104th 
Cong. (1995). Although neither bill passed in the 104th Congress, H.R. 2011 had 154 cosponsors 
and S. 1233 had 11. 
330. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
331. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. Emergency medical condition is defined as 
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including 
severe pain) such that a prudent layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of health and 
medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical attenti•Jn to result i~i) 
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would be required to cover services provided to a patient in an ED if the 
patient presented with symptoms that a prudent layperson possessing an 
average knowledge of health and medicine could reasonably expect to 
result in serious impairment to the patient's health. In addition, the bills 
establish coverage standards for out-of-plan emergency care to protect 
patients who, under reasonable circumstances, seek care in an out-of-
plan emergency department. These standards provide that health plans 
must cover services received in an out-of-plan emergency department if 
(1) the patient was unable to reach an in-plan emergency department due 
to circumstances beyond his or her control, (2) the patient reasonably 
believed he or she could not safely reach an in-plan emergency 
department without suffering from adverse consequences to his or her 
health, or (3) the health plan directed the patient to an emergency 
department other than a participating emergency department.332 The bills 
further provide that if a patient does not meet any of these conditions, a 
plan may deny or otherwise limit coverage of such services.333 
Moreover, the plans may also impose different cost sharing 
arrangements for use of out-of-plan EDs, as long as such differences are 
"reasonable."334 In addition, the bills allow plans greater control over 
care received once a patient has been stabilized. In these circumstances, 
an ED is: 
required to contact the patient's health plan to obtain authorization 
of any medically necessary services (other than emergency 
services) identified by the treating physician within 30 minutes of 
the point that a physician determines that the patient is stabilized. 
The health plan would be required to either deny or approve the 
request within 30 minutes of the time when it is notified. If the 
health plan denies the request, the treating physician may request a 
consultation with one of the health plan's participating physicians 
within 30 minutes of the time the health plan is notified of the 
request for consultation. If the [ED] does not call the health plan, 
the health plan is not responsible for payment of any services 
provided after stabilization of the patient. If the health plan does 
not respond to the [ED] in a timely fashion, the health plan can not 
placing the health of the individual ••• in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impainnent to bodily 
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." 
H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
332 H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
333. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
334. H.R. 815, §§ 2, 3, 4; S. 356, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
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retrospectively deny payment for post-stabilization services unless 
those services were subsequently determined to be medically 
unnecessary. 335 
Finally the bills require that health plans educate members about 
"coverage of emergency services, the process for obtaining emergency 
services, the location of participating medical facilities and cost-sharing 
provisions for emergency and other medical services, as well as the 
appropriate use of emergency medical services" such as the 911 
telephone number?36 The bills have been enthusiastically supported by 
ACEP as well as by a number of provider and consumer groups.337 
1. Essential Elements and a Justification 
The proposed legislation meets the goals of a federal solution to this 
problem by including (1) provisions that eliminate managed care 
obstacles to ED use for reasonably perceived emergencies, and (2) a 
mechanism that allows plans, providers, and consumers to distinguish 
fairly reasonably-perceived emergencies from other ED visits. These 
provisions are the prohibition of a requirement for prior authorization 
for emergency services and the adoption of a "prudent lay person" 
standard in defining what constitutes an emergency for purposes of plan 
coverage. The proposed legislation implements these provisions by 
335. Office of Representative Benjamin Cardin, Detailed Summary, Access to Emergency 
Medical Services Act of 1997 2 (Feb. 1997) (on file with Washington Law Re~iew). Moreover, the 
bill provides: 
[If] an emergency physician in a non-participating hospital and a health plan cannot agree on a 
course of treatment after a patient is stabilized, the health plan must either cover the 
recommended services, subject to a review of whether those services were medically 
necessacy, or send a physician with privileges at the hospital to assume responsibility for the 
patient. The health plan must cover medically necessacy services required to maintain the 
patient in a stable condition. 
!d. 
336. Id. 
337. Similar bills introduced in the 104th Congress were supported by Public Citizen, Citizen 
Action, the American Heart Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the International 
Association of Fire Fighters, the National Association of EMS Physicians, and' the Emergency 
Nurses Association. Clark, supra note 57, at 16. Kaiser Permanente, the nation's largest HMO, also 
has expressed its support for most provisions of the bill. Doug Levy, Taking guesswork out of ER 
coverage, USA Today, Aug. 19, 1996, at Dl. Most recently, the American Association of Health 
Plans (AAHP), which represents the majority of the nation's managed care health plans, although 
not announcing support of federal legislation on the issue, said that their member plans "should 
cover emergency-room screening and stabilization as needed for conditions that reasonably appear 
to constitute an emergency, based on the patient's presenting symptoms." AAHP, Press Release, 
Health Plans Announce Policies on Appeal Rights and Emergency Care Coverage, Jan. 30, 1997. 
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mandating that insurers incorporate them in the policies they offer. A 
justification for each of these elements and for mandating that all 
policies include them is provided below. 
a. Prohibition on Prior Approval 
Without prior screening, some individuals who do not need 
emergency care will go to the ED. But with a prior approval 
requirement, some individuals who truly need emergency care may not 
get to the ED. The issue is: On which side should we err? Managed care 
plan administrators argue that the prior approval system is necessary to 
avoid loss of control by and significant costs to the plan. As one plan 
executive stated: 
The purpose of the emergency room authorization process is to 
keep medical treatment of a patient under the medical supervision 
of their primary care physician. This physician knows the patient's 
medical history and is the best judge of care needed. In the case of 
a true emergency, the PCP can notify the emergency room of the 
patient's pending arrival and give direction for the specific needs 
of the patient. This saves the patient time waiting in the emergency 
room, saves them the discomfort and risk associated with 
unnecessary diagnostic tests, and provides continuity of care.338 
But at least some research has shown that preauthorization in the ED 
context does not necessarily alter patient behavior, may not cut costs in 
the long run, and may cause harm to patients.339 In addition, in the 
338. Letter from Elizabeth J. Misek, President, Prudential Health Care Plan, to The Honorable 
Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 21, 1995) (discussing "Access to 
Emergency Medical Services Act of 1995'') (on file with Washington Law Review). 
339. See, e.g., Anne M. Gadomski et a!., Diverting Managed Care Medicaid Patients From 
Pediatric Emergency Department Use, 95 Pediatrics 170, 177 (1995). This study, which evaluated 
the health outcomes of managed care Medicaid children with nonemergent conditions who were 
not authorized to be seen in the ED by their primary care provider, was motivated by reports from 
the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, where two adyerse outcomes in children denied ED visits 
(respiratozy arrest in a two-month old infant with a "cold," and febrile convulsion requiring 
intubation in another child) led to termination of gatekeeping and assumption of costs of 
unauthorized visits by the hospital. Id. at 170-71. The study, based on Mazyland Medicaid patients, 
did not find any adverse health outcomes because of delay in health care delivezy but concluded 
that although the practice of preapproval for emergency care can be safe in the short term, denial of 
an ED visit has no impact on subsequent ED utilization by Medicaid participants and may be 
associated with higher hospitalization rates. Id. at 170. Thus, "[g]atekeeping in this setting does not 
necessarily change the health care seeking behavior of these patients." Id.; see also Shaw et al., 
supra note 77, at 61 (concluding in study that "parents of indigent children who are denied ED care 
may not contact their primacy care physician or take their child to physician" even if ED classified 
child's case as ''urgent''). 
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current health care system, few patients actually have a physician who 
knows them at all, let alone one who is intimately familiar with their 
medical history . 
. Although preapproval has much merit for cost savings in the context 
of non-emergency car~for _ specialty care or expensive treatment of 
questionable valu~it is not appropriate in the emergency context, 
where there is not time for extensive analysis and r.crutiny of the 
patient's condition. Because emergencies cannot easily be determined 
without a professional medical examination,340 it is wholly inappropriate 
that the obstacle of prior authorization to an ED visit be allowed to 
stand. In these situations, it is appropriate to err on the side of the 
patient.341 Moreover, justice requires some modification to the 
preauthorization requirement because most plan members have no 
redress when plans deny authorization for emergency care and, as a 
result, members do not receive emergency treatment and suffer harm. 
Under ERISA, as discussed above, most plans are insulated from 
liability for a negligent determination and are not held responsible for 
the consequences of their actions. It is the patient who suffers. This 
outcome alone argues for elimination of a prior authorization 
requirement or, alternatively, that a plan be subject to liability if it 
chooses to maintain a prior authorization requirement and negligently 
denies preapproval. 
While this provision in federal legislation will help protect consumers 
who need emergency care, arguably it will limit a plan's ability to 
control unnecessary ED use. However, plans have other mechanisms to 
achieve this goal. In order to avoid unnecessary use of the emergency 
room by enrollees, plans will need to develop alternative strategies or 
may need to build these costs into the premium structure of the plan. 
Patients should be provided with educational materials or even courses 
to understand when ED use is appropriate.342 Managed care plans that 
want to cut unnecessary ED use must make alternative options available 
to individuals at times and places that are accessible to them. This may 
340. In some cases, it is difficult to detennine if a patient is experiencing an emergency, even 
with a professional medical exam. 
341. As Steinbrook argues, "some emergency department care for patient> who do not present 
true emergencies is unavoidable and must be provided unless we are to miss patients with real 
emergencies." Stein brook, supra note 126, at 658. 
342 Some studies have shown that inappropriate ED visits can be reducf:d in a population by 
means of a patient education program. See, e.g., J.R. Benz & J.C. Shank, Alteration of Emergency 
Room Usage in a Family Practice Residency Program, IS J. Fam. Prac. 1135 (1982). 
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mean opening twenty-four hour urgent care centers or contracting with 
EDs for care at a discounted rate.343 
Economic incentives, such as guaranteeing coverage if prior 
authorization is obtained or requiring copayments, may also alter front-
end use. A recent study of the effect of imposing a copayment on Kaiser 
Permanente enrollees for ED use found that the copayments 
significantly reduced utilization344 without affecting health outcomes for 
the population studied.345 
While cost-sharing for emergency services may be an option for 
privately-insured individuals, cost-sharing for Medicaid beneficiaries 
enrolled in HMOs is explicitly prohibited.346 This population thus 
presents special challenges. A number of studies have shown that it is 
the lack of a PCP that pushes many Medicaid patients to the ED for 
nonurgent care. Therefore, placing Medicaid beneficiaries in managed 
343. As regards use of EDs for pediatric visits, Gadomski et al., supra note 339, at 177, argue 
that practices other than gatekeeping may be necessaxy to divert nonemergent ED utilization 
toward use of a primacy health care provider (PHCP). /d. at 177. 
Factors such as convenience, accessibility of PHCP, parental employment, age of the child, 
perception of severity of illness, and waiting times to be seen may all influence a parent's 
choice for an ER as a source of care. Unless these factors are addressed by expanding hours of 
PHCP accessibility and improving waiting times and ~y addressing parental perception of 
disease severity, it is unlikely that onsite PED visit denial will decrease PED utilization for 
nonemergent conditions in the long term. 
/d. 
344. See Joe V. Selby et al., Effect of a Co payment on Use of the Emergency Department in 
Health Maintenance Organizations, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 635, 638 (1996). This study looked at 
over 30,000 subjects who were members of Kaiser Permanente in northern California. /d. at 635. 
The population was divided into an experimental and a control group. /d. The experimental group 
was assessed a copayment of $25 to $35 for their use of the ED. The researchers found that there 
was a significant decline in the number of ED visits in the copayment group. /d. at 638. 
345. /d. The authors tentatively concluded that "[a]lthough our ability to detect any adverse 
effects of the copayment was limited, there was no suggestion of excess adverse events in the 
copayment group, such as increases in mortality or in the number of potentially avoidable 
hospitalizations." /d. at 635. However, the authors also warned that their results "should not be 
generalized to apply to low-income groups or the elderly, particularly as regards the possibility that 
imposing a copayment could lead to adverse effects." /d. at 640; see also Steinbrook, supra note 
126. In reviewing the study by Selby and his co-authors., Steinbrook argued that although the 
authors did not detect any adverse outcomes from the copayment policy, the results of their study 
are troubling because there was a significant decline in emergency department visits among 
patients with diagnoses classified as "often an emergency" in the copayment group as compared 
with the control group. /d. at 657. Individuals in this group had diagnoses such as "head trauma, 
sickle cell crisis, complications of pregnancy, pelvic inflammatory disease, pancreatitis, asthma, 
transient ischemic attack, and chest pain." /d. According to Steinbrook, "By any standard, a 
substantial proportion of patients with these diagnoses should be evaluated in the emergency 
department." /d. 
346. See Social Security Act ofl935 § 1916(aX2XD), (bX2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1396o (1994). 
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care plans where they are assigned to a provider who will see them 
should make a difference. Beyond that, plans will have to devote 
additional resources to educating this group about appropriate ED use 
and to changing old patterns of use. 
b. A Prudent Layperson Standard 
What is fair in allocating the cost of ED care is in. part based on 
expectations of the parties and their understanding of what would be 
covered under the plan's policy. When a policy states that it covers 
emergency care and the patient (prior to a medical exam) believed that 
he or she was experiencing a medical emergency, but the plan upon 
retrospective review of medical records determines there was no 
emergency, the question becomes: Whose determination should govern? 
The prudent layperson standard offers a compromise between the 
subjective views of the parties. Though not without critics in the context 
of emergency care,347 the standard appears to be a "close relative" of the 
reasonable person standard and is consistent with long-standing 
principles of contract, insurance, and tort law. In the insurance law 
context, which has its roots in fundamental contract law, 
Courts are uniquely willing to construe the meaning of an 
insurance contract against an insurer, in spite of the evident 
meaning of the policy. Theories for denying insurers range from 
perceptions that the policy is unclear, ambiguous, or incomplete, to 
sympathetic reaction to the view that it is a contract of adhesion to 
be construed against its drafter. The doctrine of reasonable 
expectations of consumers, and the recognition of rights at 
variance with policy provisions figure prominently in so construing 
insurance contracts.348 
Courts and juries tend to view disputes over policy provisions as 
issues of faimess.349 Most courts give effect to the "objectively 
347. Although managed care plans are concerned that a prudent layperson standard will require 
them to pay for inappropriate ED use, some argue that it is not protective enough of managed care 
enrollees. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 57, at 18. At least one health care provider who is critical of 
the prudent layperson standard has remarked that the ability of any layperson to act rationally and 
make prudent decisions when they are in great pain and emotionally distraught or fearful may be 
unrealistic. !d. According to this critic, ''to expect a patient who hurts [to make rational decisions 
about emergency care is] unrealistic and punitive." Id. (quoting Casey Jason, Acucare President). 
348. 1 Bertram Harnett & Irving I. Lesnick, The Law of Life and Health Insurance§ 1.08, at 1-
90 (1991); see also Jerry, supra note 185, at 141-47. 
349. They tend to see cases in terms of "well capitalized insurers . . . seeking to escape the 
liabilities to ordinruy people and small business that the insurers had presumably undertaken by 
390 
HeinOnline -- 72 Wash. L. Rev. 391 1997
Emergency Care and Managed Care 
reasonable expectations" of the insured in order ''to render fair 
interpretations of insurance coverage."350 As stated by the New Jersey 
0 
Supreme Court: 
When members of the public purchase policies of insurance they 
are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill 
their reasonable expectations. They should not be subjected to 
technical encumbrances or hidden pitfalls and their policies should 
be construed liberally in their favor to the end that coverage is 
afforded ''to the full extent that any fair interpretation will 
allow."3si 
Under this doctrine, courts will construe policies "as any laymen 
would" seeking "an objective standard of a reasonable layman 
[whereby] insurers should not be able to escape coverage with 
qualifications and exceptions that are not consistent with reasonable 
expectations of a policyholder possessing ordinary familiarity with the 
coverage involved."352 
The application of a prudent layperson standard in the context of 
insurance coverage for emergency care is consistent with this reasoning. 
In disputes over coverage for emergency services where an insured's 
policy states that it will cover "emergency medical care," and a 
reasonable person would think what is occurring is an emergency, the 
insured will have reasonably expected that the emergency services 
would be covered. 
Both insurance and tort law not only generally favor an objective 
patient standard over a medically based standard353 but also favor it over 
a subjective patient standard. In tort law, what is considered negligence 
is based on whether the actions of the defendant are consistent with what 
a "reasonable and prudent" person would have done in the same or 
accepting premium money." 1 Harnett & Lesnick, supra note 348, § 1.08, at 1-91. Consequently, 
"[i]n modem light, technicality and small print generally do not go down easily in court, and 
insurnnce, with its heavy freight of dependency by the insureds, is particularly vulnerable. This 
point is essentially an ethical one." Id. 
350. But see Jeny, supra note 185, at 145. ("[A]lthough the doctrine ... speaks to the 
'objectively reasonable' expectations of the insured, the extent to which an insured actually, 
subjectively expects coverage is relevant.'') (emphasis added). 
351. Meier v. New Jersey Life Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 862, 869-70 (N.J. 1986) (quoting Kievit v. 
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961)). 
352 l Harnett & Lesnick, supra note348, § 1.08[3], at 1-100. 
353. In tort law, one exception to this general rule is the law on infonned consent. In 
detennining what is a "material" risk for purposes of disclosure, a slight majority of jurisdictions 
apply a physician-centered detennination, while a slight minority favor a reasonable person 
standard. See Furmw et al., supra note 36, at 268--69. 
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similar circumstances.354 The basis for the rule is multifaceted. In part, it 
is one of administrative ease-it is difficult to truly ascertain how a 
particular individual would act in a given situation. But the standard has 
also been defended as necessary to ensure at least some "fairness" in 
interactions between members of a community. Without some 
requirement that all members of a managed care plan meet some 
minimum standard of conduct, some members of the plan consistently 
will benefit at the expense of others.355 To adopt a subjective standard 
wherein ED visits would be covered as long as a particular patient, no 
matter his individual peculiarities, felt he had a medical condition that 
could not wait to be treated, would undermine any effort on the part of 
managed care plans to control ED use. 
Conceptually, the prudent layperson standard is useful to apply to the 
conflict over who pays for emergency care that is not truly an 
emergency. The actual wording of the proposed federal law and the state 
statutes that have adopted the standard, however, may cr•::late problems in 
its application. The language that has been incorporated in the majority 
of these statutes is that of "a prudent lay person, who possesses an 
average knowledge of health and medicine."356 HCFA has argued that 
this standard is more stringent than the standard HCF A applies in its 
manual instructions for Medicare managed care contractors.357 In 
comments on the proposed federal legislation, the agency stated: "We 
are concerned that the 'prudent layperson' standard as d·~fined in the bill 
could actually narrow the liability of managed care plans in dealing with 
people of less than 'average knowledge'-i.e. It appears to offer less 
protection for vulnerable patients than does current Medicare policy."358 
354. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law ofToru· § 32, at 174 (5th ed. 
1984). 
355. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 108 (1881). 
When men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities 
going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a man is born 
hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt 
his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no Jess 
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. 
I d. 
356. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. II§ 19-70l(d) (1996) (emphasis added); see also 
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-309(cXl) (Michie Supp. 1995); Ga Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-3, -20A-9 
(Supp. 1996); Va Code Ann. § 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996); New Y.:~rk Regulation of the 
Delivery of Managed Care Act, S. 7553, 219th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996). 
357. See supra Part IV.C. 
358. Letter from Joan Steiber, Health Care Financing Administration, Office of Legislative & 
Inter-Governmental Affairs to Bruce Lesley, Office of Senator Bob Graham (Oct. 19, 1995) (on file 
with Washington Law Review). 
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Moreover, in interpreting the "reasonable person" or the "reasonable 
expectations of the insured," courts, in the context of tort and insurance 
law, more often use the term "ordinary" person than "average" person,~59 
and the use of the term "average knowledge" may be more confusing 
than helpful. The potential problem lies in the fact that the term 
"average" has two definitions--one of a more empirical nature and one 
of a more general nature.360 Though the intent of the drafters may be to 
apply the ordinary person standard, the potential for the application of a 
more technical definition actually may raise the standard. If interpreted 
as a higher standard by the courts, the language may be particularly 
harmful to individuals from different cultural backgrounds who have 
very different ideas about the concepts of health and disease.361 In 
addition, the standard would seem to harm those who are not well 
educated and may be particularly harsh for Medicaid beneficiaries. 
c. A New Mandated Benefit 
As a public policy matter, the most likely criticism of the proposed 
federal legislation is that it mandates that insurers provide certain health 
benefits that they might not otherwise provide, such as visits to an ED 
that are not preauthorized or that, on retrospective review, turn out not to 
have been an emergency. While emergency care is a mandated benefit 
359. In the insurance law context, although judicial concepts of what constitutes a reasonable 
expeclation of coverage in the insurance contract are not "monolithic," there is a common factor 
running through the majority of the cases. See Jerry, supra note 185, at 143 (citing Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of 
the Insured, 61 Va. L. Rev. liS I, ll53 (1981)). According to Abraham: "[t]he. insured is an 
ordinazy, unsophisticated consumer, possessing an understanding of only the most rudimentazy 
aspects of the coverage. Thus, the reasonable expeclations doctrine is used by courts to protect 
consumers, not to adjust a commercial relationship between parties with roughly equal bargaining 
power." /d. In the context of tort law, the level of knowledge to attribute to the "reasonable person" 
has been "[o]ne of the most difficult questions in connection with negligence." Keeton eta!., supra 
note 354, § 32, at 182. According to Prosser and Keeton, a reasonable person must be held to a 
"minimum standard of knowledge, based upon what is common to the community." /d. at 184. But 
above this minimum, ''the individual will not be held to knowledge of risks which are not known or 
apparent to him." /d. 
360. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 123-24 (6th ed. 1990) ("In ordinazy usage the term 
signifies the mean between two or more quantities, measures, or numbers. If applied to something 
which is incapable of expression in terms of measure or amount, it signifies that the thing or person 
referred to is of the ordinazy or usual type.''). 
361. Davidson argues that "medical and insurance professionals define 'emergency' differently 
from the way laymen of different cultures and social groups define it [and that differences in] age, 
ethnic group, social class, and sex influence significantly what individuals perceive as an 
emergency." Davidson, supra note 43, at 276-77 (citing Clifford V. Colman & Howard Robboy, 
The Social Construction of a Medical Emergency, 1 Topics Emergency Med. 61, 66 (1980)). 
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under the Federal HMO Acf62 and many state HMO Acts, insurers 
would argue that the emergency benefit is limited to "medically 
necessary" emergency care. Thus, plans are at liberty to incorporate 
mechanisms in their policies to screen out care that is apparently not 
medically necessary either before the fact, through prior approval, or 
after the fact, through denial of coverage. 
If these restrictive practices were challenged in the courts, however, 
courts would likely require plans to cover such visits on the grounds that 
the plan's policy provisions were "vague" or "ambigum1s" and did not 
meet the "reasonable expectations" of the insured.363 H:>wever, current 
law does nothing to prevent insurers from modifying their insurance 
provisions to be very clear that they will only cover ED visits for which 
the patient receives prior approval or that are determined retrospectively, 
after review of clinical test results, to have constituted an emergency.364 
If such policies were significantly less expensive than others that did not 
require prior approval and that covered ED services based on a "prudent 
layperson" standard, economists would argue that it would be more 
efficient, from a market perspective, to let consumers choose which of 
these policies to purchase, based on willingness to pay. Thus, they 
would argue that rather than mandating the less reBtrictive policy, 
Congress should simply mandate that insurers offer both the less 
restrictive and the more restrictive policy-a "mandated offering'' 
approach. 
For a number of reasons, this argument is flawed. For example, the 
solution would not apply to Medicaid beneficiaries, who do not pay 
premiums, yet are the most likely group to use th•~ ED for non-
emergencies. Moreover, as regards the privately insured, the 
assumptions underlying the argument for a mandated offering-a 
significant cost differential between the plans, informed choice on the 
part of consumers, willingness to pay, and insignificant or negligible 
externalities-are unfounded. 
362 42 U.S.C. § 300e to 300e-l (1994). 
363. See Part V .B.l.b. 
364. Under such provisions, courts would be less likely to find for the insured. See Jerry, supra 
note 185, at 147. 
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1) Costs 
State mandated health insurance benefits365 have been criticized by 
insurers, HMOs, and health plan administrators as "adding unnecessary 
costs" to our health care system, increasing health insurance premiums, 
and potentially reducing the number of employers who offer and 
individuals who purchase health care insurance.366 However, tP.ere is 
limited data on the effect of mandated benefits on insurance premiums, 
and most research has not taken into account the possibility that some 
mandates may actually reduce health care costs.367 
As regards emergency care, this cost-saving potential may be 
relevant. If individuals are inappropriately denied prior approval for ED 
access because of an inaccurate assessment of their condition and, as a 
result, their condition is worsened, they may ultimately require more 
expensive and extensive medical treatment than they would have 
required if seen in the ED on initial manifestation of their symptoms. 368 
Second, the differential in price between the relevant policies is not 
that between emergency care and no emergency care or between 
unlimited emergency care and restricted emergency care. Rather, it is 
between (1) coverage of emergency care based on prior approval and a 
365. Such benefits vary from state to state but common examples include "covering newborns 
from the date of birth (49 states), mammography screening (46 states), alcoholism treatment (39 
states}, ••. services of optometrists (46 states}, ••• chiropractors (43 states) and psychologists (42 
states)." Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 25-26. Other less common mandated benefits include 
in vitro fertilization, scalp hair prosthesis for alopecia areata, and acupuncture. See id. at 34-36, tbl. 
4.1; see also Jeny, supra note 185, at 437. Most recently, the federal government has mandated 
that all health insurers cover up to at least 48 hours of inpatient hospital care after a mother has had 
an uncomplicated vaginal delivery or 96 hours following a Cesarean-section for both the mother 
and newborn and that plans that offer mental health benefits provide some elements of parity in the 
provision of those benefits and medical and surgical benefits. See supra notes 321-322. 
366. But see Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 30 (citing John R. Gabel & Gail A. Jensen, The 
Price of State-Mandated Benpfits, 26 Inquiry 419, 431 (1989)). 
The authors [of the study] ••• examined the effect of [mandated health benefits] on a small 
employer's likelihood of offering health insurance in each state. The authors found that several 
individual mandates, such as mental health, alcoholism, and drug abuse treatment were not 
statistically significantly associated with the probability that small employers would not 
insure. 
!d. 
367. Although mandated treatment for substance abuse and outpatient mental health care has 
been shown to increase premiums by 8.8% and 12.8 % respectively, home health care and nursing 
home care have been shown to lower them by between 3.2% and 3.6%. Id. 
368. At least one study of pediatric Medicaid patients concluded that denial of an ED visit may 
be associated with subsequent higher hospitalization rates. See Gadomski et al., supra note 339, at 
170. 
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retrospective assessment of whether the condition was truly an 
emergency and (2) coverage of care based on a "prudent layperson" 
standard. This cost differential will primarily be based on the costs of 
care for those who go to the ED with symptoms that a prudent layperson 
would regard as indicative of an emergency but that turn out not to be 
related to an emergency after appropriate screening and diagnostic tests. 
Examples of such cases would include patients who experience chest 
pains, excessive bleeding, a severe and sudden headache, or a painful 
arm after a serious fall. Based on this more limited distinction, the cost 
differential is unlikely to be significant, and the difference in premiums 
between these two types of policies may be negligible?69 
2) Consumer Choice and Willingness To Pay 
If, however, for purposes of discussion, premiums for the two types 
of policies were significantly different, economists would argue that a 
mandated benefit would force employers to offer only this more 
expensive plan to their employees and force employees and others who 
do not wish to pay the additional premium cost to do so. This argument 
assumes that consumers, in fact, are able to assess accurately the risks of 
needing the more expensive policy and that they will have sufficient 
information to make an informed choice as to how the need for ED care 
will be assessed by the plan. 
If the debate focused simply on plans that covered and did not cover 
any emergency care, arguably there would be no consumer demand for 
the latter.370 However, given the choice between a plan that covered 
emergency care only with prior authorization and retrospective 
assessment of emergency ("Type 1 ") and a plan that cov•::red emergency 
care under a prudent layperson standard ("Type 2"), some market 
segmentation might occur based on the price of the policies.371 Whether 
369. In any case, empirical data regarding this differential cost could advance the debate by 
clarifying the extent of the cost implications. For instance, a recent article found that the marginal 
cost of a nonurgent ER visit was only $24.40. See Williams, supra note 45, at 24. 
370. See Peter Passell, Editorial, Economic Scene: When Politicians Seek to Please on Medical 
Benefits, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1996, at D2 (arguing that certain mandated health benefits, such as 
recent requirement that plans cover at least 48 hours of inpatient hospital care after woman has had 
uncomplicated vaginal delivery, might be avoided if consumers make choices among health plans 
that do and don't offer such coverage but that other types of benefits, such as trauma care, do not 
merit even offering consumers choice because "[h]ardly anyone, presumably, would choose to opt 
out of the right to trauma care in the emergency room in order to save on insutance premiums"). 
371. It is questionable under a mandated offering approach, however, whether employers would 
offer the more restricted policy in light of experience with "bare bones" insurance policies 
authorized by about half the states in 1990 and 1991 for small firms. These p•llicies, which limited 
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the decision to choose one policy over another, however, would be truly 
informed and ''voluntary," that is, based on willingness to pay as 
opposed to ability to pay, is open to debate. As discussed above, 
individuals generally have a difficult time assessing the significance to 
be given small probabilities of potentially catastrophic outcomes372 (for 
example, being denied prior authorization for ED treatment when 
experiencing chest pains that tum out to be symptoms of a heart attack). 
Second, even with a requirement that policies disclose the fact that an 
individual's ED treatment will not be covered unless the individual 
receives prior authorization or the treatment is determined 
retrospectively to be for a true medical emergency, consumers will be 
unlikely to have sufficient information about how those mechanisms 
will be implemented to make an informed choice. The type of 
information that would be important would include: (1) the average 
waiting or response time from initial calls requesting approval for an ED 
visit to a decision on the part of the plan; (2) who is making the decision 
for the plan-a physician or someone without medical expertise; (3) the 
financial incentives, in terms of limiting ED visits, of the person making 
the decision; and ( 4) the number of individuals denied prior approval for 
emergency care and details about their experience-pain and suffering 
due to delay in receipt of care, how soon they were able to see a plan 
physician, their ultimate health outcome Oength of time ill, lost time at 
work, inability to function, or residual pain). This information would 
likely be significant to an individual's determination yet possibly would 
be more costly to provide than the unrestricted benefit. 
Finally, there is an argument that an individual's decision between the 
two policies may be made more on ability to pay than on willingness to 
pay. This argument will have more merit as the premium differential 
between the two plan types increases. If the broader coverage is 
mandated, however, the additional costs of the broader benefit will be 
spread among a larger population and the per-person cost will decline, 
making the coverage available to some who might otherwise not be able 
to afford it. 373 
services below what most considered standard coverage, were generally not attractive to employers 
or their workers. Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 30. 
372 See supra note 146 and accompanying text 
373. This across-the-board increase, however, also must be evaluated in terms of the number of 
individuals who might decide, as a result of the incremental increase in cost, not to buy insurance 
at all. 
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3) Externalities 
Finally, a modified market-based approach mandating that plans offer 
the two types of policies overlooks some significant cost8 to society that 
may result from those who purchase the Type 1 plan. The most 
significant cost is the loss of life or productive capacity for an individual 
who is inappropriately denied timely prior approval, who does not get to 
the ED as a result, and who suffers a catastrophic outcome-either death 
or significant injury. The cases of Lewis Hand and Jara.es Adams are 
illustrations of such outcomes.374 These outcomes not only will affect the 
families of these individuals but also will affect society. In many cases, 
the state will contribute to the support of these individuals throughout 
the remainder of their lives or to the support of their families, in cases 
where death results. 
This argument clearly has more strength when applied to the 
prohibition on prior approval, but also has some rel.evance to the 
requirement of a prudent layperson standard. The argument about 
externalities based on risks to life and health will apply to the prudent 
layperson standard to the extent that the more restrictive policy 
provision, that is, retrospective assessment of whether the condition was 
truly an emergency, "over-deters" individuals from obtaining necessary 
emergency care. There are no data on whether retrospective review has 
such an effect, although there is some anecdotal evidence from ED 
physicians that individuals who do not receive affirmative indication 
from their plan that a test or procedure will be covered (prior to receipt 
of the test or procedure) are reluctant to obtain the test or undergo the 
procedure. 
The requirement of a prudent layperson standard, however, also can 
be justified on the basis of other externalities resulting from a plan that 
denies coverage when a prudent layperson would have thought an 
emergency existed. In those cases, the ED likely will have to cover the 
costs associated with the patient's screening and treatm;lnt. This has a 
number of implications for health care costs and access to ED care. First, 
to the extent a hospital is able to cross-subsidize losses in the ED with 
higher prices to other "insured" patients, costs and ultimately premiums 
for this group will increase. Second, if these costs cannot be recovered 
through cross-subsidization, eventually the ED may have to close 
because of fmancial inability to sustain itself. These externalities 
potentially could be avoided by mandating that managed care plans 
374. See supra Parts IV.B.3, .Lb. 
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cover these services. Although infrequent, there are cases where 
governments mandate insurance coverage to reduce such externalities. 
Most recognized is the requirement that automobile owners purchase 
liability insurance to cover costs to person or property of others who 
may be harmed as a result of the owner's driving.375 
The public policy debate over mandated benefits generally boils down 
to a question of "[t]o what extent ... health benefits policy [should] 
protect a vulnerable minority or advance the larger community's interest 
in containing health care costs."376 That question, in tum, is influenced 
by "citizens' often imperfectly estimated perceptions of their personal 
risks of contracting certain conditions and by their belief in the 
community's responsibility to share in the misfortunes of its individual 
members."377 This trade-off was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,318 when it 
found that "sharing the risk of the need for mental health care to assure 
its affordability for those who might need it was the essence of the 
'business of insurance,' which ERISA permits states to regulate."379 
Given the life and death stakes that may be associated with policies 
requiring prior approval, the uncertainty associated with experiencing a 
true emergency, the difficulty for consumers to be informed about this 
issue, and the potential inability of some segments of the population to 
afford a policy with less restrictive benefits, there is a strong argument 
for mandating the less restrictive coverage and for spreading the costs 
associated with that coverage among the community of insureds. 
315. SeeJerry,supranote 185,at847. 
Currently, forty-two states and the District of Columbia require every person registering a 
motor vehicle in the state to present a certificate stating that he or she has liability insurance in 
at least a specified minimum amount. These statutes provide victims of automobile accidents 
with access to funds to cover their loss by requiring each vehicle owner in the state to have 
"security for any judgments that may be registered against the owner of the vehicle arising out 
of the vehicle's operation. 
!d. 
376. Butler&Polzer,supranote 195,at30. 
377. Id. 
378. 471 u.s. 724 (1985). 
379. See Butler & Polzer, supra note 195, at 32 n.60. 
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2. Strengths and Potential Weaknesses of the Federal Proposal 
a. Strengths-A Compromise Between Controlling Costs and 
Safeguarding Patients 
The primary strength of the proposed Federal Acces:; to Emergency 
Medical Services Act (FAEMSA) is the balance it achieves between 
controlling costs and safeguarding patients. In addition to the prudent 
layperson standard that ensures that only ED visits that are "reasonable" 
will be reimbursed, the law does not prevent plans from requiring prior 
approval for further care once a patient has been stabiliz,ed. This type of 
requirement on the part of plans is well-founded and will deter EDs from 
providing care that can be as effectively provided by a plan physician. 
Moreover, the proposed legislation permits plans to impose a copayment 
on ED visits as a way to control inappropriate ED us•e380 and, unlike 
some state laws, does not require plans to cover all costs associated with 
mandated screening under EMTALA.381 In addition, nothing in the 
legislation deters an ED physician from eliminating all possible risks of 
catastrophic outcome for patients that come to the ED. The legislation 
does not alter ED physician incentives to rule out even small 
probabilities of serious outcomes before transferring or discharging a 
patient. As such, it is a reasonable compromise in its effort to protect 
consumers yet allow plans to discourage inappropriate ED use. 
b. Potential Weaknesses-Enforcement Provisions 
The proposed federal law follows the complex structural contours of 
the recently enacted Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(IllP AA) and would be implemented through amendments to the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), ERISA, and the Public Health Service 
(PHS) Act. As a result, the enforcement mechanisms vary according to 
the enforcement provisions in each of these Acts for violations of 
HIP AA. The F AEMSA would require compliance by private health 
380. Although the bill places limits on a plan's ability to impose cost-sharing for services 
provided at an ED (that is, such cost-sharing may not be greater than that imposed for comparable 
services in other settings, often 20%), a health plan "may impose a reasonable copayment (as 
determined in accordance with standards established by the Secretary) ... to deter inappropriate 
use of services of hospital [EDs]." Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1995, H.R. 2011, 
104th Cong. § 3(bX1}-(2) (1995). 
381. These state provisions, by requiring plans to pay for all federally maJ19llted screening and 
treatment, arguably undermine the goals of the "prudent layperson" standard. 
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plans in both the group and individual market, by insurance issuers, and 
by plans serving the Medicare or Medicaid population. 
The provisions regarding group health plans are enforced under both 
the IRC and ERISA. Under the IRC, a group health plan is defined as: 
[A] plan (including a self-insured plan) of, or contributed to by, an 
employer (including a self-employed person) or employee 
organization to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the 
employees, former employees, the employer, others associated or 
formerly associated with the employer in a business relationship, 
or their families. 382 
Failure of a group health plan to comply with the provisions of 
F AEMSA would be governed by the relevant enforcement provisions of 
the IRC. These provide that a tax of up to one hundred dollars for each 
day of noncompliance with respect to each individual may be imposed 
on the employer sponsoring the plan383 or on the plan in the case of a 
multiemployer plan. 384 There are exceptions to the application of the tax. 
In general, no tax or a limited tax will be imposed if the violation was 
unintentional385 or corrected within thirty days.386 Moreover, no tax may 
be imposed "on a small employer (defined as an employer who 
employed an average of 50 or fewer employees on business days during 
the preceding calendar year) that provides health care benefits through a 
contract with an insurer or HMO and the violation is solely because of 
the coverage offered by the insurer or HM0."387 
In amending ERISA, the Act would adopt that law's existing 
enforcement mechanisms, as modified by IllP AA. Under ERISA, the 
382 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000{bXl) (West Supp. 1997). 
383. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(eXl) (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 
316 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990,2129. 
384. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(b) (West Supp. 1997). 
385. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(cXl) (West Supp. 1997). 
386. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(cX2) (West Supp. 1997). 
The maximum tax for unintentional violations that can be imposed generally is the lesser of (1) 
10 percent of the employer's payments during the taxable year in which the failure occurred 
under group health plans (or 10 percent of the amount paid by the multiemployer plan or 
multiple employer welfare arrangement during the plan year in which the failure occurred for 
medical care, if applicable), or (2) $500,000. The Secretaiy may waive all or part of the tax to 
the extent that payment of the tax would be excessive relative to the failure involved. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 316-17 (referring to 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(cX3), (4) (West Supp. 
1997)), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2129-30. 
387. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 316 (referring to 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D(d) (West Supp. 
1997)), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2129. 
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enforcement mechanisms are somewhat different depending on whether 
the party is a "group health plan"388 or is a health insurance issuer.389 
Relevant provisions with respect to group health plans allow for civil 
actions by beneficiaries "to recover benefits due ... under the terms of 
[the]plan,"390 and to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan, or to 
clarify rights to future benefits.391 In addition, a beiJ.eficiary or the 
Secretary of Labor may sue a plan (1) to enjoin any act or practice that 
violates any provision of the law regarding protection of employee 
benefits or violates the terms of the plan, or (2) to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or to enforce any 
provisions of the law regarding protection of employee benefits or 
violations of the terms of the plan.l92 Regarding the provisions of the law 
applicable to health insurance issuers, enforcement provisions are 
limited to ERISA's private rights of action for beneficiaries.393 Civil 
monetary penalties also may be levied against either state or local health 
plans or insurance issuers, but not under ERISA. They are based on such 
remedies established under HIP AA amendments to the PHS Act. 394 
Under the PHS Act, each state may require that health insurance 
issuers (but not health plans) meet the Act's requirements.395 States have 
significant discretion in how they enforce the law.396 In the case of a 
determination by the Secretary of HHS that a state has failed to enforce 
substmitially a provision of the Act, the Secretary would enforce the 
provision or provisions. 397 
388. Group health plan is defined in ERISA as "an employee welfare benefit plan to the extent 
that the plan provides medical care ... to employees or their dependents ... directly or through 
insurance, reimbursement, or otherwise." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191b(aX1) (West Supp. 1997). 
389. A health insurance issuer is defined as "an insurance company, insurance service, or 
insurance organization (including a health maintenance organization . . • which is licensed to 
engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to State law which regulates 
insurance .•.. Such term does not include a group health plan." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191b(bX2) (West 
Supp. 1997). 
390. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX1)(B) (1994). 
391. § 1132(aX1)(B). 
392 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX3), (5) (1994). Civil monetary penalties are limited to violations of the 
information and reporting requirements of the law, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1994}, and violations by 
fiduciaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i), (I), (m) (1994). 
393. 29 U.S.C.A. § I 132(bX3) (West Supp. 1997). 
394. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22 (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 192, 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 2005. 
395. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(aX1). 
396. The Act provides no guidelines for states in enforcing the provisions o:? the law. 
397. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(aX2) (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 
193 ("Secretarial enforcement would apply only in the absence of state enforcement and with 
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The PHS Act amendments provide that in the case where a health 
insurance issuer fails to comply with the Act's provisions, a civil 
monetary penalty is to be levied directly on the issuer.398 Where a 
nonfederal governmental health plan fails to comply with the Act's 
requirements, the plan is liable if it is sponsored by two or more 
employers (that is, governmental entities); otherwise, the employer is 
liable.399 The maximum penalty which could be levied is "$100 for each 
day for each individual with respect to which such a failure occurs. "400 
In determining the penalty amount, the Secretary of HHS would 
have to take into account the previous record of compliance and 
the gravity of the violation. No penalty could be assessed if the 
failure was not intentional or if the failure was corrected within 30 
days. A procedure would be available for administrative and 
judicial review of a penalty assessment. Collected penalties would 
be paid to the Secretary of HHS and would be available for the 
purpose of enforcing the provisions with respect to which the 
penalty was imposed.401 
The enforcement provisions also require that the Secretaries of 
Treasury, Labor, and HHS "ensure, through execution of an interagency 
memorandum of understanding, that regulations, rulings, and 
interpretations are administered so as to have the same effect at all 
times.'>402 In addition, "[i]t requires the Secretaries to coordinate 
enforcement policies for the same requirements to avoid duplication of 
enforcement efforts and assign priorities in enforcement.'>403 
F AEMSA also would require compliance by insurers offering policies 
in the individual market. These provisions would be enforced in a 
manner similar to the enforcement provisions for the large group 
market.404 Each state could require such issuers to meet the FAEMSA's 
respect to group health plans that are nonfedeml governmental plans."), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2006. 
398. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XBXi) (West Supp. 1997). 
399. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XBXii) (West Supp. 1997); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
736, at 194, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2007. 
400. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XCXi) (West Supp. 1997). 
401. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 194, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2007; see also 42 
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22(bX2XC), (D), (E), (G) (West Supp. 1997). 
402 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 194, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2007. 
403. !d. 
404. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-61 (West Supp. 1997). 
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requirements. If a state failed to enforce the provisions of the law, the 
Secretary ofHHS would be responsible for their enforcement.405 
Finally, the Access to Emergency Medical Services Act amends the 
Medicare and Medicaid laws to require that all plans enrolling Medicare 
beneficiaries or Medicaid recipients comply with the Act.406 For 
Medicare plans that fail to comply with the provisions of the Act, the 
Secretary of HHS may terminate the plan's Medicare contract407 or may 
impose one of a number of intermediate sanctions such as civil monetary 
penalties, suspension of enrollment of individuals, or suspension of 
payment to the organization.408 These actions only may be taken, 
however, where the Secretary determines that a plan has ''substantially" 
failed to carry out the contract or "substantially" fails to carry out certain 
"applicable conditions.',4Q9 
Regarding enforcement of the provisions of F AEMSA applicable to 
Medicaid plans, a state Medicaid plan will not be approved by the 
Secretary of llliS unless the "plan requires each health insurance issuer 
or other entity with a contract with such plan to provide coverage or 
benefits to individuals eligible for medical assistance under the plan to 
comply with [the provisions of the Act.]',.;10 
Whether or not the law is followed will depend primarily on two 
factors: (1) the effectiveness of the substantive enforcem•:mt provisions; 
and (2) the ability of each of the responsible agencies to enforce their 
respective portions of the law. As regards the first factor, the substantive 
provisions themselves leave some doubt as to the likely effectiveness of 
the law. Although states have significant discretion in how they will 
enforce the law and are free to set higher civil monetary penalties than 
are available to the Secretary ofllliS, there is no indication, as yet, as to 
how well states will implement the relevant provisions of the law or 
what type of substantive enforcement mechanisms they will impose. In 
addition, where states fail to enforce the law against health insurance 
issuers and when enforcement action is necessary against health plans, 
the penalties that may be imposed by DllliS are relatively minor, that is, 
either a one hundred dollar tax or civil monetary penalty for each day of 
violation per individual. For plans or issuers that vic.Jate the prior 
405. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-61. 
406. H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997). 
407. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(iX1) (West Supp. 1997). 
408. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(iX6XB), (C) (West Supp. 1997). 
409. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(iXI). 
410. H.R. 815, 105th Cong. § 6. 
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approval provisions or prudent layperson standard, it is unclear how the 
violations would be counted. A plan that had a written policy requiring 
prior approval for emergency care conceivably could be fined for each 
day the policy is in place after the effective date of the law multiplied by 
the number of individuals enrolled in the plan. A cap of $500,000 would 
apply for group plans, but no such cap would apply to health insurers. 
However, if a plan did not have a written policy of prior authorization 
but instead plan personnel occasionally told enrollees over the phone 
that they should not go to the ED because the plan would not cover it, 
the infraction probably would be considered only a one-time violation 
(each time the plan personnel told this to an individual) and thus only 
subject to a fine of up to one hundred dollars. This hardly seems likely 
to be effective at changing plan behavior, given that the cost of 
emergency care avoided is likely to be less than the penalty involved. 
As regards violation of the prudent layperson standard, which would 
arise upon plan review of a claim for payment, this probably also would 
be considered a one-time (day) violation for each time a plan made a 
decision that clearly was based on a retrospective review of clinical 
records rather than a prospective review of patient symptoms. As a 
result, the plan would only be subject to a one hundred dollar penalty. 
Again, this seems insufficient to motivate plans to change their behavior. 
The private right of action provisions may also lack the teeth 
necessary to ensure compliance with the law. They are limited to the 
private right of action provisions currently in ERISA and, as discussed 
supra, 411 are quite limited and inadequate for individuals who have 
suffered injury. This is most likely to occur where a plan requires prior 
approval for emergency care and as a result an individual either does not 
receive necessary emergency treatment or receives it ''too late." 
Moreover, even in those cases where the harm is solely economic, that 
is, payment of a large ED bill, individuals may have difficulty asserting 
a private right of action. Although the bill may be large to an individual, 
it often is insufficient in terms of attorney time and payment to warrant 
an attorney's interest or willingness to take the case. 
The provisions for Medicare and Medicaid plans may be more 
effective in terms of achieving compliance although this is not wholly 
clear. Although Medicare administrators have some effective 
intermediate sanctions that can be imposed for failure to comply with 
the provisions of the proposed law, the violations must meet a 
"substantiality" test. Whether an occasional requirement of prior 
411. See supra Part IV.B.l.a. 
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approval for emergency services or denial of coverage based on a 
clinical retrospective review would meet the test is unclear. For 
Medicaid to take action, a similar substantiality test is not imposed and 
HCFA's ability to dictate the terms of plan participation should ensure 
that plans, at a minimum, do not have written policies at odds with the 
Act's requirements. 
The second part of the enforcement equation is whethc::r the agencies 
responsible for implementing the provisions of the law will be effective 
at doing so. This will depend in large part on staffing and resources 
devoted to the effort as well as adequate coordination among the 
agencies. 
Those individuals who are responsible for implementing HIP AA will 
likely also be responsible for implementing the provisions ofF AEMSA. 
HIP AA itself has yet to be enforced and enforcement action is not likely 
to begin until January 1, 1998. Thus, it is too early to tell how effective 
these agencies will be at implementing the provisions of that law. 
However, some judgments can be made about the likely e:ffectiveness of 
the agencies in implementing the law. One noteworthy factor is that 
Congress did not appropriate funds or personnel (FTEs) to implement 
HIP AA. As a result, unless future appropriations are made for 
implementation of HIP AA or as a result of the passage ofF AEMSA, the 
agencies will be limited in their ability to enforce the provisions of the 
laws. In addition, the responsible agencies have limited experience in 
implementing similar laws from which to extrapolate~ their likely 
effectiveness in enforcing the provisions of a new law.412 
As a result, there is considerable uncertainty as to how effective the 
enforcement provisions of the proposed Access to Emergency Medical 
Services Act law will be and without significant attention to their 
implementation, they could prove a potential obstacle to its overall 
success. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although it is appropriate and understandable that managed care 
plans seek to control unnecessary health care costs, a check is needed on 
some of their overly broad efforts to limit health care spending, 
412 Analogous efforts might be those by the IRS to ensure insurer compliance with the health 
care insurance continuation rules (the COBRA requirements) and by the Department of Labor to 
enforce the provisions of ERISA as they apply to employee health plans. Yet there is little, if any, 
published data on how well these agencies have enforced these provisions. 
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especially when a potential emergency is involved. The current practice 
of managed care plans to deny or discourage access to emergency care 
for plan members is placing in jeopardy members who truly need 
emergency care. Moreover, plan practices that retroactively deny 
coverage for emergency care are unfair when the plan members had 
good reason to believe that they were experiencing emergencies. In these 
situations it is often the ED providers who are left covering the cost of 
the care they provide. This puts the burden of "gatekeeper" on the 
emergency medical personnel-an unfair and impossible task when they 
are required under federal law to screen all individuals who come to the 
hospital seeking emergency care. Furthermore, it shifts the insurance 
"risk" to the provider when it is the managed care plan that has agreed to 
accept the financial risk associated with providing health care for their 
subscribers. 
Current law and policies to address these ''unfair'' practices on the 
part of managed care plans are limited in their effectiveness in large part 
by ERISA, which in many cases prevents suits against plans for 
negligent denial of prior authorization for emergency care and preempts 
state statutory efforts to address the problem. As a result, a federal 
solution to the problem is necessary. Essential elements of a federal 
solution must include a prohibition on prior authorization requirements 
for emergency care and a requirement that plans cover ED care obtained 
in circumstances that a ''prudent lay person" would consider to be an 
emergency. These provisions will insure some balance among the 
concerns of (1) managed care plans in reducing utilization of 
unnecessary or inefficient use of health care resources, (2) plan members 
in receiving emergency treatment and not being left with a large bill 
when emergency care appears warranted, and (3) emergency care 
providers in being adequately compensated for patients that they treat. 
Without such efforts to regulate plan decisions and protect subscribers, 
individuals who join managed care plans unknowingly face risks to their 
health, their lives, and their pocketbooks. 
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